

Mapping and problematising external funding to the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities

Sören Stapel & Fredrik Söderbaum

Book chapter in Ulf Engel and Frank Mattheis, (eds) *The Finances of Regional Organizations in the Global South: Follow the Money*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 112-125.

Abstract

External actors have invested enormous financial resources to support African regional organizations. This chapter maps and problematizes the external funding provided to the African Union (AU) and the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Based on a new dataset, we show that there has been a drastic increase of security-related funding during the last 15 years. The AU is by far the most targeted recipient. Funding also goes to a few favored RECs (ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC), whereas other RECs do not receive much support at all. Considerable variation also appears on the donor side since a few donors provide most of the funding but still differ regarding priority areas and targeted organizations. The chapter provides further insights into funding activities of three powerful external actors – the EU, USA, and China. The analysis opens up questions related to donor strategies and the consequences for ROs as well as regional support more generally.

Introduction

In the last 25 years, regional cooperation and integration have been intensifying all over the world. Most observers believe that regionalism and regional institutions evolve in response to the demands of actors ‘from within’ the region. ‘Global’ and structural factors are often noted, but there is as yet only fragmented information about how and to what extent external actors and their funding impact regions and regional organisations (ROs).

The fact that external actors have received so little attention in both scholarly and policy debates serves as inspiration for this chapter and we have chosen to study ROs in Africa because outside influences are so evident and powerful there. This study analyses external support for what are usually considered the most important African ROs in the fields of security and governance, namely the African Union (AU) and the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs).¹ Although ‘regional’ support for these organisations is rather limited compared to ‘country-based’ development cooperation, its importance cannot be overstated. As this volume shows, external funding makes up a large proportion of the total budgets of many African ROs – particularly the AU – and some of the continent’s RECs (cf. Engel, 2015).

Scholars and practitioners alike agree that external influence may be problematic for African ROs (AU, 2013; Buzdugan, 2013; Vanheukelom et al., 2016). Many observers have now begun to recognise that external funders rarely act as neutral supporters of purely endogenous and home-grown regionalist projects. For instance, the much-discussed “Kagame report” on the institutional reform of the AU critically asks whether African member states can ever “own” this organisation as long as they remain so dependent on external funding (Kagame 2017, p. 17). Some scholars claim that donors not only influence African ROs and projects but may even seek to control them (Buzdugan, 2013; Gray, 2011; Krapohl, 2017; Muntshick, 2017; Söderbaum, 2017; Söderbaum and Brolin, 2016). This chapter argues that development cooperation and financial support are inevitably associated with external influence, and it aims to both map out and problematize such external funding to African ROs. Given the paucity of knowledge and data about regional development cooperation, this study begins by focusing on a series of rather basic questions: how much funding is allocated to official development assistance (ODA) at a regional level, and how much of this is awarded to the AU and RECs? How much of this is allocated to security-related issues and how much to other policy areas? Who are the most important donors? How do patterns

vary over time and between donors? We believe that a better understanding of these trends and funding flows are essential before delving, as we do towards the end of the chapter, into deeper and more ambitious questions about donor influence and possible “control” over the AU and RECs.

For this study, we rely on a newly-created database of information about the External Funding of Regional Organisations (EFRO). The EFRO database tracks ODA reported to the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System between 2002 and 2016. While there are other data sources such as AidData, OpenAid and Publish What You Fund, we have opted to use the officially-accepted statistics reported to the OECD. The OECD data is also broad in range and the fact that it relies on a single classification system makes it possible to carry out a systematic comparison of donor activities. It provides information about annual disbursements instead of committed resources, which in our view is a preferred measure. The database tracks both disbursements and number of activities/projects, a method which among other things enables us to compare the average size of activities. OECD data entail certain limitations, however. The OECD relies on the willingness of member states to disclose the development assistance they provide while significant donors do not report. Another limitation is that it does not contain much information from non-OECD countries, particularly new donors such as China (Dreher et al. 2013). It should also be noted that it includes only ODA but not direct loans or non-ODA funding. While loans are rarely offered in the field of peace and security, a considerable amount of funding is nevertheless provided outside of ODA.

The EFRO database covers ‘regional’ ODA, which should be distinguished from country-based ODA. Regional ODA refers to development activities that cover two or more countries within the same region or sub-region. The funds are often (but by no means always) channelled through a regional counterpart, for instance a RO, a regional NGO, a regional committee, *ad hoc* regional projects, or donor-driven mechanisms and projects. Some of the regional projects in this category are ‘multi-country’, meaning they may operate parallel projects in two or more countries (with few ‘regional’ links among them). Although there has been some systematic underreporting of regional ODA and some development agencies have reported regional ODA under other categories, the quality of reporting is improving and national ODA is now less likely to be used for regional projects or for funding ROs. Furthermore, it also deserves mentioning that national ODA may sometimes have a positive impact on regional cooperation and the provision of regional public goods.

We use a broad definition of support to the AU and RECs that covers both direct transfers (to core budgets and to the programme budgets) and what might be termed ‘indirect’ funding. Indirect funding is destined to contribute to the agenda of the AU and RECs, but it is channelled through other actors and organisations. The choice to include indirect funding in the database is not unproblematic, but we believe that it adds important insights as to how donors seek to contribute to, influence and even exert “control” over African ROs. Our definition of support also includes three continental programmes led by the AU: the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the African Governance Architecture (AGA), and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). We also acknowledge that ODA may be directed to several ROs involved in the same project line, thereby reinforcing the trend of ‘overlapping regionalism’ (Panke and Stapel 2018).

We deal with security issues in keeping with the overall theme of this volume but, seeing as security and governance are closely related in the African context, we examine both. Security projects are designed to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts and ultimately to ensure peace (Nye 1971; MacFarlane and Weiss 1992), while governance has to do with the provision of collective goods and collectively binding regulations, such as human rights, democracy, the rule of law and anti-corruption measures (Börzel and Stapel 2015). When these two sources are grouped together, we refer to them as ‘security-related’ funding.

The chapter is organized as follows: in the next section, we show that total foreign funding to the AU and RECs as well as to ‘regional projects’ (outside the framework of the AU and the RECs) has increased dramatically since 2002. While regional projects comprise a range of policy sectors, nearly half of all funding to the AU and RECs is related to security and governance. The third section details the most important donors of security-related ODA to the AU and RECs and looks at their funding strategies and who supports whom. The fourth section looks beyond the OECD-DAC data used in the EFRO database to consider three powerful external actors – the EU, USA and China. A conclusory section completes the chapter.


The increase in security-related funding to the AU, RECs and regional projects

Regional ODA has increased dramatically since the turn of the millennium. Between 2002 and 2016, it increased from USD 1.5 bil. to USD 5 bil. per year. During this period, 60,084 ‘regional’ ODA projects were listed, accounting for more than USD 45.8 bil.

Although support to the AU and RECs has increased over time, only 3,956 of these projects targeted these organisations specifically, for a value of approximately USD 3.1 bil. In 2002, the AU and RECs received 58 projects worth a total of USD 19 mil., but by 2016 they had more than 380 activities worth a total of USD 377 mil.

While regional ODA covers twenty different policy sectors, the support provided to the AU and RECs is to a large extent focused on the security and governance sectors (i.e. what we refer to as security-related funding). The number of projects in these two sectors increased from 300 in 2002 to 1,000 in 2016 (with disbursements increasing from USD 143 mil. to USD 575 mil.). A total of 22 projects were linked to the AU and RECs in 2002, but by 2016 this number had increased to 150 (annual disbursements amounted to USD 6.6 mil. in 2002 and USD 121 mil. in 2016). Figure 1 shows that about 40 per cent of projects to the AU and RECs are in the security and governance sectors, while only some 20 per cent of all regional ODA projects fall within these sectors. We assume this reflects donor interests and beliefs in that that donors consider security issues better dealt with through the AU and select RECs, rather than through regional projects that fall outside these organisations.

Figure 1: Share of security-related ODA compared to overall ODA disbursements (2002-2016)




Another important feature is the AU’s dominance in relation to RECs. From 2002 when the Organisation of African Unity was transformed into the AU until 2016, donors funded a total of 634 security-related AU projects. As noted above, these figures do not include the non-ODA funding provided to security activities, some of which are carried out by the AU using external

funding while some are carried out through programmes controlled by external powers and agencies (e.g. the EU, UN, and the US Africa Command [AFRICOM]). When donors target regional organisations in the security and governance sectors, 90 per cent of their activities are carried out by the AU (44 per cent) and a second tier comprising four organisations: SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, and IGAD (46 per cent). A third group of RECs that are rarely targeted includes COMESA and ECCAS (3 per cent), and our data shows that the two remaining RECs have received no ODA support at all (CEN-SAD and AMU).² We have also found that donors fund several organisations at the same time, often through the continental APSA and NEPAD programmes (6 per cent of the overall number of activities).

Similarly, the dominance of the AU is also evident in the volume of ODA directed to the AU and RECs as a whole: 60 per cent of all disbursements, or USD 550 mil., were distributed to the organisation and its programmes between 2002 and 2016 (see Figure 2). The support provided to other organisations is marginal by comparison. The organisation that receives the second highest amount of ODA is SADC, but it receives only 12 per cent of all disbursements. ECOWAS, EAC and IGAD receive 9, 7, and 6 per cent of all disbursements respectively, and each of the remaining RECs attract less than 2 per cent or none.

Figure 2: Security-related ODA disbursements according to recipient organisation (2002-2016)



Four time phases can be identified in the data (see Figure 2). Firstly, between 2002 and 2006, disbursements were limited and spread across many African organisations. Between 2007 and 2011, the AU began receiving increasing attention and it was the only recipient to which

disbursements were increased, while other RECs received the same or lower amounts. Between 2012 and 2015, the number of both projects and disbursements to the AU and RECs declined slightly. The numbers increased again in 2015 and 2016, when external support to the security and governance sectors reached around USD 120 mil.

The most important donors

More than 20 donors have contributed to the 1,452 security-related aid activities recorded between 2002 and 2016 (see Table 1). However, only a small group of them is responsible for most of the activities and ODA.³ The EU, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom (the ‘Big 5’) account for 67 per cent of the activities and 80 per cent of the ODA disbursements in the EFRO data set. Canada, Denmark and the United States also provide a considerable amount of support to the AU and RECs for security and governance. Together, these eight donors account for 85 per cent of project activities and 91 per cent of disbursements.⁴


Table 1: Security-related aid activities by top donors (per year)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Sum
Germany	1	6	10	0	17	13	25	26	26	23	18	22	21	24	26	258
EU	4	3	4	3	1	3	6	19	24	21	24	21	22	24	32	211
Sweden	2	7	4	0	18	9	14	20	12	18	22	13	16	11	17	183
Norway	4	4	3	0	8	6	13	13	20	21	18	17	19	18	15	179
Canada	3	6	5	5	5	6	9	11	38	31	9	10	1	5	2	146
UK	1	2	4	5	5	9	13	9	19	14	10	12	6	19	10	138
US	0	0	0	2	0	1	2	5	5	6	7	5	4	3	18	58
Denmark	0	2	1	2	3	4	4	3	7	4	7	6	6	5	3	57
others	7	6	4	4	10	15	17	10	15	13	26	24	21	23	27	222

Three notable trends can be observed in relation to the number of projects pursued over the past 15 years. Firstly, Canada was an ‘early mover’ in funding ROs in the field of security and governance, but its support declined after the Harper administration formed a majority government in 2011 and decreased the country’s support for multilateral cooperation in general. Secondly, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the EU were also early movers and the number of projects funded by these four donors went on to increase and then stabilize at relatively high levels. Thirdly, other countries and development agencies have been increasing their involvement since 2009. The EU’s dramatic

increase in providing external funding since 2009 is the most striking case, but Denmark and the United States have also become more active.

Figure 3: Security-related ODA disbursements by top donors (2002-2016)



Among the top eight donors, their respective ranking shifts when we examine the financial size of their ODA disbursements (see Figure 3). Germany and the EU contribute the most, having provided more than USD 20 mil. annually in recent years. They are followed by Sweden and a group of three donors that has disbursed considerably less ODA for security-related purposes (Denmark, Norway, and the UK). Canada and the United States have spent the least out of these top eight, and only slightly more than other donors (such as Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland, which are not shown in Figure 3). Most importantly, however, the EU's ODA disbursements to the AU and RECs skyrocketed in 2015 and 2016 (USD 40 and 45 mil., respectively) even though our ODA-based data does not include the enormous contributions made by the EU to peacekeeping missions and other security-related projects in Africa (see more in the next section).

There are other nuances of note in terms of average disbursement per activity and preferred recipients. Firstly, the average size of disbursement differs widely between donors. The EU, Denmark, and Germany spend on average USD 1 mil. per aid activity. The AU in particular receives funding for large-scale projects from these donors – USD 2.77 mil. (EU), USD 1.25 mil. (Germany), and USD 1.09 mil. (Denmark). By contrast, the United Kingdom, United States, Norway, and Canada fund much smaller projects, with an average disbursement of less than USD

350,000 per activity. This explains why these donors rank higher for number of activities than they do for disbursement size. Sweden falls in between these two groups: this donor tends to disburse USD 500,000 per average aid activity. Secondly, donors tend to favour different recipient organisations. Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway and the UK initiate more than 50 per cent of their governance and security activities with the AU. Although the other top donors also work extensively with the AU (around 60 per cent of disbursement, with the exception of the United States at 10 per cent), a larger proportion of their funds goes to a few favoured RECs: SADC (Germany, EU, Norway), ECOWAS (Canada, Denmark, UK, United States), EAC (Germany, Sweden), and IGAD (Denmark, Norway, and United States). Thirdly, donors do not initiate an equal number of projects and do not distribute equal amounts of ODA in both sectors. One group of donors (Germany, Norway, and Denmark) focuses on security issues in funding the AU and RECs, while another (Canada, Sweden, UK and EU) concentrates on the governance sector. The activities funded by the United States tend to be more balanced, although they too are slightly skewed in favour of the governance sector.

In summary, most of the external funding to the AU and RECs for security-related activities comes from just a few donors; eight of them are responsible for most of the activities and disbursements of regional ODA, a fact that offers insights into their overall funding strategies.

The role of the EU, USA and China

This section expands our focus beyond the EFRO database for two reasons. Firstly, although the EU and United States report their ODA activities to the OECD-DAC, a significant portion of their support to Africa's regional security comes from outside the ODA framework. Secondly, China has become a powerful donor in Africa and should be considered even though the country does not report to the OECD. Most observers would agree that these three countries are among the most important when it comes to supporting regions and ROs in Africa, especially in the field of security and governance. A further indication of their importance is that EU, USA and China have established permanent diplomatic missions to the AU (although Japan and Norway followed suit recently.)

The EU is considered by both the donor community and African counterparts to be the most important supporter of APSA and of African security regionalism more broadly. The amount of

ODA it channels to African ROs alone does not justify this status, however; we need to take into account the EU's other policies and financial tools as well. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) provides a general cooperation framework, but the EU has long been using instruments such as the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the Instrument for Stability, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget to support peace and security in Africa. However, the African Peace Facility (APF) is the major source of EU funding to the peace and security activities of the AU and RECs. The European Development Fund (EDF) has enabled the EU to commit more than EUR 2.7 bil. to the APF since its establishment in 2004. The APF has three priority activities: (1) to enhance dialogue about challenges to peace and security, (2) to operationalize the APSA, and (3) to sustain Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Africa. The AU mission in the Sudan (AMIS) is the major PSO recipient, while others include Somalia (AMISOM), Comoros (AMISEC), and the CEMAC Mission to the Central African Republic (FOMUC) (EU 2017).

The APF has made the European Commission the largest financial contributor to African PSOs. The fact that the Commission has thus become an important player in a CFSP-related field sometimes causes legal and inter-institutional friction within the EU (Froitzheim et al 2011). Legal constraints in the EU prevent some countries, such as South Africa and several North African countries, from benefitting from APF-funded efforts. It is also difficult to combine EDF resources with funds from other instruments, such as the European Neighbourhood Instruments (ENI) or the DCI. Crucially, while EDF funds may be used for costs relating to African-led PSOs – such as communication and logistics equipment, peace-keepers' per diem allowances and medical facilities – they must not be used for anything that could have lethal implications, such as military hardware or training (EU 2017).

Apart from supporting African-led PSOs, the EU has also launched a number of civilian and military operations dealing with national or regional conflicts in Africa. Some EU peace operations have been given limited mandates to stabilize conditions and improve the humanitarian situation within a specified period of time. Examples include the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission in 2006 and Operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003, both of which are regarded as having achieved their objectives even if they have had a minimal impact on regional peace and security more broadly (Froitzheim et al. 2011). Moreover, strengthening cooperation in the fight against terror is identified as one of the first priorities for the EU-Africa partnership (CAERT 2017).

The United States has also been involved in security regionalism in Africa, though its motivations differ from those of the EU. Africa has not been a top priority in US post-Cold War foreign policy strategy, but the US did begin militarizing its Africa policy agenda after the 9/11 attacks. The global fight against terror, and increasingly the fight against radical Islam in Africa, were core priorities of the Bush and Obama administrations (Rye Olsen 2017). Accordingly, US cooperation with the AU and RECs includes conflict prevention, mitigation and peace operations. The official brief of the US AFRICOM highlights the need to build defence capacity and respond to crises and transnational threats. This is designed to advance US domestic interests and to promote regional security, stability and prosperity in Africa. Another line of support relates to governance, notably under the Obama administration (Cook and Husted 2016).

At the regional level, the US has contributed aid to the AU and RECs to develop their peace and security capacities. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has a relatively small office in Addis Ababa that supports the AU in two main areas: 1) building technical and soft capacity for executing its broad continental mandate (especially in line with the AU's Agenda 2063), and 2) disseminating knowledge about best development practices and policies to all 55 AU Member States. USAID support to the AU is provided in two ways, with direct funding awarded to selected activities and technical knowledge and assistance provided for particular topics and tasks. Some elements of technical assistance are directed to RECs, but most of it is provided to the AU Commission's departments. The US Department of Defence has also seconded staff to both AU and ECOWAS, and the Department of State has worked closely with RECs in Africa, for instance by posting ambassadors to the AU, ECOWAS, EAC and ECCAS (USAID 2014). However, US regional ODA to the AU and the RECs does not compare with the large sums provided by donors such as Germany, Sweden and the EU (see Figure 3).

US support for peace and security in Africa tends instead to be provided through bilateral cooperation with individual AU and REC member states (meaning that such support is not easily reflected in US regional plans and funding mechanisms). Much of it includes logistical support to states that participate in particular peace operations. US support for countries that provided troops to AMISOM has reached some USD 2 bil., while its support to AMIS amounts to USD 470 mil. It has also supported the African states that supplied troops to recent AU peace operations in Mali and CAR (Cook and Husted 2016). The Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance

Program (ACOTA) has provided small arms and training for peacekeeping operations to Benin, Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia. There are also many examples of other security programmes targeting Africa. For instance, under the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), the Pentagon provides aid to strengthen border security and counter-terrorism efforts in Mali, Chad, Niger and Mauritania. The US Navy also monitors countries from Guinea to Angola, and the Department of Defence has signed agreements that guarantee US access to air bases and ports maintained by local security forces in Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia. US security interests also stem from the fact that Africa is an increasingly important source of natural resources for the US economy. Oil thus lies at the heart of increasing militarization and geostrategic interests on the part of the US.

Finally, China has become one of Africa's most important partners for trade, economic cooperation, natural resource exploitation and, consequently, politics and security. Chinese interest in and support for the AU and RECs has increased over the past decade. China recognizes that African regional integration will improve political stability, a goal to which China seeks to contribute. China is now seeking to secure consensus with the AU and other sub-regional organisations on critical topics (Lammich 2014, p. 7), but it also understands that the AU's efforts to ensure peace and stability are constrained by a lack of human, economic and material resources. China is therefore not only promoting regional approaches to peace-keeping in Africa but is also providing material resources to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Zhengyu and Taylor 2011) and funding for new facilities at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa.

As is the case with the US, there is a tendency for China to develop bilateral relations with African countries instead of working through the AU and RECs (Söderbaum and Tavares 2008; Taylor 2008). China's considerable emphasis on natural resources has led it to seek supplies from countries such as the Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo. China is also a major arms supplier to the Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Burundi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, and this helps cement relationships with African leaders and arguably also offset the costs of buying natural resources. Since China does not express the same human rights concerns that the US and EU member countries do, it has a more flexible attitude regarding what countries it chooses to develop relations with. At the same time, however, it is important to the Chinese that security and political stability are maintained

in Africa, a fact which appears to lead to a gradual intensification of China's involvement in Africa's security arrangements. For instance, the Chinese military has sent trainers to aid its African counterparts and this helps China build alliances with African leaders that are important in global forums. As a result, although China's policy in relation to Africa is heavily concerned with natural resources and access to new markets, these elements are inextricably linked to China's global geostrategic interests (Taylor 2008). It is consequently worth considering Chinese activities in the region, particularly regarding peace operations and the APSA, in terms that go beyond its economic interests (Alden et al. 2018).

Conclusion

The analysis presented here contextualizes and grants nuance to current debates about the donor dependence of ROs in Africa. By giving an overview of donor activities over an extended period, we are able to identify important patterns and trajectories of external funding to AU, RECs and Africa's security and governance more broadly. Several important insights can be drawn from this analysis.

Firstly, external support in the form of ODA and funding to the AU and RECs has steadily increased in recent years. A large proportion of the funding to the AU and RECs is focused on security and governance. The AU has gradually become the main recipient of such support, with a number of favoured RECs (ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC) also receiving considerable international donor aid. Other RECs receive little or no external support.

Secondly, a few donors are very active (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the EU, Norway, Sweden and the UK) while the majority of donors give little to the AU and RECs. However, our mapping reveals that donors differ in the extent to which they prioritize the AU and RECs in favour of working outside the framework of these organisations, whether they prioritize the AU over other RECs, whether the projects they fund are small or large, and whether they prioritize security or governance projects. The major powers of China and the US tend to favour bilateral cooperation with individual partners and to focus their activities on peace operations. Overall, the striking amounts of external funding and variety of approaches beg questions about the motivations of those involved, and of African agency in managing these funds.

Thirdly, we have expanded our analysis beyond the EFRO database to also inquire into the strategies of some of the most important external donors to African nations: the EU, US and China. For these powers, supporting African security regionalism is at least partly intertwined with their own normative or geostrategic interests. External funders of the AU and RECs should not, therefore, be seen as neutral financiers of a purely ‘home-grown’ African peace and security architecture.

Our findings suggest several questions for future research. Firstly, we need to better understand how the external funding of ROs impacts their performance. An idealistic belief is that donor funding is ‘assisting’ African ROs, but a growing body of literature alludes to potentially problematic effects, with excessive donor dependence resulting in diminished RO effectiveness, implementation gaps and the failure of member states to comply with decisions and budget targets (Gray 2013; Engel 2015). Hence, there is still a lack of understanding about the conditions under which donor dependence does or does not become detrimental to RO performance. It is thus imperative that greater knowledge be created about what factors render aid to ROs effective or counterproductive, whether these factors vary across policy sectors and if there are patterns of variation across different donors as well. The mapping carried out in this chapter and the EFRO database should prove valuable for such purposes.

Secondly, scholars need to look beyond RO effectiveness and performance to also consider broader development objectives. Regional organisations offer means for achieving peace, development and poverty alleviation, but we still know far too little about the conditions under which external funding of these organisations will help bring about such positive outcomes. Our database might effectively be combined with other sources to generate such findings.

Finally, it is imperative that we better understand relationships between donors and recipients. The donor community, particularly the most active donors, are motivated by various and shifting interests (both egalitarian and more narrow). These interests cannot be fully understood, however, unless the perspectives of their African counterparts are also considered. Donors are rarely able to implement their agendas as they would wish; they tend to rely on ROs and their staff. ROs are likewise extremely reliant on external funding, which makes it necessary for them to collaborate with and adjust to donor policies and preferences. We therefore need more studies of interaction

between donors and recipients and of the way in which these relationships in turn affect strategies and outcomes. The intention of this chapter has been to contribute to such a research agenda.

References

- Alden, C., Alao, A., Chun, Z. and Barber, L., eds. (2018) *China and Africa: Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent*. Cham: Springer.
- AU (2013) *Report of H.E. Mr. Olusegun Obasanjo, Former President of Nigeria, Chairperson of the High-Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Funding the African Union. Assembly/AU/6(XXI)*. Addis Ababa: 26–27 May 2013.
- Börzel, T. A. and Stapel, S. (2015) 'Mapping Governance Transfer by 12 Regional Organisations: A Global Script in Regional Colors', in T. A. Börzel and V. van Hüllen. *Governance Transfer by Regional Organisations. Patching Together a Global Script*, 22-48, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Buzdugan, S. R. (2013) 'Regionalism from without: External involvement of the EU in regionalism in southern Africa', *Review of International Political Economy* 20(4): 917-946.
- CAERT (2017) African Centre for the Study of & Research of Terrorism website: <http://caert.org.dz/> (accessed, 25 September 2017).
- Cook, N. and Husted, T. F. (2016) *The African Union (AU): Key Issues and U.S.-AU Relations*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service R44713.
- Dreher, A., Fuchs, A. and Nunnenkamp, P. (2013) 'New Donors', *International Interactions* 39(3): 402-415.
- Engel, U. (2015) *The African Union finances – How does it work? Working Paper Series of the Centre for Area Studies No. 6*. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag.
- EU (2017) 'African Peace Facility', EU Commission website: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-cooperation/african-peace-facility_en (accessed, 25 September 2017).
- Froitzheim, M., F. Söderbaum and I. Taylor (2011). "The Limits of the EU as a Peace and Security Actor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *Africa Spectrum* Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 45-70.

- Gray, J. (2011) *External Actors and Outside Funding in South-South Regional Trade Agreements*. Paper presented at the conference The Political Economy of International Organisations (PEIO): ETH Zurich, Switzerland.
- Gray, J. (2013) *The Company States Keep: International Economic Organisations and Investor Perceptions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kagame, P. (2017) 'The Imperative to Strengthen Our Union. Report on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union, Decision on the Institutional Reform of the African Union', *Assembly/AU/Dec.606 (XXVII)*, Addis Abeba: African Union.
- Krapohl, S. (ed) (2017) *Regional Integration in the South. External Influence on Economic Cooperation in ASEAN, MERCOSUR and SADC*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Lammich, G. (2014) 'China's Impact on Capacity Building in the African Union', paper presented at the Workshop: South-South Development Cooperation Chances and Challenges for the International Aid Architecture, September 26-27, 2014 at Heidelberg University.
- MacFarlane, S. N. and Weiss, T. G. (1992) 'Regional Organisations and Regional Security', *Security Studies* 2(1): 6-37.
- Muntschick, J. (2017) *The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the European Union (EU). Regionalism and External Influence*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Nye, J. S. (1971) *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisation*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Panke, D. and Stapel, S. (2018) 'Exploring Overlapping Regionalism', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 21(3): 635-662.
- Rye Olsen, G. (2017) 'The ambiguity of US foreign policy towards Africa', *Third World Quarterly* 38(9): 2097-2112.
- Söderbaum, F. (2017) 'Swedish Development Cooperation and Ownership of African Regional Organisations', *Forum for Development Studies* 44(3): 357-375,
<https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2017.1382088>
- Söderbaum, F. (2016) *Rethinking Regionalism*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Söderbaum, F. and Brolin, T. (2016) *Supporting Regional Cooperation and Integration in Africa —What Works and Why?* Stockholm: Expert Group for Aid Studies.

- Söderbaum, F. and Tavares, R. (2008), *The African Union and the Regional Economic Communities: 3 Scenarios for 2018-2028*. Report commissioned by the Swedish Armed Forces (August), Swedish Armed Forces, Stockholm.
- Taylor, I. (2008) *China's New Role in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- USAID (2014) Regional Economic Communities. Results from a Landscape Analysis of Regional Health Sector Actors in Africa: Comparative Advantages, Challenges, and Opportunities.
- Vanheukelom, J., Byiers, B., Bilal, S. and Woolfrey, S. (2016) *The political economy of regional integration in Africa. What drives and constrains regional organisations? Synthesis Report*. Maastricht: ECDPM.
- Zhengyu, W. and Taylor, I. (2011) 'From refusal to engagement: Chinese contributions to peacekeeping in Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 29(2): 137-154.

¹ The RECs form the pillars of an envisioned African Economic Community and they are acknowledged by the African Union. The eight organisations are AMU, CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC.

² It may be noted that the funding contributed to ECCAS countries for dealing with the crisis in CAR is not reported as regional ODA.

³ The 23 donors are the African Development Bank, African Development Fund, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, the International Development Association, the International Labour Organisation, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

⁴ Although 15 donors do not feature prominently in our data set, some of their funding has been important for the security-related activities of the AU and RECs.