


Comparative Public Administration

Second edition

Edited by **J. A. Chandler**



- Elcock, H. (1995) 'Leading people: Some Issues of local government leadership in Britain and America', *Local Government Studies*, 21 (4): 546-67.
- Elcock, H. (1998) 'German lessons in local government: The opportunities and pitfalls of managing change', *Local Government Studies*, 24 (1): 41-59.
- Fenwick, J.H., Elcock, E. and McMillan, J. (2009) 'Local governance and the problem of English governance', *Local Government Studies*, 35 (1): 5-20.
- Lynn, L.E. (2008) 'The study of public management in the United States. Management in the New World and a reflection on Europe', in W. Kickert (ed.), *The Study of Public Management in Europe and the US*, London: Routledge, pp. 233-62.
- Neustadt, R. (1960) *Presidential Power*, New York: Wiley.
- O'Neill, T. (1994) *All Politics is Local*, New York: Times Books.
- Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1993) *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*, New York: Penguin Books USA.
- Peters, B.G. (1997) 'Regional economic development and political mechanisms: Western Pennsylvania in comparative perspective', in M. Keating and J. Loughlin (eds), *The Political Economy of Regions*, London: Frank Cass, pp. 262-74.
- Peters, B.G. (2002) 'The Federal bureaucracy', in G. Peele, C.J. Bailey, B. Cain and B.G. Peters, *Developments in American Politics 4*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 133-46.
- Peters, T. and Waterman, R. (1987) *In Search of Excellence*, New York: Harper Row.
- Potter, A.M. (1955) *American Government and Politics*, London: Faber & Faber.
- Royko, M. (1971) *Boss: Mayor Richard J Daley of Chicago*, Boulder, Col: Paladin Books.
- Schubert, G.A. (1963) *Judicial Decision Making*, New York: Free Press.
- Sorensen, T.C. (1963) *Kennedy*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Storry, R. (1963) *A History of Modern Japan*, London: Penguin Books.
- Svara, J. (1990) *Official Leadership in the City*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Thomas, R. (1987) 'The experience of other countries', in R.A. Chapman and M. Hunt (eds), *Open Government*, London: Croom Helm, pp. 135-72.
- Woodward, R. and Bernstein, C. (1974) *All the President's Men*, London: Quartet Books.
- Woodward, E. and Bernstein, C. (1976) *The Final Days*, London: Coronet Books.
- Zimmerman, J. (1992) *Contemporary American Federalism*, Leicester: University of Leicester Press.

Russia

Marina Nistotskaya

Political culture

Modern Russia emerged as an independent state in 1991 from the remains of the USSR – once one of the most powerful states in the world, but whose capacity – ability to make and implement policies – was severely undermined in the course of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the late 1980s. The dismantlement of the Communist Party's monopoly on power was followed by the proliferation of institutions with competing claims to authority. At the central level the USSR Congress of People's Deputies challenged the powers of the president; and at the subnational level, the leaders of the constituent members of the USSR, strengthened by their electoral mandates, called for the independence of the republics. The uncertainty about the future of the USSR led to colossal defection and asset-stripping by the party and state officials (Gregory 1990; Solnik 1998), which incapacitated the Soviet state even further.

New Russia experienced considerable difficulties in state building. Institutionally, fractures within the Russian state unfolded along both the vertical and horizontal axes. The early 1990s were marked by a showdown between the national legislature and the president. Not only did each of them claim to be the supreme governing body, but they were ideologically diametrically opposed. This hampered the ability of the state to formulate cohesive policies and to pass co-ordinated legislation. In the early 1990s much policy was carried out in the form of presidential decrees and government regulations. The dissolution of the national legislature and the adoption of the constitution in 1993, which considerably empowered the president, resolved the acute legislative-executive stalemate. However, significant ideological heterogeneity between the branches of authority continued to persist throughout the 1990s, providing for a low degree of co-operation between them and therefore impeding coherent law-making. In addition, as with the republican leaders of the USSR, the regional elites of new Russia sought greater political and fiscal autonomy and even independence, while the federal center tried to keep the federation intact through the policies of 'executive bilateralism' (Tafel 2010) and 'selective fiscal appeasement' (Treisman 1999).

Consequently a system emerged in which diverse constituent units enjoyed different rights and obligations and were governed by the centre in an ad hoc and opaque manner. Furthermore, relying on political influence rather than on competitiveness for their success, much of post-Soviet big business developed a cosy relationship with the state (Guriey and Rachinsky 2005; Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2005) thereby undermining its autonomy. The early 1990s also witnessed a large-scale exodus of state officials to the private sector (Huskey and Obolonsky 2003). While the success of sweeping economic reforms critically depended on the ability of the state apparatus to implement them, by 2000 Russia's public bureaucracy remained largely unreformed, and also was older and less educated than its Soviet counterpart (Brym and Gimpelson 2004). Overall, through the 1990s the ability of the Russian state to structure a coherent policy-making process and the ability to implement policy decisions remained low.

Vladimir Putin made 're-building the state' a cornerstone of his presidential agenda in the 2000s. The political component of Putin's '*solidization* project' was concerned with the autonomy of the state in general and the president/federal government policy-making center in particular (Hashim 2005; Remington 2003, 2006; Sakwa 2008). The major initiatives in this sphere are:

- the indictment of several politically active business tycoons;
- weakening of the regional executives' sway over key policy-making centers through the reform of the upper house of parliament and suspension of gubernatorial elections;
- weakening the autonomy and the role of the parliament via the institutionalization of the 'party of power' – an electoral vehicle that brings 'to the national legislature politicians who are loyal to the federal executive' (Golosov 2004: 29).

The improvement of the administrative or implementation capacity of the state was another component of state-building. Public administration reform has been processed through three interconnected strands – civil service, budget and administrative reform. These developments have taken place against the background of the vastly improved macroeconomic situation and the waning of the political polarization in society that characterized the early transition period.

The constitutional framework

According to the constitution of 1993 Russia is a democratic federal state. Therefore *de jure* the country's system of government reflects both the democratic principles of the separation of powers into executive, legislative and judicial branches, and the federative principle of a shared sovereignty between the federal authorities and the authorities of the constituent members

(regions).¹ *De facto*, however, a clear separation of powers has never been achieved in post-Soviet Russia, and the intergovernmental relationships have evolved from the 1990's system of 'asymmetric federalism' with a weak central government and a considerable difference among regions in their rights and obligations, to the contemporary arrangement known as 'the power vertical', reflecting the supremacy of the federal authority in general and the institute of president in particular.

The Russian president, who since 2012 is elected by an absolute majority in a two-round national election for a term of six years, is the head of state. Within the constitution, this is distinct from all branches of power. At the same time, the president possesses considerable powers that belong to both legislative and non-legislative domains (see list below). This range of powers makes the Russian presidency 'more dominant than the French, and about as powerful as the American, but well short of the Mexican and several other Latin American presidencies' (White and Mcallister 2008, 605). The selected powers of the Russian president are:

- issue decrees with the force of law, draft federal laws, veto legislation passed by the parliament, and suspend acts passed by the regional executives;
- nominate and/or appoint and dismiss key officials from the prime-minister, federal ministers, key judges and supreme military personnel;
- directly oversee the ministries of the federal government with coercive powers: Defense, Interior, Security, Justice and Emergency;
- chair the meetings of the federal government;
- dissolve the State Duma (in certain circumstances) and dismiss the federal government as a whole without reference to the parliament;
- settle disputes between the federal and regional governments and between the regions;
- announce referenda and introduce a state of emergency;
- shape the directions of the domestic and foreign policies.

The system of institutional checks and balances is weighted heavily in the president's favour. He may veto legislation and dissolve the obstructionist assembly, but there is no practical way for the legislature to block or overrule the president's decrees. In his analysis of the Russian presidency in the 1990s, Stephen White concludes that 'In terms of the constitutional powers of president, prime minister, and parliament, the president was clearly the dominant figure' (1999, 222). During Putin's first two presidential terms this feature of Russia's constitutional framework has been further reinforced.

Since at least the parliamentary elections of 2003 the State Duma, the lower 450-member chamber of the Russian parliament, has been controlled by the pro-Kremlin majority party. This has been done through a series of changes in electoral law (Golosov 2011), and has ensured that not only the president's legislative initiatives and personnel decisions that require the approval of the parliament are passed smoothly but, more importantly, that the policy agenda

of the president and government dominates the floor (Remington 2006, 2008). The most recent elections to the State Duma took place on December 4, 2011. Under party-list proportional representation system the pro-government party *United Russia* received 49 per cent of the vote, which translates to 53 per cent of the Duma's seats.

Most commentators agree that up until the year 2000 the Federation Council, the upper 178-member chamber, populated by the incumbent governors and the heads of regional legislatures, served as a constitutional venue for center-regions' bargaining, and was capable of defending the interests of Russia's regions, or at least their elites, by delaying or blocking legislation (Remington 2003; Tafel 2010, 267–270). However, since 2000 under the initiative of the president the composition of the Russian senate has been altered several times and its political clout has been diminished to the 'rubber stamp' of the Kremlin. Thus, in the spring of 2011 the Federation Council approved 264 laws and rejected one, in the autumn session of 2011 it approved 153 and rejected 2, and in the spring of 2012 it approved 101 drafts, rejecting none (Vedomosti 2012a). Soon after commencing his third term as president, Vladimir Putin initiated a new law altering the rules for the formation of the upper chamber once again. Under the new rules regional parliaments choose one of the senators from their own members through a vote. The procedure for the second representative is linked to the elections for governors, which were re-instituted in May 2012. Each gubernatorial candidate nominates three candidates for the Federation Council post, and the winner of the gubernatorial race appoints one of them at their own will. The law also sets forth a new residential qualification for senators. They must have lived in the region for at least the past five years before the nomination. At the same time the age qualification was relaxed from 30 to 21 years. In contrast to the previously existing rules, neither governor nor regional parliament can recall the region's representatives in the Federation Council.

While formally the president is not the head of the executive, the post-holder wields many executive powers, including some that are not clearly specified in the constitution but conferred by office. The president nominates the top state officials, including the prime minister, who must be approved by the State Duma. In turn ministers are formally nominated by the prime minister, but the power of appointment lies firmly in the hands of the president. Russian presidents have been more likely to draw ministers from their personal networks than from the national parliament or regional leaders. Furthermore the president directly oversees ministries and agencies with coercive powers such as Defence, Interior, Security, Justice and Emergency, and steers foreign policy (see the list of selected presidential powers above). The work of the president is supported by his executive office, one of the largest administrative bodies of the central state. It drafts federal laws and presidential decrees, oversees the implementation of presidential decisions and co-ordinates the work of the governments of all levels.

It should be noted that the real distribution of power in Russia goes beyond the constitutional prescriptions and 'a great deal depends on the individual office-holders' (White and McAllister 2008, 606). Thus, although formally the current system is heavily 'stacked' in favour of the president, scholars of Russia agree that in his spell as prime minister between 2008 and 2012 Vladimir Putin had more influence over events than the actual president (Colton 2012; Ortung 2013). The recent return of the most influential figure of Russian politics to the most influential office of the Russian state leaves no doubt that in the next six to 12 years the locus of power and the decision-making center in Russia will be located in the Kremlin.

The civil service

The early 1990s were the heyday of neo-liberalism, and post-communist reformers focused on privatization and price liberalization with the civil service featuring low on their reform agendas. Yet when Russia's Civil Service Act was passed in 1995, this was one of the first among the post-communist countries. The 1995 law introduced the rules and procedures for hiring, firing and promoting career bureaucrats and this had the potential to create a competent and impartial bureaucracy. However, it was never fully implemented (Huskey 2004; Huskey and Obolonsky 2003; Nisitskaya 2009) and was subsequently replaced with a new law.

A new civil service act, 79-FZ, effective from 2005, preserved large parts of the existing system, namely the key personnel policy provisions. 79-FZ provides a clear definition of the scope of the civil service vis-à-vis political posts and other forms of public sector employment. The term 'civil service' refers to professional activity pertaining to the fulfilment of the powers of the state, i.e. the execution of decisions made by elected officials and state organs. Civil service can be in the federal or regional levels (see Table 8.1). The former, which is sub-divided into the federal bureaucracy in Moscow and the federal bureaucracy in the regions, considerably outnumber the regional bureaucracy (see Table 8.2). As local self-government is formally separated from the state, municipal officials do not form part of the civil service. Similarly individuals working in other sectors of public employment, such as teachers, doctors and about 4 million employees of the semi-autonomous organizations operating under the auspices of the central and regional governments (Vedomosti 2012b) are not part of the civil service.

The legislation also distinguishes between the senior civil service, known as managers, or advisors to managers and the rest of the public bureaucracy, labelled as specialists (see Table 8.1). According to the law, personnel decisions with regard to the former two categories are a matter of political judgment. That is, while officials such as ministers and governors can hire and fire managers at will, managers have a free hand in personnel decisions relating to the posts of advisors. At the same time, the law authorized vacancy contests as the main procedure for hiring specialists. Such elements of the hiring

Table 8.1 Structure of Russia's Civil Service

<i>Classification grounds</i>	<i>Main groups of state service posts</i>
Branches of authority	Legislative Executive Judicial
Levels of authority	Federal in Moscow Federal in regions Regional
Categories of posts	<i>Managers:</i> deputy heads of the state organs, heads of the structural units of the state organs <i>Advisors:</i> organizational, information and analytical support to managers <i>Specialists:</i> including support-specialists
Grades/ranks of specialists, including support-specialists	Level 8 = most senior level Level 1 = most junior (entry) level

Table 8.2 Russia's Civil Service and municipal service (executive branch): 2001, 2011 (in thousands)

	<i>Federal civil service in Moscow</i>	<i>Federal civil service in regions</i>	<i>Regional civil service</i>	<i>Municipal service</i>
2001	26	287.1	130.2	280.3
2011	29.9	454.6	182.6	358.3

Source: Rosstat 2009a

procedure as the compulsory advertisement of job vacancies in the mass media and the presence of independent experts in the commissions adjudicating the competition were sought to enable the emergence of a competent bureaucracy, free from undue political influence, cronyism and nepotism.

Promotion-wise, Russia adopted a position-based system, in which senior bureaucratic posts are open to both internal and external job seekers, and advancement in ranks is carried out through competitive contests. In reality, however, insiders are hugely favoured. Act 79-FZ also provides for a rather limited use of such personnel policy tools as demotions and discretionary dismissal of specialists. Overall, while Russia's Senior Civil Service is highly politicized by design and in practice, the lower ranks, which account for the overwhelming majority of the civil servants in the executive branch (see Table 8.3), are modelled more on a Weberian/Progressivist bureaucracy.

Unlike some post-communist countries such as Poland or Hungary who experienced reform backlash after gaining accession to the EU (Meyer-Sahling 2011), Russia has maintained its effort to reform public bureaucracy without

Table 8.3 Civil service personnel (executive branch) by levels of authority and categories of posts, 2009 (in per cent)

	<i>Managers</i>	<i>Advisors</i>	<i>Specialists</i>	<i>Support-specialists</i>
Federal in Moscow	10	1.1	74.4	14.2
Federal in regions	17.4	0.2	58.8	23.6
Regional	22	1.6	60.3	16.1

Source: Data on local self-governments as of January 1, 2011 (Rosstat, 2011a); on the number of Ministries, Agencies and Services as of June 1, 2012 (Government of the Russian Federation 2012c)

facing strong external pressure. However, the road to the full implementation of 79-FZ and related legislation (including that on standards of conduct and conflict of interests, and standard operating procedures that regulate bureaucratic behavior) has remained bumpy. For instance, although public notice of job vacancies in the state organs has become a permanent feature of the labour market, a considerable proportion of vacancies still remain unadvertized. According to the federal government, in 2011 about 40 per cent of all appointments in the regional civil service circumvented this provision and were made through the so-called 'cadres reserves', pools of pre-qualified candidates (Federal Portal of Managerial Cadres 2012). Other impediments include, but are not limited to, the absence of an independent merit-protection agency, coherent competence standards for bureaucratic positions, and a non-judicial system of appeal for unsuccessful job candidates and aggrieved civil servants, as well as the problems of the objectivity of the examination system and the selection commissions.

Although 79-FZ provided for salaries tied to the seniority of the position and service length as the main form of remuneration for bureaucrats, civil service reform was also concerned with strengthening performance incentives for individual officials. This element of the reform is part of an ongoing move to a performance-based management style within the public administration, which has been followed not only through civil service, but also administrative and budget reforms. It was expected that individual civil servants would be assigned performance targets that would influence their regular appraisal and the overall level of pay. While such indicators are being developed, the law provided for an interim measure in the form of monetary rewards for good performance distributed at managerial discretion. Consequently, the pay formulae are 'extremely complex and thus opaque' (Tompson 2007 19). Although some progress has been made since, especially in the central government (Gorodetski 2012; Verheijen and Dobrolubova 2007), today a fully functioning pay-for-performance system based on the formally assessed effectiveness of individual civil servants seems as far away as it was at the end of the 2000s.

In the executive branch of the civil service 85 per cent of personnel at all levels of government have university degrees (Rosstat 2009c, 2009d); however,

only about 5 per cent hold a specialized degree in public administration (Vedomosti 2012c). Degrees in public administration are offered by institutions of higher education throughout the country, including specialized academies of state service. Service-related specialized training is available through educational establishments attached to the federal ministries and agencies. While in service officials may pursue graduate, postgraduate and other training with the financial support of the state. Despite this, the quality of Russia's Civil Service remains low as the bulk of university educated civil servants graduated in the Soviet times (Vedomosti 2012c) and the quality of Russia's higher education remains low (Guriev and Tsyvinski 2012).

Central government agencies

The Russian government system is structured in three substantive tiers: federal, regional and local (see Table 8.1). The federal government is the chief executive organ of the state. The constitution has empowered it with considerable policy-making authority, especially with respect to macroeconomic and fiscal policies. The federal government initiates about half of all enacted laws (Bocharova and Galay 2013). One of the key responsibilities of the government is the development of the annual budget.

The year 2004 witnessed a radical attempt to create an 'agency model' of central government, aimed at separating the core, rule-making, function of the government from its more operational routines. To this end a number of formerly ministerial functions, namely regulatory, monitoring and law enforcement, and public service provision, were devolved to services and agencies, which were supposed to operate at arm's length from their parent ministries. The initiative, however, was short-lived as most of the services and agencies were gradually brought back under direct control of their ministries. Thus, in a comparative perspective most of Russia's central government agencies and services are located on the right hand side of the 'quango continuum' (Greve, Flinders and van Thiel 1999, 142) as among the most restricted in terms of their independence. At the same time about 20 agencies and services, for example, the Federal Antimonopoly Service, the Federal Space Agency, the Federal Security Services, and the Federal Migration Service have remained as independent units of the central government.

The actual number of ministries and other units within the central government has evolved since 2004. As of June 2012, there were 20 ministries, 23 agencies and 34 services. At the end of 2011 almost 30,000 civil servants worked in the central apparatus in Moscow, with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economic Development, Defense and Finance being the largest organizations employing 3,100, 1,800, 1,600 and 1,300 civil service staff respectively (Rosstat 2012). Most of the departmental units of the federal government have their own territorial structures to exercise their jurisdiction throughout the country. In 2011 there were almost 455,000 civil servants working in such field units of the government (see Table 8.2).

The different ways in which the structural units of the federal government are configured can be illustrated by the following examples. The Ministry of Finance is one of the largest and one of the most influential ministries of the central administration. It is subordinated to the prime minister. The Ministry has three services within its structure – the Tax Service, Financial and Budgetary Oversight, and the Treasury. It also has 11 quasi-autonomous organizations operating under its responsibility (as of June 2012). In turn the Tax Service, which is a subordinate unit of the Ministry, has offices in all territorial units of the Russian Federation, with 14 specialized field offices and 11 other sub-service organizations.

The Federal Civil Defense and Emergency Management Ministry is one of the oldest ministries, and one of those that is directly subordinated to the president. It is responsible for the protection of people and territories from natural and human-made disasters. Functionally its responsibilities include all phases of the policy process from rule-making to co-ordinating the response to the disaster. Although there are no agencies or services within its structure, the Ministry has territorial branches in all 83 regions of the Russian Federation and about 1,130 sub-ministry quasi-autonomous organizations that operate under its responsibility (Federal Civil Defence and Emergency Management Ministry 2010).

At the sub-ministry level one can observe a variety of organizations that do not make strategic decisions independent of their parent ministry, agency or service, but enjoy varying degrees of operational autonomy. They are the outcome of 'agencification from below' – the emergence of public organizations that charged user fees of various types or were engaged in direct commercial activities – that was typical of the first decade of transition in post-communist countries (Lehmbruch 2012). The legal forms of these organizations vary from joint stock companies with majority state ownership, state unitary enterprises that are under ministerial responsibility but 'work on the basis of commercial accounts and commercial legislations' (Kraan et al. 2008, 16) to a variety of so-called 'budgetary organizations'. These are non-profit organizations established by the central, regional or municipal authorities and financed by the state in whole or in a part. As of April 2009 there were about 25,000 such budgetary organizations at the central level and about 300,000 at the regional level, receiving financial resources from the state in exchange for the provision of public services (Government of the Russian Federation 2009).

Currently the amount of money that the state allocates to a budgetary organization depends on the amount of money it spent in the previous budget period (so-called cost budgeting) and not on performance evaluation (performance budgeting). Although financial reporting of the budgetary organizations has improved since the budget reform of the early 2000s, the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the quasi-autonomous organizations and their accountability remain low (Klyachko, Mau and Simeonov-Murylev 2010).

Since the middle of the 2000s the political leadership of the state has pushed for a complete overhaul of the system of the budgetary organizations in the spirit of performance-based management. This ambitious reform is currently still in progress with many questions being raised about the feasibility of its implementation (Diamond 2005; Timoshenko and Adhikari 2009). Indeed, while some elements of performance-based management have been successfully implemented at the level of ministries (Verheijen and Dobrohubova 2007), performance-related contracts are not an established feature of the relations between the ministries, services or agencies on the one hand and their quasi-autonomous organizations on the other.

Regional and local government

Regional authorities

The Russian transition of the 1990s entailed a change from a highly centralized state to the largest federative state in the world. Currently it is made up of 83 constituent members, known as subjects of the federation or regions each with a broad jurisdiction and its own legislative and executive authorities.

Since 1990 Russian regions have had several rounds of elections for regional parliaments. Two rounds of gubernatorial elections took place between 1996 and 2004, when they were substituted by a system of presidential appointees. In May 2012 the direct elections of governors were reinstated, however restrictions on who can run for governor raise doubts as to whether the elections will change the status quo (Goloso 2012; Ortung 2013, 469). Indeed in five regions that held such elections in 2012 the Kremlin managed to ensure victory for its preferred candidates. A similar trend was observed in the course of gubernatorial elections held in eight regions in September 2013.

In contrast to the benchmark principles of effective federalism (Weingast 1995), the formation of center-periphery relations in Russia in the 1990s was conducted 'without a map' and driven largely by transient political reasons (Shleifer and Treisman 2000). Consequently a system of 'federalism, Russian style' emerged with asymmetric powers enjoyed by formally equal constituent units, governed in a highly idiosyncratic and non-transparent manner by the centre. The regions' response to 'the delinquency, inconsistency and caprice of the central state' (Goode 2010) was chronic noncompliance with federal laws and the constitution. Regional confrontation with the federal centre was also fuelled by the interests of the local economic elites, on whose behalf regional administrations set up tariff and other barriers for inter-regional trade and allowed nonpayment of federal taxes (Sonin 2010) and preferential treatment of local firms (Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2005). Overall, Moscow's legal and financial leverage over the territories was so weak that by the end of the 1990s the system of center-periphery relations was evaluated by most observers as a threat to the cohesion of Russia as a single political and economic space (Stoner-Weiss 2006, 4).




Figure 8.1 Russia's structure of government, June 2012

Source: Data on local self-governments as of January 1, 2011 (Rossat 2011b); on the number of Ministries, Agencies and Services as of June 1, 2012 (Government of the Russian Federation 2012c)

Vladimir Putin addressed this issue in his election campaign in 2000, and made federal reform one of the cornerstones of his 'state building' political agenda. As of today, most observers agree that a new center-periphery balance, heavily tilted towards the centre, is achieved. The immediate problems of the federal relations were addressed through a series of political measures in the early 2000s. The most important of them were: reform of the system of presidential oversight in the regions (Goode 2010), reform of the Federation Council (Remington 2003) and eventual suspension of gubernatorial elections.

More fundamentally, the entire distribution of authority between the federal, regional and local governments was revisited. In June 2002 a special presidential commission, known as the Kozak commission, came up with a detailed list of public services and functions for regional authorities, which substituted a catalogue of rather vague powers implied by Articles 72–73 of the constitution. Most constitutional powers of the regions remained formally intact, but a shift from defining them broadly as, for example, 'co-ordination of issues of health care' to the detailed description of functions and services pertaining to health care, considerably reduced the scope of the regions' policy authority. Many powers that regions held jointly with the federal centre were simply gutted (Goode 2010). Also bilateral power-sharing treaties with 42 regions were abolished, with exceptions for Tatarstan and Chechnya. At the same time, some of the most demanding state responsibilities involving little or no policy authority, such as the bulk of social security obligations were assigned to the regions (see list below). Currently the distribution of authority between different levels of government is regulated by about 300 legal acts, and the process has not completely finished (Government of the Russian Federation 2012a). The main responsibilities of regional authorities can be summarized as follows:

- provision of health care (specialized hospitals);
- provision of vocational education;
- planning and financial provision for pre-school, primary and secondary education, delivered by municipalities;
- provision of the welfare of the elderly, disabled and orphans;
- provision of social security to low-income households, families with children, victims of political repressions, workers of the Second World War defense enterprises, and unemployed;
- environmental protection and emergencies prevention;
- regional roads and other infrastructure;
- intercity public transport;
- culture and sports events, regional libraries, and museums.

The redistribution of powers in favour of Moscow translated to an increase in the number of people working for the federal authorities in the regions. Between 2001 and 2011 the total number of civil service and auxiliary staff

employed in the territorial offices of the federal government increased by a staggering 74 per cent, compared to the 31 per cent increase in the number employed in the central apparatus of the federal government in Moscow and the 29 per cent growth in the regional governments (Rosstat 2013). As far as the civil service per se is concerned, in 2011 the average ratio of federal to regional officials (the executive branch) in the regions was 2.5 to 1 (see Table 8.2).

The effort to delineate the scope of authority was coupled with the reform of intergovernmental fiscal relations. The reform had three major components. First of all, subnational governments were assigned new revenue sources. 'Own revenue' is made up of a few taxes, three for regional authorities and two for municipalities. The tax rates are set by the subnational governments and retained by them in full. In addition 'own revenue' is comprised of nontax revenues that include income from property and business operations, administrative fees and fines. Second, all subnational authorities retain a fixed and equal for all regions/municipalities proportion of some federal taxes raised in their jurisdictions. Hitherto the share of the federal taxes that went to subnational budgets was often set individually for each region/municipality in an ad hoc manner, and frequently renegotiated. Third, the system of redistribution of cash from richer to poorer regions via so-called equalization grants has been overhauled. In the 1990s the allocation of transfers was an important tool of Moscow's regional policy: cash transfers served to appease regions ill-disposed toward the centre (Treisman 1996, 1998a, 1998b) or to reward the loyal ones (Popov 2004). A new, formula-based, grant allocation system has been in place since 2001. The formula reflects the regions' capacity to raise sufficient resources to cover the costs of delivering public services in their jurisdiction (de Silva et al. 2009, 37) and covers the gap between the spending responsibilities and the region's fiscal strength.

Most commentators agree that these were important changes for the better. The current system is based on an adequate legal framework and ex-ante specified rules for tax sharing and transfer allocation. Therefore it is more stable and transparent, and ensures that the responsibilities of subnational authorities are sufficiently provided for (de Silva et al. 2009; Kraan et al. 2008; Zhuravskaya 2010). However, as a result of this reform lower governments also found themselves overall more dependent on the federal government than they had been before. Thus, while in 1998 the share of subnational revenue in the total state revenue was at its highest at 55 per cent, in 2010 it was only about 37 per cent (de Silva et al. 2009, 44; Strategy 2020, 776).

Local self-government

The third substantive level of government in modern Russia is local self-government. Russia, compared to most European countries, has had a very short history of local self-government: introduced in late imperial Russia, it effectively did not exist during the Soviet period and was re-established in the

1990s. The 1993 Constitution legally separates local self-government from the state in a sense that it is seen more as a type of 'social organization' dealing with issues of 'local significance' through their own revenue sources rather than the lowest level of a vertically organized system of government. However, throughout the 1990s in sharp contrast to the proclaimed principles, both federal and regional authorities transferred numerous responsibilities onto local governments, including some of the state's social security obligations, pre-university education, some health care and recreation, and subsidies to loss-making enterprises. For the majority of the municipalities the spending obligations exceeded their fiscal capabilities. In the 1990s local taxes and other locally derived revenues made only up to 20 per cent of the budget of a typical Russian city with the rest coming from the taxes shared with higher governments and annually renegotiated transfers from regional budgets. What is more, regional governments used to reduce the transfers to those municipalities that increased their own revenue (Alekseev and Kurtyandskaya 2003). As research showed such fiscal arrangements provide local governments with no incentive to promote local growth and thus collect more tax and has a negative effect on the efficiency of public goods provision (Zhuravskaya 2000).

The reorganization of local self-government was part of a broader political and public administration reform of the 2000s. In accordance with the new law on local self-government, effective since 2006, the local government system is a two-tiered one. Currently there are about 23,000 municipalities: about 90 per cent of them are the lower tier rural and urban settlements, and the rest are the upper tier municipal counties (or *raions*) and cities (see Figure 8.1). As under the previous legislation, all new municipalities, except for those with a population of less than 100 people have popularly elected legislatures and elected heads, that is, the highest local official with executive powers.

Today local self-government can take on one of the three organizational forms depending on whether the local head is elected in popular elections or by the members of the local legislature. If the local head is popularly elected, they can be either the local chief executive or the chairperson of the local legislature. In the latter case, the administration is led by a non-elected manager (known as city manager, although this form of local self-government is practiced not only by cities but also by other municipalities). In those localities where the head of municipality is elected among and by the members of the local legislature, the role of local chief executive can be carried out only by a hired manager. The concrete form of the local government is stipulated by local charters and may be changed by the local population in a referendum-type event. According to the Ministry of Regional Development, in 2011 about 9,000 municipalities had a council-manager form of government (Reznikova 2011).

The concept of 'tier', not present in the previous legislation, was meant to help in allocating responsibilities and resources for municipalities in accordance with their size and other vital characteristics. The law specified the lists of 'issues of local significance' for settlements, cities and counties (see Table 8.4),

Table 8.4 Main responsibilities of local authorities (issues of local significance)

<i>Municipal counties and cities</i>	<i>Settlements</i>
Delivery of pre-school, primary and secondary education and after-class activities using special-purpose funds from the regional budget	Delivery of utilities (electricity, gas, water, heating), street lighting and provision of waste collection
Provision of health care (general hospitals, organizations of preventive medicine, maternity care and ambulance)	Housing, including that for low-income households
Provision of utilities (electricity and gas) and waste disposal	Urban planning
Municipal police (as yet not fully implemented)	Parks, gardens and cemeteries
Recreation and culture, including libraries of local significance	Libraries of local significance
Roads of local significance (inter-municipal)	Public transport of local significance (intra-municipal)
Public transport of local significance (inter-municipal)	Basic fire protection

and the number of items on those lists has more than doubled over time from about 20 to approximately 50 nowadays.

The law re-allocated several important responsibilities from the municipal to the regional level, at the same time permitting the delivery of the functions of a higher government by a lower government, on the condition that adequate financial resources are provided. Thus, for instance, today municipalities have no authority over the provision of pre-college schooling. The provision of this function, i.e. the overall organization, including specification of the service standards and funding, was moved to the competence of regional authorities. Yet, municipal counties and cities are charged with the delivery (as opposed to the provision) of pre-school, primary and secondary education using special-purpose funds from regional budgets. Local governments continue to bear full responsibility for housing and public utilities (communal services), an immense task considering the deplorable state of the public infrastructure in Russia and that these are highly monopolized and unreformed areas (Yegshyants 2012).

The expert community is agreed that the imposition of the lists of issues of local significance³ from above has stretched the centre's steering of local governments to the extreme. Moreover, these lists are too large for most municipalities, and the two-tier structure of local self-government inadequately reflects the variety of localities in terms of their financial and other capabilities (Glazychev 2011). Furthermore, the problem of municipal revenue has persisted. The federal personal income tax has remained the main source of revenue for local authorities: in 2011 its proceeds were 1.5 times larger than

locally levied taxes and nontax revenues (Government of the Russian Federation 2012a). In addition, unlike the federal government that managed to establish a reasonably transparent system of grant allocation to the regions, regional-to-municipal equalization policies are neither fair nor transparent (Kraan et al. 2008, 54). Regional governments have a major say in municipal finances not only by determining the parameters of the equalization policies, but also through executive decisions on investment programs and loans. As most local revenue still comes from higher governments that are prone to opportunism, nowadays local authorities face similar problems with incentives to foster economic growth and to effectively provide public goods as in the 1990s.

Financing the system

For most of the 1990s public finance did not rest on a modern footing. Suffice to say that the Tax and Budget Codes, governing the revenue and expenditure sides of the public finance, were passed only in 1998. As far as taxation is concerned, in the 1990s tax policy was greatly affected by elite bargaining. As the revenue extracting strategy developed in Russia relied mostly on enterprises in the commodity export sector rather than households, business representatives sought and often succeeded in securing concessions on tax rates, tax exemptions or simply not paying taxes at all (Easter 2002). Powerful governors acted in a similar way, often in collusion with local large enterprises, consolidating their claim over local revenue sources. 'Across the government, tax policy was made and remade in an idiosyncratic and personalistic manner' (Easter 2006, 31), i.e. in negotiations between corporate and regional elites on the one hand and senior officials in Moscow on the other.

Since 2000, the focus has been on shifting fiscal authority in favor of the federal center, equidistant from powerful economic interests and regional leaders. Together with the measures aimed to tame 'oligarchs' and governors, major tax and budget reforms took place in the 2000s. The number of taxes was reduced, the rates were lowered and numerous tax breaks were abolished. Moreover today only federal authorities can levy a tax, regardless of whether it is federal, regional or local tax. Federal legislation establishes the tax base for all taxes and rates' ceilings. The exact parameters of subnational tax rates and tax exemptions are set by regional and local authorities. Revenues from most federal taxes, including corporate, excise on goods and some natural resource extraction, are shared between Moscow and subnational governments in fixed proportions. Revenues from one of the most productive taxes, personal income tax of 13 per cent, are split 70 to 30 per cent between regional and municipal authorities.

The revised Budget Code sets out the process of preparation, adoption and execution of the consolidated budget of the state in great detail. The draft budget is prepared by the Ministry of Finance and must be agreed by key spending ministries before it is approved by the government and by both

chambers of parliament and signed by the president after which it becomes a law. Budget laws are getting increasingly detailed. The 2012 budget law contained 4,289 pages compared to the 423-page-long 2002 and 8-page-long 1992 laws.

Although the Russian state does not have a uniform internal audit system, financial monitoring and reporting are quite well developed. Audit is carried out by the internal audit units within the ministries and by the Ministry of Finance, the Federal Treasury and the Federal Service of Financial and Budgetary Control. In addition, the Audit Chamber conducts an external audit of the entire central government and those regions that receive the majority of financing from the federal budget. External audit of subnational governments is also carried out by the regional audit chambers. The weakness of the system of external audit is the absence of strong procedures to follow up the findings of the auditors as the auditors themselves do not have the power to bring legal charges.

Detailed reports of federal budget execution, aggregated by the Ministry of Finance, are submitted to the government and parliament quarterly and annually. The lower chamber of parliament draws upon annual reports of the Ministry of Finance and the Audit Chamber to approve the budget execution. International organizations, such as OECD and World Bank regularly assessed the Russian budget process, and their recommendations have been largely incorporated by the Russian government (Kraan et al. 2008).

In the years since the 2008 economic crisis government expenditures have remained at the level of about 38 per cent of GDP, moreover this happened on occasion with a budget balance surplus rather than deficit (World Bank 2011, 3; 2012, 24). The federal budget increasingly relies on proceeds from oil and gas industries. If in 2009 oil and gas revenues made up 7.6 per cent of GDP, equal to two-fifths of the federal revenues, in 2011, they accounted for 10.4 per cent of GDP, equal to half of federal revenues (World Bank 2012, 25). The trend has remained the same in more recent years. Although high oil prices and the macroeconomic stabilization have been important to Russia's fiscal recovery, research also credits the contribution of the tax and budget reforms to financial stabilization (Appel 2008; de Silva et al. 2009; Easter 2006; Fritz 2007, 285–314; Jones Luong and Weinthal 2004; Kraan et al. 2008).

Co-ordinating the system

Through the 2000s the dominant trend in relations between the organs of state power of all levels and branches was increasing centralization. At the top of the established 'power vertical' is the president, who not only has a major say on the content of public policies, but also ensures the co-ordinated functioning and interaction of all the organs of state power. The content of public policy is decided in policy communities around three decision-making centres: the president, legislature and the federal government. It is further developed as rules and regulations by the federal government and passed down

the line to the departments of the federal ministries, their field offices and semi-autonomous organizations, and the regional and municipal governments. Since 2000 special presidential envoys have attuned the work of the regional authorities in line with the federal public policies and co-ordinated the work of the territorial branches of the federal ministries in several adjacent regions assigned to their jurisdiction (known as federal districts). The office of the president also plays an important role in co-ordinating and monitoring the performance of the regional authorities. In turn regional authorities have a major say in co-ordinating the work of municipal authorities within their jurisdictions. The expert community considers that political and financial centralization in Russia has reached the point where it becomes counter-productive as public managers at the subnational level face no incentives to innovate in the name of economic growth and adequate provision of public goods (Strategy 2020, 775).

The role of voluntary organizations in the system of governance has been largely marginal since the onset of post-communist Russia. One reason for that is that in a comparative perspective Russia stood out as a country with a particularly low level of civic participation (Howard 2002; Bartkowsky and Jasinska-Kania 2004). The most recent data from the World Values Survey Association (2009) shows that, excluding trade unions and consumer organizations, 96 per cent of Russians do not belong to any voluntary association. The number of voluntary groups is also relatively low, as of December 2011, there were about 224,000 registered civil society organizations. However, experts estimate that as many as 60 per cent of them are inactive (USAID 2012, 168). Furthermore, many of these non-government organizations (NGOs) such as consumer co-operatives, do not have goals of achieving political or social change and therefore do not actively seek participation in policy networks. Yet those civil society groups that engage in advocacy work and accept foreign financing were recently required to take on the stigmatizing label of 'foreign agent' (121-FZ of July 2012). This measure is widely seen as a tool of control that authorities wield selectively against targeted NGOs (Ortting 2013; Human Rights Watch 2013).

Second, the channels of intermediation between the state and voluntary organizations are poorly defined. Governmental control of the mass media considerably impedes the efforts of the NGOs for influencing the policy-making. The introduction of public chambers as a formal networking 'node' between interested voluntary groups and the executive agencies is seen, even by their own creators, as a veneer for genuine state-third sector co-operation (Putin 2012).

Unlike the situation in the 1990s when the key decision-making centres in Moscow and the regions were under the influence of business, particularly big companies (Fry 2002; Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2005), today business's position in the governance networks is much less influential (Yakovlev 2006). The mode of business-state interaction also changed from

direct, informal contacts and individual lobbying to co-ordinated actions via larger associations of business (Pyle 2011).

A new important line of interaction between business and the authorities is public-private partnerships (PPPs). Having been sprung into life by the deplorable state of the public infrastructure in Russia, the active development of public-private partnerships began in the middle of the 2000s. Although some successful projects have been carried out, such as the Western High-speed Diameter or the Orlovsky toll tunnel in St. Petersburg, observers note that the further development of PPPs in Russia is constrained, mainly by the absence of a general law on public-private partnerships (The Expert Institute 2010). Concessions remain the most popular form of PPP projects in Russia, enabled by the passage of the appropriate law in 2005. However, the law is vague with regards to the relationship between the state and the private party. It also lacks the provision to protect the rights of the concessionaire and allows the pledging of the concession's assets as security for bank loans only after the projects have been commissioned and with the explicit consent of the grantor. Interestingly, regional authorities seem to be ahead of the federal government on the issue: as of June 2012, 59 of them passed acts regulating PPPs in their jurisdictions. Practitioners find regional acts, like for instance the pioneering law of Saint-Petersburg, to be more flexible regarding the types of PPPs relationships, tender process and support from the authorities (Schwartz and Ivanov 2008).

Managing the system

The overall template for managing the Russian administrative system represents a mix of the Weberian rational-legal model and New Public Management (NPM) initiatives. On the one hand, an array of measures has been introduced in the name of making the government more client-oriented and efficient. It puts much emphasis on performance-based management and budgeting. On the other hand there has been a move to regulate administrative behavior through clearly defined job descriptions, standards of conduct for public officials and administrative procedures. While budget reform was grounded more on performance principles, civil service reform was less reflective of the NPM ideas such as 'let the managers manage'. A distinct strand of the public administration reform called 'administrative reform' blends both approaches. The adoption of explicit standards and targets for the quality of government services (NPM) is supported by a rational-legal approach through the development of administrative regulations detailing how services are to be provided.

Russia is one of a few post-communist countries where the introduction of performance-based public management systems is at a, relatively, advanced stage (Verheijen and Dobrolybova 2007, World Bank 2011). However, it is still work in progress as neither a comprehensive system of performance

indicators nor powerful incentive systems embracing individuals in all public administration organizations has been institutionalized. The performance of individual regional governments is assessed in its entirety on an annual basis. This is done against economic and social indicators, the number of which fluctuated from about 40 in 2007 to almost 300 in 2009 and to 11 in 2012 (Kulikov 2012; Vedomosti 2012d). A system of individual performance indicators is still under-developed, as 'evaluation tools are highly formal and disconnected from institutional performance management' (World Bank 2011, ix). An initiative to introduce key performance indicators for officials is currently under way, but only for the senior federal bureaucracy (Government of the Russian Federation 2012b; Vedomosti 2012e).

Contracting out, another NPM hallmark method, has been applied in Russia on a small scale so far, mostly in social services (Cook and Vinogradova 2006; USAID 2012, 172; Zobnin 2011) and also with respect to the noncore activities in other public services. For instance state education organizations tend to contract out such supporting services as catering, cleaning, security and accounting (Gadzhieva 2012). The limited use of contracting out (including its more radical vintage – customer choice method of service delivery or vouchers) could be due to the weak managerial autonomy experienced by Russian public administration organizations. Autonomy is expected to increase with the progress of budgeting reform.

Public procurement of goods and services for the needs of public administration is perhaps an area where the approach of introducing private sector practices in public administration is most evident. Since 2006 the law has required that most goods, services and works by the government and budgetary organizations be purchased through open competitive tendering and auctioning. The reality is, however, far from the legal ideal. According to the Audit Chamber, 70 per cent of large contracts have been concluded with a single supplier/provider without competition (Kotova 2012), and 17 to 20 per cent of all funds spent on public procurement is embezzled (Lutova 2013; Zakharov and Popov 2010).

Accountability, secrecy and openness

The lack of transparency and accountability on the part of government organizations has been noted by many observers. Russia's rank on voice and accountability – one of the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators measuring governments' preparedness to be externally accountable through citizen feedback, democratic institutions, and a competitive press has considerably deteriorated in the last 15 years (see Figure 8.2).

Until recently Russia lacked basic formal prerequisite for openness such as a freedom of information act (FOI). Having been in the legislative pipeline since 2002, Russia's first FOI Act was finally adopted in 2009. The law has two important elements. First of all, it regulates in detail what information government organizations should make publicly available by, for instance,




Figure 8.2 Russia: Voice, accountability and control of corruption (as per centile rank, 0–100)

Source: Kauffman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010; The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project 2012

publishing it in the mass media, including the Internet, or allowing citizens to attend government meetings. Second, it regulates the practical aspects of the realization of the right to information about the activity of the state/municipal organ. Although on paper the FOI Act (8-FZ of February 2009) marks a radical step toward greater public service transparency, the implementation of the law remains problematical. Recent monitoring showed that, on average, both federal and regional governments publish on their websites only about half of the information that is required by the FOI Act (Freedom of Information Foundation 2012a, 2012b). The effective implementation of the law has also been hampered by the lack of clarity on the notion of 'information about the activity of the state/municipal organ of power'. Often officials reject information requests and courts uphold such decisions on the grounds that the required information does not relate to the activities of a government body and is therefore not subject to the FOI law. The Constitutional Court consistently refuses to clarify the notion in question – one of the most recent instances was on June 19, 2012 (Constitutional Court 2012) – therefore permitting practices restricting the right of access to information.

The development of administrative law allowing citizens to seek redress against the state has proceeded at a slow pace. Although the Russian constitution lists the right to address the state by filing a request, complaint

or suggestion, among the fundamental rights of Russian citizens (Article 33), the first legislation regulating complaints procedure was passed only in 2006 (59-FZ). The law covers mostly complaints over illegal treatment of citizens by the state. It does not provide for an independent institution that may review and adjudicate decisions made by public organizations, with exceptions for Human Rights and the Children's Ombudsmen. These two attributes make 59-FZ a rather weak legal instrument for improving the accountability of public officials.

A mechanism allowing citizens to seek redress against the state regarding poor provision of public services was adopted by the federal government in August 2012. As all governmental services are now codified in terms of basic quality standards and procedures regulating their delivery (such as deadlines, costs and documents required), this provides a solid foundation for the effective challenge of the authorities by citizens and hence improved bureaucratic accountability.

Hope for improved transparency and accountability also comes from the success of e-government in Russia. Having advanced 32 positions in the United Nations e-government world ranking from 2010 to 2012, Russia is currently the Eastern European leader and is above such western European countries as Italy or Ireland (UN 2012, 30). One of the most notable projects of e-government is the Internet portal of public services (www.gosuslugi.ru), which provides a single point of access to all references on government services and allows citizens and organizations to receive services and to file complaints electronically. The proliferation of this type of interaction between citizens and officials may help to overcome the pervasiveness of informal rules and personal contacts that for many years was the *modus operandi* of Russia's public bureaucracy (Jakobson 2001; Barabashev and Straussman 2007).

Democracy and the administrative system

A clear consensus among observers is that over the past decade democracy in Russia has deteriorated. It has been classified as 'not free' (since 2005) and as a consolidated authoritarian regime (since 2009) by Freedom House (Ortung 2013). The fundamental feature of authoritarianism is the limited number of political players. Indeed Vladimir Putin managed to wrest authority away from oligarchs, regional leaders and parliament, and to emasculate the mass media and civil society. These measures resulted in a monopoly of power in the hands of the president that may have both advantages and disadvantages for state capacity and the quality of government. It is argued that systems with a limited number of veto players are capable of making quick policy changes compared to systems with many veto players who tend to limit the set of feasible policy changes, rendering governments less decisive (Tsebelis 2002). They can also implement their decisions effectively due to the advantages of their hierarchical monitoring system (Back and Hadenius 2008, Ertman 1997). Indeed, Russia's considerable improvement in tax admin-

istration, budget process, land property rights, judiciary and center-periphery relations and some improvement in the state's fiscal and other infrastructural capacities since 2000 cannot be gainsaid (Appel 2008; Ashund 2004; Colton and Holmes 2006; Taylor 2011).

On the other hand, the comparative advantages of autocracies are said to be unsustainable. This happens for a number of reasons, fundamental to which are the following. First, a wider account of the relationship between democracy and high quality of government holds that the absence of political competition breaks the link between the preferences of citizens and the policy output of the government. Therefore authoritarian 'steering from above' mechanisms as in Russia are 'standing on a perilously narrow base, out of touch with society and hence in danger of making bad decisions' (Shevtsova 2004, 74). Second, and more important, when power is concentrated in one pair of hands, there is a danger that the rules of the game are manipulated to the advantage of the ruler and her associates (North 1990). Thus assessing the current governance system created in Russia, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya notes that its sustainability rests upon 'the utopian assumption of honesty and self-limitation of federal authorities' (2010, 77).

It is interesting to note evidence suggesting that Russia's ruling elite understands some of these limitations of the government system it has built. In his 2012 election manifesto Vladimir Putin outlined a number of initiatives aiming to bridge the preferences of citizens and government policies. One such initiative, which is similar to the United Kingdom's e-petitions, presupposes a mechanism by which the government and parliament are obliged to consider a citizens' initiative that collects 100,000 or more signatures (Putin 2012). Another initiative is concerned with the re-launch of public chambers as a platform for intermediation between the state, business and the third sector. In addition to these measures, that are all located outside the realm of competitive politics, the authorities also undertook steps that were meant to improve the competitiveness of Russian politics. First, the law on political parties (28-FZ of April 2012) made it considerably easier for Russian citizens to set up political parties. As the law reduced the minimal number of members from 40,000 to 500 the number of officially registered political parties increased from 7 in April 2012 to 72 in August 2013 (The Ministry of Justice 2013). However, with the next parliamentary and presidential elections not due until December 2016 and March 2018, the practical effect of this change will likely be minimal. Second, the popular elections of regional governors were restored, and today 12 subjects of the federation, including Moscow city, have popularly elected heads with about a further 40 elections to be held in 2014–2015. However, as it was predicted by experts, the so-called 'municipal filter' – a feature of the law that stipulates that any candidate wishing to run for governor has to first ensure the endorsement of 5 to 10 per cent of the region's municipal lawmakers (each region establishes its own threshold), who are dependent on both the ruling United Russia party and the sitting governors – effectively allowed the incumbent authorities to manipulate the contest.

The nature of the political regime also affects the quality of Russia's bureaucracy. The authoritarianism built by Putin and Medvedev is an 'electoral authoritarianism' that presupposes the considerable involvement of public bureaucracy in elections to ensure the 'right' election outcome (Golosov 2011; Remington 2008). Consequently, within the public administration 'there are employees whose career prospects depend directly on the results of the elections' (Golosov 2011, 637). This is clearly in contradiction to the key structural prerequisite for a welfare-enhancing bureaucracy to place bureaucrats 'above politics' by creating a set of incentives that are different to those of politicians (Knott and Miller 2008; Miller 2000). Instead of separating the incentives of politicians and bureaucrats electoral authoritarianism aligns them, therefore inhibiting positive qualities of public bureaucracy, such as for instance impartiality in the implementation of the law (Rothstein and Teorell 2008).

Another important feature of the recent political regime that may have had a negative impact on the quality of bureaucracy is 'a Russian roulette' pattern of gubernatorial appointments (Petrov 2010). The environment of high uncertainty it had created was clearly conducive to the shortening of the time-horizons of individual governors, which is found to have a negative impact on the success of the institutionalization of politically neutral bureaucracies (Lapunte and Nistolskaya 2009).

Further developments and issues with the system

Examination of the developments in Russia's public administration since 2000 has clearly shown that there has been a concerted drive to reform it. What is less clear is the extent to which the reform undertaken is likely to succeed. Both research and practitioners' accounts demonstrate that there is real progress in some important areas. For example, in terms of the budgetary process, intergovernmental transfers and public procurement, making the processes more rule-based and public has certainly made them less susceptible to abuse. Considerable developments have also taken place in the area of access to public documents and administrative redress.

While reform initiatives in public administration have led to some modest improvement in the infrastructural state capacity – the ability of the state 'to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm' (Mann 1986, 113) – there is little evidence to suggest that there has been improvement in the quality of government and the provision of public goods. Russia today is no safer than in the past, the threat from terrorism and organized crime remains unabated (Taylor 2011, 82–94) and the military is 'poorly trained, ill-equipped and undisciplined' (Rumner and Wallander 2003, 63). There is a lack of improvement in public health and property rights protection (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008; Taylor 2011, 102–107), nor does there appear to have been improvement in the level of corruption (Figure 8.2).

The state of the public infrastructure remains poor as corroborated by the recent admission by the Russian authorities that only half of Russia's roads satisfy government standards (Prosecutor General's Office 2012). Of course, one can point to the substantial economic growth of the recent past as an encompassing measure of the improved well-being of Russians and therefore the improved quality of government. However research shows that economic growth is unlikely to be a consequence of the Kremlin's steering (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008; Robinson 2011).

There are competing explanations as to why the output of government has not improved despite a reform agenda that appears to have targeted the key areas for change. It may be argued that the full impact of the individual reforms has not yet had sufficient time to make itself apparent. In effect the reform has not yet 'kicked in'. Alternatively the lack of real progress may be due to an incorrect sequencing of New Public Management and the rational-legal approaches to public administration reform as it has long been argued that the NPM tools work only in countries where basic attributes of a Weberian bureaucracy are irreversibly institutionalized (Mann and Parson 2004, 54; Pierre and Rothstein 2011; Schick 1998).

In the most extensive study to date, Brian Taylor (2011) attributes Russia's low state capacity/low quality of government trap to the interplay between structural (Leninist legacy and hydrocarbon dependence) and organizational factors (patrimonial bureaucracy, the lack of strong monitoring of the state by citizens and the lack of organizational mission that encourages public-interested behavior on the part of the state officials).

Perhaps even more profound is the suggestion that the ultimate problem relates to the character of the current political regime, and a contradiction between the regime-strengthening and state capacity-building elements of Russia's *etatization* project (Hashim 2005; Taylor 2011). As part of a perennial debate about regime type and human well-being, the answer to this question remains largely open. However, current scholarly debate on Russia seems to link the hope for an improvement in the quality of Russia's government with the evolution of its political regime into a fully-fledged democracy rather than a developmental dictatorship (Taylor 2011; Shevtsova 2004; Zhuravskaya 2010).

Note

- 1 In addition to this, there are also local self-governments that are formally separated from the state but in reality act within the scope of power prescribed to them by the higher levels of authority.

References

- Aleksey, M. and Kuryandskaya, G. (2003) 'Fiscal Federalism and Incentives in a Russian Region', *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 31: 20–33.

- Appel, H. (2008) 'Is It Putin or Is It Oil? Explaining Russia's Fiscal Recovery', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 24: 301–323.
- Aslund, A. (2004) 'Russia's Economic Transformation under Putin', *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 45: 397–420.
- Back, H. and Hadenius, A. (2008) 'Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a J-Shaped Relationship', *Governance*, 21: 1–24.
- Barabash, A. and Straussman, J. D. (2007) 'Public Service Reform in Russia 1991–2006', *Public Administration Review*, 67: 373–382.
- Bartkowski, J. and Jasinska-Kania, A. (2004) 'Voluntary Organizations and the Development of Civil Society', in Arts, W. and Halman L. (Eds.) *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium*, Leiden: Brill, pp. 109–137.
- Bocharova, S. and Gallay, A. (2013) 'What is Behind the Increased Legislative Activity of the State Duma?', *Vedomosti*, August 28 (in Russian). Online, available at: www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1566871/gosduma-vozvrashchaetsya-k-perelomnoy-rabote (accessed September 17, 2013).
- Brynn, R. and Gimpelson, V. (2004) 'The Size, Composition and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy in the 1990s', *Slate Review*, 63: 90–112.
- Colton T. J. and Holmes S. (Eds.) (2006) *The State After Communism: Governance in the New Russia*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Colton, T. J. (2012) 'Medvedev – Former President Who Was Never Really President', Interview. Online, available at: <http://valdaiclub.com/politics/42260.html> (accessed September 17, 2012).
- Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (2012) Notion N 1245-O-P of June 19 (in Russian). Online, available at: <http://base.garant.ru/70203746> (accessed August 30, 2012).
- Cook, L. J. and Vinogradova, E. (2006) 'NGOs and Social Policy-Making in Russia's Regions', in *Problems of Postcommunism*, 53: 59–77.
- De Silva, M. O., Kurlyandskaya, G., Andreeva E. and Golovanova, N. (2009) *Intergovernmental Reforms in the Russian Federation: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?* Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The World Bank.
- Diamond, J. (2005) 'Reforming the Russian Budget System: A Move to More Devolved Budget Management?' *International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 05/104*. Online, available at: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05104.pdf (accessed September 17, 2012).
- Easter, G. (2002) 'Politics of Revenue Extraction in Post-Communist States: Poland and Russia Compared', *Politics and Society*, 30: 599–627.
- Easter, G. (2006) 'Building Fiscal Capacity' in Colton, T. J. and Holmes, S. (Eds.) *The State After Communism: Governance in the New Russia*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 21–52.
- Erman, T. (1997) *Birth of Leninism: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- The Expert Institute (2010) 'Barriers for the Development of Public-Private Partnerships in Russia' (in Russian), Moscow: NPF the Expert Institute. Online, available at: http://pppirussia.ru/userfiles/upload/files/Analitika/ppp-Results_24_11_2010_Fin_1.pdf (accessed August 23, 2012).
- Federal Civil Defense and Emergency Management Ministry of the Russian Federation (2010) Order No. 488, 'The List of the Federal State Agencies under the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense and Emergency Management' (in Russian). Online, available at: www.mchs.gov.ru/ministry/?SECTION_ID=5791 (accessed July 15, 2012).
- Federal Portal of Managerial Cadres (2012) 'The Analysis of the Use of Cadres Reserves in the Regions of the Russian Federation' (in Russian). Online, available at: www.rezerv.gov.ru/GovService.aspx?id=626&t=34 (accessed September 17, 2012).
- Freedom of Information Foundation (2012a) 'Monitoring 2012: Informational Openness Rating for Federal Executive Government Bodies' Online, available at: www.svobodainfo.org/en/print/1639 (accessed August 26, 2013).
- Freedom of Information Foundation (2012b) 'The Results of the Monitoring of the Official Websites of Russia's Regional Authorities, Executive Branch' (in Russian). Online, available at: www.svobodainfo.org/en/print/1928 (accessed August 26, 2013).
- Fritz, V. (2007) *State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus and Russia*, Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Fry, T. (2002) 'Capture or Exchange? Business Lobbying in Russia', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54: 1017–1036.
- Gadzhieva, L. (2012) 'Transferring Non-Core Functions to External Contractors by the Educational Institutions of Perm as a Means of Their Performance Improvement' (in Russian), *Public Administration Issues*, 2: 174–182.
- Glazyev, V. (2011) *Local Self-Governance: The Scene in the Middle of 2011* (in Russian). Online, available at: <http://2020strategy.ru/g12/documents/32581823.html> (accessed September 17, 2012).
- Golosov, G. (2004) *Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: Democracy Unclaimed*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Golosov, G. (2011) 'The Regional Roots of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 63: 623–639.
- Golosov, G. (2012) 'Dilemmas of an Authoritarian Political Reform'. Online, available at: www.polt.ru/article/2012/05/18/elect (accessed June 11, 2012).
- Goode, P. (2010) 'The Fall and Rise of Regionalism?' *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 26: 233–256.
- Gorodetsky, D. (2012) 'Key Indicator of the Country's Health' (in Russian), *Vedomosti*, July 31. Online, available at: www.vedomosti.ru/career/news/2334860/klyuchevoy_pokazatel_zdorovya_strany (accessed July 31, 2012).
- Government of the Russian Federation (2009) 'Explanatory Note to the Draft of the federal law 83-fz (in Russian), online, available at: [http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/MAIN.NSF/\(VIEWDOC\)?OPENAGENT&WORK/DZ.NSF/BYID&EB91E2ECCDE5440C325769C00505AE5](http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/MAIN.NSF/(VIEWDOC)?OPENAGENT&WORK/DZ.NSF/BYID&EB91E2ECCDE5440C325769C00505AE5) (accessed September 17, 2012).
- Government of the Russian Federation (2012a) 'Verbatim Report of the Meeting the Federal Government on the Realization of the Targets Set by Vladimir Putin in His Election Articles as a Candidate for the Post of Russian President' (in Russian), March 22. Online, available at: <http://government.ru/docs/18490/> (accessed August 31, 2012).
- Government of the Russian Federation (2012b) 'Verbatim Report of the Meeting of the Advisory Board of the Agency of the Strategic Initiative Chaired by the Prime-Minister Vladimir Putin' (in Russian), February 3. Online, available at: <http://government.ru/docs/17986/> (accessed July 3, 2012).
- Government of the Russian Federation (2012c), 'The Structure of the Government' (in Russian). Online, available at: <http://government.ru/ministries> (accessed June 12, 2012).

- Gregory, P. (1990) *Restructuring the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Greve, C., Flinders, M., and van Thiel, S. (1999) 'Quangos – What's in a Name? Defining Quangos from a Comparative Perspective', *Governance*, 12: 129–146.
- Guriey, S. and Rachinsky, A. (2005) 'The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19: 131–150.
- Guriev, S. and Tsyvinski, A. (2012) 'A High-Yield Personal Investment' (in Russian), *Vedomosti*, April 10. Online, available at: www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/1620707/cena_vyshego_obrazovaniya (accessed July 31, 2012).
- Hashim, M. S. (2005) 'Putin's Privatization Project and Limits to Democratic Reforms in Russia', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 38: 25–48.
- Howard, M. (2002) 'Postcommunist Civil Society in Comparative Perspective', *Demokratizatsiya*, 10: 285–305.
- Human Rights Watch (2013) World Report 2013: Russia. Online, available at: www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/russia (accessed August 23, 2013).
- Huskey, E. and Obolonsky, A. (2003) 'The Struggle to Reform Russia's Bureaucracy', *Problems of Post-Communism*, 50: 22–33.
- Huskey, E. (2004) 'Nomenklatura Lite? The Cadres Reserve in Russian Public Administration', *Problems of Post-Communism*, 51: 30–39.
- Jakobson, L. (2001) 'Public Management in Russia: Changes and Inertia', *International Public Management Journal*, 4: 27–48.
- Jones Luong, P. and Weintal, E. (2004) 'Contra Coercion: Russian Tax Reform, Exogenous Shocks, and Negotiated Institutional Change', *American Political Science Review*, 98: 139–152.
- Kaufman, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2010) 'The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues', *The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 5430. Online, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130 (accessed July 3, 2012).
- Klyachko, T., Mau, V. and Sinehikov-Murylev, S. (2010) 'On the Budgetary Organizations Reform', in Gardar, E., Glavatskaya, N., Rogov, K., Sinehikov-Murylev, S., Starodubovskiy, V. and L. Freinkman (Eds.) *Economy in Transition. Collection of Published Works, 2003–2009*, Moscow: Delo, pp. 157–174.
- Knott, J. K. and Miller, G. J. (2008) 'When Ambition Checks Ambition: Bureaucratic Trusts and the Separation of Powers', *The American Review of Public Administration*, 38: 387–411.
- Kotova, J. (2012) 'Stepashin: 1 Trillion Roubles a Year Embezzled from State Procurement' (in Russian), *Vedomosti*, 14 November. Online, available at: www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/6076361/stepashin (accessed August 23, 2013).
- Kraay, D. J., Bergvall, D., Hawkesworth, I., Kostyleva, V. and Witt, M. (2008) 'Budgeting in Russia', *OECD Journal of Budgeting*, 8: 1–58.
- Kulikov, S. (2012) 'The Efficiency Scale Is Cut Down' (in Russian), *Natsionnaya Gazeta*, July 11. Online, available at: www.ng.ru/economics/2012-07-11/1_scale.html (accessed August 28, 2012).
- Lapente, V. and Nisitskaya, M. (2009) 'To The Short-Sighted Victor Belong The Spoils: Politics and Merit Adoption in Comparative Perspective', *Governance*, 22: 431–458.
- Lehmbruch, B. (2012) 'It Takes Two to Quango: Post-Soviet Fiscal Relations, Political Entrepreneurship and Agencification from Below', *International Institute for Social Studies, Working paper 538*. Online, available at: <http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32156/wp538.pdf> (accessed July 15, 2012).
- Luotva, M. (2013) 'The Audit Chamber: 70% of All Large State Procurement Contracts Executed in Contravention to the Law' (in Russian), *Vedomosti*, 16 August. Online, available at: www.vedomosti.ru/finance/news/15277091/zakupki-v-serjone (accessed September 17, 2013).
- McFaul, M. and Stoner-Weiss, K. (2008) 'The Myth of Authoritarian Model: How Putin's Crackdown Holds Russia Back', *Foreign Affairs*, 87: 68–84.
- Manin, N. and Prinson, N. (2004) *International Public Administration Reform: Implications for the Russian Federation*, Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Mann, M. (1986) 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results', in Hall, J. A. (Ed.) *States in History*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 109–136.
- Meyer-Sahling, J.-H. (2011) 'The Durability of EU Civil Service Policy in Central and Eastern Europe After Accession', *Governance*, 24: 231–260.
- Miller, G. (2000) 'Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design of Public Agencies', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 10: 289–327.
- The Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation (2013) 'The List of Registered Political Parties (as of August 23, 2013)'. Online, available at: <http://minjust.ru/nko/gosreg/partii/spisok> (accessed August 23, 2013).
- Nisitskaya, M. (2009) 'Organizational Design of Welfare-Enhancing Public Bureaucracy: A Comparative Analysis of Russia's Regions', Ph.D. Dissertation, Budapest: Central European University. Online, available at: http://web.ceu.hu/polsci/dissertations/Marina_Nisitskaya.pdf (accessed September 17, 2012).
- North, D. C. (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Performance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Oetting, R. (2013) *Nations in Transit: Russia*, Freedom House. Online, available at: www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NT13_Russia_1stProof.pdf (accessed September 17, 2013).
- Petrov, N. (2010) 'Gubernatorial Roulette', *The Moscow Times*. Online, available at: www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/gubernatorial-roulette/397352.html (accessed September 5, 2011).
- Pierre, J. and Rothstein, B. (2011) 'Reinventing Weber: The Role of Institutions in Creating Social Trust', in Christensen T. and Lægreid, P. (Eds.) *The Ashgate Research Companion to New Public Management*, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp. 405–416.
- Popov, V. (2004) 'Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Rules Versus Electoral Politics', *Comparative Economic Studies*, 44: 515–541.
- Prosecutor General's Office (2012) 'The Prosecutor General's Office Has Taken Steps to Ensure the Rule of Law in the Field of Road Construction' (in Russian). Online, available at: <http://genproc.gov.ru/news/news-77590/> (accessed September 13, 2012).
- Putn, V. (2012) 'Democracy and the Quality of the State' (in Russian), *Kommersant*, 20 (4805), February 6. Online, available at: www.kommersant.ru/doc/1866753 (accessed September 17, 2010).
- Pyle, W. (2011) 'Organized Business, Political Competition, and Property Rights: Evidence from the Russian Federation', *The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, 27: 2–31.
- Remington, T. F. (2003) 'Majorities without Mandates: The Russian Federation Council Since 2000', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 55: 667–691.

- Remington, T. F. (2006) 'Presidential Support in the Russian State Duma', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 31: 5–32.
- Remington, T. F. (2008) 'Patronage and the Party of Power: President-Parliament Relations Under Vladimir Putin', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 60: 959–987.
- Renikova, A. (2011) 'The Proliferation of City Managers Has Come to an End' (in Russian), *RBC Daily*, July 25. Online, available at: www.rbcdaily.ru/2011/07/25/focus/562949980767169 (accessed July 26, 2012).
- Robinson, N. (2011) 'Political Barriers to Economic Development in Russia: Obstacles to Modernization under Yeltsin and Putin', *International Journal of Development Issues*, 10: 5–9.
- Rostat, Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service (2009a) 'Civil Service Personnel of the Federal Level of Authority by Gender, Categories and Ranks of Posts, and Branches of Authority as of October 1, 2009' (in Russian). Online, available at: www.gks.ru/free_doc/2009/gos-kadr/f3.xls (accessed August 23, 2013).
- Rostat, Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service (2009b) 'Civil Service Personnel of the Regional Level of Authority by Gender, Categories and Rank of Post, and Branches of Authority as of October 1, 2009' (in Russian). Online, available at: www.gks.ru/free_doc/2009/gos-kadr/f4.xls (accessed September 17, 2012).
- Rostat, Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service (2009c) 'Civil Service Personnel of the Federal Level of Authority by Level of Education, Categories and Rank of the Post and Branches of Authority as of October 1, 2009' (in Russian). Moscow: Rostat.
- Rostat, Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service (2009d) 'Civil Service Personnel of the Regional Level of Authority by Level of Education, Categories and Rank of the Post and Branches of Authority as of October 1, 2009' (in Russian). Moscow: Rostat.
- Rostat, Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service (2011a) 'The Number of Civil Servants and Municipal Servants by Gender, Branches and Levels of Authority' (in Russian). Online, available at: www.gks.ru/free_doc/2011/gos-kadr/rab1.htm (accessed August 23, 2013).
- Rostat, Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service (2011b) 'The Number and Types of Municipalities in the Subjects of the Russian Federation' (in Russian). Online, available at: www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/bd_munst/1-adm_2011.xls (accessed August 23, 2013).
- Rostat, Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service (2012) 'On the Number of the Civil Service Personnel of the Federal Government (the Central Offices of the Ministries, Agencies and Services) in 2011' (in Russian). Online, available at: www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d03/rab_god2011.htm (accessed July 15, 2012).
- Rostat, Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service (2013) 'The Total Number of Employed in the Organizations of Federal, Regional and Local Governments, Updated 13.04.2013' (in Russian). Online, available at: www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/gosudar/chisl_vetv.xls (accessed August 23, 2013).
- Rothstein, B. and Teorel, J. (2008) 'What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions', *Governance*, 21: 165–190.
- Rummer, E. and Wallander, C. (2003) Russia: Power in Weakness? *The Washington Quarterly*, 27: 57–73.
- Sakwa, R. (2008) *Russian Politics and Society*, London: Routledge.
- Schick, A. (1998) 'Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand's Reforms', *World Bank Research Observer*, 13: 23–31.
- Schwartz, M. and Ivanov, I. (2008) 'Russian Federation: Public Private Partnerships in Russia: An Overview'. Online, available at: www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=70344 (accessed August 23, 2012).
- Shevtsova, L. (2004) 'The Limits of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism', *Journal of Democracy*, 15: 67–77.
- Shleifer, A. and Treisman, D. (2000) *Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Slinko, I., Yakovlev E. and Zhuravskaya, E. (2005) 'Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia', *American Law and Economics Review*, 7: 284–318.
- Solnik, S. (1998) *Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions*, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Somin, K. (2010) 'Provincial Protectionism', *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 38: 111–122.
- Stoner-Weiss, K. (2006) *Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Strategy (2020) 'New Growth Model – New Social Policy, Final Report by the Expert Group on the Problems of the Socio-Economic Development of Russia through 2020' (in Russian). Online, available at: <http://2020strategy.ru/data/2012/03/14/1214585998/1itog.pdf> (accessed June 11, 2012).
- Tafel, H. I. (2010) 'Regime Change and the Federal Gamble: Negotiating Federal Institutions in Brazil, Russia, South Africa, and Spain', *Publicus: The Journal of Federalism*, 41: 257–285.
- Taylor, B. D. (2011) *State Building in Putin's Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Timoshenko, K. and Adhikari, P. (2009) 'Exploring Russian Central Government Accounting in Its Context', *Journal of Accounting and Organizational Changes*, 5: 490–513.
- Tompson, W. (2007) 'From "Clientelism" to a "Client-centered Orientation"? The Challenge of Public Administration Reform in Russia', *OECD Working Paper No. 536 ECO/WKP(2006)64*. Online, available at: <http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/505/1/ECO-WKP%282006%2964.pdf> (accessed July 12, 2012).
- Treisman, D. (1996) 'The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia', *British Journal of Political Science*, 26: 299–335.
- Treisman, D. (1998a) 'Fiscal Redistribution in a Fragile Federation: Moscow and the Regions in 1994', *British Journal of Political Science*, 28: 185–222.
- Treisman, D. (1998b) 'Deciphering Russia's Federal Finance: Fiscal Appeasement in 1995 and 1996', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 50: 893–906.
- Treisman, D. (1999) *After the Deluge: Regional Crisis and Political Consolidation in Russia*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Tsobelis, G. (2002) *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*, New York: Russell Sage.
- United Nations (2012) 'United Nations E-Government Survey 2012: E-government for the People'. Online, available at: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan048580.pdf> (accessed August 30, 2012).
- USAID, US Agency for International Development (2012) 'The 2011 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia', 15th Anniversary Edition. Online, available at: http://transition.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/reports/2011/2011CSOSI_Index_complete.pdf (accessed September 17, 2012).

- Vedomosti (2012a) 'Editorial: How Will the Federation Council Change' (in Russian), June 26. Online, available at: www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/2214623/omolozhenie_stareishin (accessed June 26, 2012).
- Vedomosti (2012b) 'Editorial: Bureaucrats are Many: They are Expensive and Useless' (in Russian), July 31. Online, available at: www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/2334831/ne_pashut_ne_seyut_ne_sroyat (accessed July 31, 2012).
- Vedomosti (2012c) 'Editorial: Illiterates in the Civil Service' (in Russian), August 1. Online, available at: www.vedomosti.ru/newsline/news/2378531/neuchi_na_gossluzhbe (accessed August 1, 2012).
- Vedomosti (2012d) 'Editorial: New Marks for Governors' (in Russian), August 28. Online, available at: www.vedomosti.ru/newsline/news/3218441/11_punktov_putina (accessed August 24, 2012).
- Vedomosti (2012e) 'Video interview with Sergey Belakov, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Economic Development' (in Russian), August 29. Online, available at: www.vedomosti.ru/politics/video/21_1321 (accessed August 29, 2012).
- Verheijen, T. and Dobrolubova, Y. (2007) 'Performance Management in the Baltic States and Russia: Success Against the Odds?', *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 73: 205–215.
- Weingast, B. (1995) 'The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development', *Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations*, 11: 1–31.
- White, S. and Mcalister, I. (2008) 'The Putin Phenomenon', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 24: 604–628.
- White, S. (1999) 'Russia', in Elgie R. (Ed.) *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 216–231.
- World Bank (2011) 'Russia: Public Expenditure Review. Report No. 58836-RU'. Online, available at: www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSCContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/08/01/000356161_20110801010543/Rendered/PDF/588360ESW0Gray00702701100BOX361521B.pdf (accessed September 17, 2013).
- World Bank (2012) 'Russian Economic Report: Moderating Risks, Bolstering Growth', Russian Economic Report No 27. Online, available at: www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/rer-27-march2012-eng.pdf (accessed September 17, 2013).
- World Values Survey Association (2009) *World Values Survey 1981–2008, Official Aggregate v20090901*. Online, available at: www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/wvsdata.jsp (accessed January 20, 2013).
- The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project (2012) 'Aggregate Indicators of Governance 1996–2011. 2012 Update'. Online, available at: www.govindicators.org (accessed January 20, 2013).
- Yakovlev, A. (2006) 'The Evolution of Business-State Interaction in Russia: From State Capture to Business Capture?' *Europe-Asia Studies*, 58: 1033–1056.
- Yegshyants, S. (2012) 'Russia: Oil, Budget and Life' (in Russian), ITInvest Online Broker. Online, available at: www.itinvest.ru/analitics/reviews/strategic-analysis/6792/ (accessed September 17, 2012).
- Zakharov, M. and Popov, P. (2010) 'Kickbacks as a Mode of Production' (in Russian). Online, available at: www.polit.ru/article/2010/10/29/roz (accessed August 28, 2012).
- Zhuravskaya, E. (2000) 'Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style', *Journal of Public Economics*, 76: 337–368.

- Zhuravskaya, E. (2010) 'Federalism in Russia', in Åslund, A., Guriev, S. and Kuchins, A. (Eds.) *Russia after the Global Economic Crisis*, Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, pp. 59–77.
- Zobnin, A. (2011) 'Social Outsourcing in Fumanskiy Municipal District of the Ivanovo Region' (in Russian), *Public Administration Issues*, 1: 167–178.