

# Inter-level trust in a multi-level political system

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Paper prepared for NORKOM XXIV, Gothenburg 26-28 Nov. 2015

Very first draft – do not cite

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## **Introduction**

Most people would agree that in a well-functioning multi-level government system, the responsibilities of public authorities are carefully distributed between the tiers of government, balancing the values of cost-effective service production and local self-governance. Ideally, political bodies and administrative authorities on all tiers of government work together for the good of the society in a spirit of harmony and trust.

However, in every multi-level system, there are inherent and probably unavoidable tensions between different tiers of government that may produce breaches of trust (Aars, Fimreite, & Flo, 2008; Hansen & Klausen, 2002; Karlsson, 2015; Karlsson & Gilljam, 2014b). One such tension could be described as a conflict of interest between territorially defined groups of citizens, between or within tiers of government. What is good for your country or for your neighboring municipality is not necessarily good for your own municipality.

From a political perspective, especially for elected representatives, such tensions could also translate into a struggle for political power. Representatives in local, regional and national tiers of government all want to implement their own preferred policies in order to govern successfully and to be rewarded by the support of voters in coming elections. Political and

administrative bodies on other tiers of government could here be perceived as meddling complications that limit their scope of action. In an extreme case, a political representative elected on one tier of government may come to regard a fellow party member elected on another tier as a political opponent.

A complicating factor in this power struggle is that political representatives may be elected on several tiers of government simultaneously. The tension between tiers is then not merely a conflict with others but a conflict of loyalties for the individual representative. One way of handling this conflict may be to perceive one tier as the prime representation focus and the other as the subsidiary. Or maybe multi-tier representatives divide their loyalties evenly, and become more understanding and trusting towards all tiers of government while single-tier representatives tend to favorize their own tier?

Furthermore, in a multi-level system built on the principles of parliamentary democracy, political representatives on each tier of government could be divided into two categories: members of parties in *government* and members of the *opposition*. With three tiers of government, representatives from a particular party could experience that their party is in government on all three tiers; in opposition on all three tiers; or in a combination of government and opposition roles on different tiers.

As both tier association and party affiliation could be potential sources of political loyalty and trust, it is an open question which of the two that affects a representative the most. Do political representatives in opposition trust a political institution in their own tier of government more than they do institutions in other tiers, where their party is in government?

The aim of this paper is to study political representatives in a multi-level government system and their level of political trust in relation to institutions in other tiers of government. The analysis is built on data from two surveys which combined cover all elected political representatives in Sweden, on the local, regional and national level.

As this is the first draft of this paper, much of the effort is put on sketching research questions and finding a modeling strategy. In future versions the analysis will hopefully be more streamlined, and better anchored in earlier studies. All tips and comments will be greatly appreciated.

## Inter-level relations

Trust is an essential facilitator for interactions between all kinds of actors. Without trust, the coexistence of actors in a society, not to mention active cooperation and division of labor, are hard to achieve. Social sciences have put a lot of effort into studying the trust between citizens and between citizens and political institutions (LOTS OF REFERENCES (Norén Bretzer, 2005)). It is hard to overstate the importance of high trust levels for a successful society.

Political institutions are normally intended to function together and trust between institutions is crucial for enabling efficient service production. However, in some cases political institutions are constructed to be counterparts, creating checks and balances and healthy competition. In other cases, such conflicting interests between political institutions are accidental and potentially disruptive. In both cases, generating and keeping trust is crucial in order to uphold a constructive atmosphere of cooperation.

Tensions between tiers of government in a multi-level system are arguably both intentional and unintentional. There is always an inherent value conflict between, on the one hand, local autonomy and service variation, and on the other hand, national equality and service conformity. Finding the balance between these two values is a challenge for political leaders in all multi-level systems (Karlsson, 2015). But many inter-level relations are not intended to create friction. Actors in different tiers of government interact daily and are co-dependents of one another. National policies will fail if local authorities do not respect or trust the sources of these policies. And local policies will never be implemented if national institutions do not trust municipalities and regions with sufficient autonomy and resources. To increase our understanding of how political actors in different tiers of government assess one another, and which factors contribute to build up and tear down trust-levels, is therefore a very important task social science.

In a previous Swedish study on democratic satisfaction in different tiers of government, a main result was that political representatives are more satisfied with democracy at the tier where they are elected, and less satisfied with democracy at other tiers (Esaiasson, Gilljam, & Karlsson, 2013). A couple of factors can potentially explain this result: Firstly, representatives' awareness on how democracy works is probably much stronger in relation to their own tier. It is easy to appreciate what you know and be suspicious of the unknown.

Secondly, the representatives are partly responsible for how democracy works in their own tier. And since they have been elected to their offices in the existing system, the system has obviously worked in their interest. It is probably easier to appreciate processes that you are responsible for and which have benefitted you in the past, and harder to appreciate processes that are fully out of your control and of little gain for your personal interests. The fact that representative's views on democratic practices are affected by personal and party interest is well established (Bowler, Donovan, & Karp, 2006; Gilljam & Karlsson, 2015).

Analytically, satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions are separate phenomena. Trust in institutions could be described as a more specific form of trust than democratic satisfaction (compare (Norén Bretzer, 2005; Norris, 1999). Attitudes towards how democracy works and how institutions work could also refer to different aspects of legitimacy. The legitimacy of public institutions are partly built on input legitimacy (like democratic processes) but the most important factor is normally output legitimacy (like welfare services and collective services)(Roos & Lidström, 2014). But if we presume that these results of tier association on representatives' democratic satisfaction are analogous to the discussion on inter-level political trust, the following hypothesis is likely to be true:

***H1. Political representatives will trust political institutions in their own tier of government more than they trust institutions in other tiers of government***

Then there is the question of multiple mandates as a possible mitigating factor. For example, are national MPs more or less inclined to serve as promoters of local government if they have a background as local representatives? Jacob Aars has identified a few potential mechanisms for why this could be the case: information and knowledge is being passed on through the movement of personnel between tiers; MPs may have been socialized into identifying with the problems and concerns of local government; and there is likely to be stronger personal ties between MPs and the people back home (Aars, 2014) p.348). However, Aars discovered that the relation between previous local experiences and MPs priorities might not be so clear-cut. To the contrary, Norwegian MPs with a background in local politics seemed to be more skeptical towards local government than colleagues who do not share this this experience. For Swedish MPs on the other hand, a local experience seemed to have the opposite effect. Setting the nuances aside and building on Aars result from Sweden, and extrapolating to all tiers of government, the expectation in this study is that:

***H1a.*** *Political representatives elected in one tier of government will trust political institutions in other tiers of government more if they are elected to office in those tiers as well.*

If H1a is true, double-mandate representatives are likely to be less of a partisan than single-mandate representatives. And if experience of having positions on several tiers of government produces an openness and wider understanding for political institutions in general, maybe the following hypothesis is true as well?

***H1b.*** *Double-mandate representatives are more trusting than single-mandate representatives towards institutions in tiers of government where they are not elected.*

The outcome of decisions made by political assemblies and executive bodies are determined by the party-political composition of members of these institutions. It is therefore likely that people have higher trust in institutions where their own party is in government. “We tend to trust those we agree with” (Citrin, 1974). Sören Holmberg has called this assumption “the Home Team Hypothesis” (Holmberg, 1999). For example, a longitudinal study on citizens’ trust in the Swedish national parliament and in the national government showed sharp and immediate changes in trust levels before and after an election where the election results produced a shift in government: After the election, supporters of the party in the outgoing government lost trust in both government and parliament while supporters of parties in the new government gained in trust for both institutions (Holmberg & Weibull, 2011). Ylva Norén-Bretzer has confirmed Holmberg’s Home Team Hypothesis for citizens’ trust both in relation to national and local political institutions (Norén Bretzer, 2005). Another corresponding result in the above mentioned study on democratic satisfaction is that both political representatives and citizens are more satisfied with democracy in tiers where their own party is in government (Esaiasson, et al., 2013). Hence we could expect:

***H2.*** *Political representatives will trust political institutions in a particular tier of government more if their own party is in government in that tier, and trust them less if their own party is in opposition.*

To complicate this discussion even further, the effect of party affiliation on trust may vary in relation to different kinds of political institutions (i.e. legislative, executive or administrative institutions). From studies on citizens we learn that political ideology is a very important

factor for explaining trust in the government, as citizens with an ideology similar to the governing parties are much more inclined to trust the government as an institution. Ideology is less important in relation to trust in the parliament, and even less important in relation to unpolitical administrative agencies (Holmberg & Weibull, 2014). If these results are applicable for political representatives as well, we should expect a differentiation in the hypothesized effect of party affiliation in the following way:

*H2a. The hypothesized effect of party affiliation on political trust in H2 will be stronger in relation to executive institutions, less strong in relation to political assemblies and there will be no effect on trust for unpolitical administrative institutions.*

## **Representative democracy in a multi-level system: Sweden**

The Swedish multi-level government system is based on three tiers of government where political assemblies are elected on the same day every fourth year: 290 Municipalities with close to 13 000 elected representatives in local councils; 20 county councils/regions<sup>1</sup> with 1662 members in regional councils; and the national level with 349 members in the national parliament - The Riksdag.<sup>2</sup>

The shares of representatives in each tier of government who simultaneously have mandates in other tiers (i.e. “double-mandates”) are presented in table 1. Table 1 also presents the share of representatives who are members of local and regional executive boards.<sup>3</sup> In table 2, the shares of single-, double -and triple-mandates among representatives on each tier are presented by party affiliation. Both tables are based on survey data.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The formal name of the second tier of government in Sweden is county council [landsting], but since a number of county councils in recent years have taken to call themselves regions, the terminology is complicated. In this paper all institutions on the second tier is called “regional”, irrespective of whether the county council has claimed regional status or not.

<sup>2</sup> The EU-level, and the 20 Swedish representatives in the European parliament, are not included in this study.

<sup>3</sup> On the national level, no representatives are simultaneously members of parliament and of the executive (the government), MPs in the government take a leave of absence from the Riksdag during their time in office.

<sup>4</sup> The information on national–local and national–regional double-mandates, as well as information on membership in executive boards, are built on survey data. In surveys of this kind, there is always a risk that respondents misunderstand the question and exaggerate their own status. The numbers of local–regional double-mandates also refer to the respondents of the KOLFU-survey, but this information is corroborated by independent sources.

**Table 1: Double-mandates and membership in executive boards among political representatives in Sweden by tier of government (percent within each tier, survey data)**

	National parliament	Regional council	Regional executive board	Local council	Local executive board	N
National MPs 2014	100	6	2*	36	9*	295
Regional Councillors 2012	1	100	21	38	15	1267
Local Councillors 2012	1	5	1	100	28	9707

Comments: Sources of data: RDU 2014, KOLFU 2012

\*Includes membership in the executive board *and* other council committees

**Table 2: Representatives in different tiers of government with single, double- and triple mandates by party and tier of government (percent within each tier, survey data)**

	Party									Sum	N
	V	S	Mp	C	Fp	Kd	M	SD	Others		
<u>All representatives</u>											
National MPs 2014	6	35	8	6	5	4	23	13	-	100	295
Regional Councillors 2012	7	41	7	7	7	5	21	1	3	100	1267
Local Councillors 2012	5	37	6	11	5	8	22	3	4	100	9707
<u>Single-mandates</u>											
National MPs 2014	7	28	13	8	8	6	23	7	-	100	155
Regional Councillors 2012	7	41	7	7	9	5	20	1	3	100	760
Local Councillors 2012	6	37	6	11	7	5	22	3	4	100	9113
<u>Double-mandates</u>											
Local–regional 2012	5	31	5	8	5	6	31	7	2	100	483
Local–national 2014	4	41	0	6	3	3	22	22	-	100	107
Regional–national 2014	6	17	0	6	0	0	22	50	-	100	18
<u>Triple-mandates</u>											
Local–regional–national 2014	8	15	0	8	0	0	8	62	-	100	13

Comments: Party abbreviation: V (The Left party/socialists); S (Social democrats); MP (The Green party); C (The Center party/agrarians); Fp (The People's liberal party); Kd (Christian democrats); M (The Moderate party/conservatives); SD (Sweden democrats/nationalists). Sources of data: RDU 2014, KOLFU 2012.

The political executive in municipalities and regions are shared between the executive board and other council committees, where the executive board is the undisputed center of power. A member of the executive board is normally (but not mandatory) an elected member of the council. In the KOLFU survey of 2012, 29 percent of the local councillors claimed to be members of the executive board (substitute board members not included); 20 percent of the regional councillors claimed to be members of the regional executive board.

According to the table 1, 5 percent of local councillors were also members of the regional council (which means that 41 percent of regional councillors are also local councillors).

1 percent of local and of regional councillors claimed to be national MPs in 2012. Conversely, 31 percent of the national MPs in 2014 claimed to be members of local councils and 5 percent of regional councils.

It is possible to be an elected representative on all three tiers of government simultaneously, and 6 individual representatives in the KOLFU 2012 survey and 13 in the RDU 2014 survey claimed to be so. In 2014, 8 of the 13 triple-mandate representatives were Sweden democrats. The Sweden democrats have also by far the highest share of double-mandates after the 2014 election. The Sweden democrats has recently experienced a rapid growth in voter support which has not been matched by a growth in viable candidates, and it is apparent that prominent SD-candidates – perhaps unexpectedly – have been elected on multiple mandates to a larger extent than others parties.

The parliamentary principles at the Swedish national level are constitutionally unambiguous, while the practice of forming local and regional majorities heavily leans on informal constitutional rules. But the informality behind the formation of the local and regional regimes does not make them less real or influential. All elected representatives in Sweden could easily be classified as either being members of parties in government or in opposition in the tier where they are elected (Gilljam & Karlsson, 2012; Karlsson, 2013).

Furthermore, all representatives could also be classified as being a member of a party in government or in opposition in tiers where they are *not* elected. For example in 2012, 44-45 percent of all regional and local councillors could be classified as members of national government parties (at that time: Moderates, Liberals, Center party representatives and Christian democrats) while 55-56 percent were members of national opposition parties (all other parties). All representatives could also been classified as belonging to their party's parliamentary position in their home region and home municipality, even if they have no local or regional mandates.<sup>5</sup> As the Sweden democrats have yet to be part of any ruling coalition on either tier of government, their elected representatives are all classified as opposition members on all tiers. Table 3 presents the share of members of government/opposition parties by tier of government in 2012 (local and regional tiers) and 2014 (national tier).

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<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately, as we do not have data on the home municipalities of regional councillors who do not simultaneously are local councillors, only regional councillors with regional–local double-mandates could be classified in accordance with the parliamentary situation in their home municipality.



**Table 3: Share of Swedish political representatives who are members of parties in government or in opposition in different tiers of government (percent, survey data)**

	National government	National opposition	Regional majority	Regional opposition	Local majority	Local opposition	N
National MPs 2014	40	60	43	57	51	49	349
Regional Councillors 2012	44	56	53	47	48*	52*	1289
Local Councillors 2012	45	55	52	48	54	46	9725

Comments: Sources of data: RDU 2014, KOLFU 2012

\*Numbers only based on regional councillors with double regional-local mandates.

## Methodology and data

The data used in this paper come from two surveys which together cover all elected local, regional and national representatives in Sweden.

The first of these, KOLFU 2012<sup>6</sup>, was a survey of all local and regional councilors in the 290 municipalities and 20 county counties/regions in Sweden (close to 13,500 representatives).

The survey was carried out from October 2012 to March 2013, accumulating 10,491 responses, which translates to a response rate of 79 percent.<sup>7</sup> Analyses show no differences in response rates between male and female representatives. The response rate of seven of the eight national parties varies between 77-82 percent while the rate of Sweden democrats is somewhat lower, 62 percent. The response rate exceeded 60 percent in 266 of 290 municipalities and as well as in all 20 regions (Karlsson & Gilljam, 2014c).

The second survey, RDU 2014<sup>8</sup>, was directed to all 349 MPs in the Swedish national parliament (The Riksdag). The survey was carried out from November 2014 to May 2015, accumulating 306 responses, which translates to a response rate of 88 percent. Analyses show that female MPs responded to a higher degree (92 percent) than male MPs (86 percent). The

<sup>6</sup> "Kommun- och landstingsfullmäktigeundersökningen 2010"

<sup>7</sup> Representatives who left the council during the period the survey was conducted (from May 2012 to March 2013) was excluded from the list of respondents. Their replacements were not added to the respondent list as their experience of the post was too brief to merit participation in the survey. As a result, the actual survey population was somewhat lower than the total number of mandates in all councils.

<sup>8</sup> "Riksdagsundersökningen 2014"

response rate of the eight national parties varies between 76 percent (Sweden democrats) and 96 percent (The Green party) (Karlsson & Nordin, 2015).

The two surveys were conducted two years apart and it should be noted that since RDU was conducted after the general elections of 2014, the results of the two surveys refer to different election periods. The MPs of RDU 2014 are classified as members of parties in government (Social democrats and Greens – 40 percent) and members of the opposition (all other parties – 60 percent). All MPs in RDU 2014 have also been classified as being members of the ruling parties or the opposition of their home county council/region (43 and 57 percent respectively) and their home municipality (51 and 49 percent) (see table 3 above).

The dependent variables of this study all relate to the political representatives' trust in political institutions. These variables are built on responses to a question which was included in both the RDU and the KOLFU survey. The question was formulated as follows: "How much trust to you have in the way which the following institutions conduct their work?". The representatives responded on a five-graded scale from very high level of trust to a very low level of trust".<sup>9</sup> The alternatives which the representatives were asked to evaluate were: the national government; then national parliament; the national administrative authorities; the regional executive board in your region; the regional council in your region; the regional administrative authorities in your region; the local council in your municipality; the local executive board in your municipality; and the local administrative authorities in your municipality.<sup>10</sup> In this study, the dependent variables are recoded into a 0–100 scale. In table 4, the mean value of trust for each institution is presented for representatives in the three tiers of government. The table also presents the mean values of trust by the parliamentary position of the representatives' party in the tier of the mentioned institutions, and the mean difference between the government/ruling majority and the opposition for each institution.

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<sup>9</sup> In Swedish: "Hur stort förtroende har du för det sätt på vilket följande institutioner sköter sitt arbete?", "mycket högt förtroende" – "mycket litet förtroden".

<sup>10</sup> In Swedish: "Regeringen, riksdagen, statsförvaltningen, landstingsstyrelsen i ditt landsting, landstingsfullmäktige i ditt landsting, förvaltningen i ditt landsting, kommunstyrelsen i din kommun, kommunfullmäktige i din kommun, förvaltningen i din kommun".

**Table 4: Trust in political institutions of elected representatives by tier of government and parliamentary position (mean values (0-100) and mean differences)**

	Local councillors 2012				Regional councillors 2012				National MPs 2014			
	All	Maj	Opp	<i>Dif</i>	All	Maj	Opp	<i>Dif</i>	All	Maj	Opp	<i>Dif</i>
<b>National level</b>												
Parliament	63	75	53	-22	65	77	55	-22	<b>75</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>-6</b>
Government	57	84	35	-49	59	87	36	-51	<b>57</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>-56</b>
Administrative authorities	60	68	53	-15	62	70	56	-14	<b>79</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>-10</b>
<b>Regional level</b>												
Council	54	62	44	-18	<b>65</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-28</b>	56	63	51	-12
Executive	53	62	42	-20	<b>62</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-35</b>	55	64	48	-16
Administrative authorities	54	59	48	-11	<b>64</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>-15</b>	60	63	58	-5
<b>Local level</b>												
Council	<b>69</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>-21</b>	62	78	52	-26	63	77	46	-31
Executive	<b>66</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>-26</b>	61	78	49	-29	63	79	44	-35
Administrative authorities	<b>66</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>-11</b>	62	73	58	-15	67	75	57	-18
N	8694-8962				1170-1198				274-276			

Comments: Representatives trust in institutions in their own tier of government is marked by bold text. The values for regional councillors by local parliamentary position are marked in grey, since these data only refer to regional councillors with regional–local double-mandates and not single-mandate regional councillors. Sources: RDU 2014 and KOLFU 2012.

The general picture is that Swedish political representatives have high levels of trust in political institutions on all tiers of government. But there is also significant variation. For example, the overall tendency is that executive institutions have somewhat lower trust levels than the other institutions, and the inter-level trust in regional institutions is lower than in local and national institutions.

In addition, the results in table 1 shows that representatives in a specific tier of government have higher trust in the institutions of their own tier than representatives of other tiers have (one marginal exception is that national MPs have slightly higher trust in the local administrative authorities of their home municipality than do local councillors). These results clearly support H1.

Furthermore, there is a considerable difference in trust levels between representatives who are members of government/ruling majority parties and of opposition parties in all tiers of government and for all nine institutions. These results are all predicted by H2.

But in order to test these and other hypotheses more thoroughly, multivariate analyses must be adapted and relevant other factors must be controlled for. These analyses will be carried out

through MLS regression in two steps. In the first step, analysis of trust for the nine institutions within each tier of government is carried out and presented in tables A1 (national MPs), A2 (regional councillors) and A3 (local councillors). In the next step Tables B1 and C1-9, all representatives on all tiers are grouped together, and political positions are included as independent variables. The C-tables make it possible to compare the effects of tier association and belonging to a party in government while the A-tables show whether effects are consistent in the three groups of representatives.

The C-tables consist of five models (M1-5) where M1 only include indicators of political office, M2 only indicators of membership of government parties in the three tiers. In M3 a number of control variables are introduced. In M3-5, effects of the gender, age and education level of the representatives will be controlled for, as well as their ideological position on the left-right scale. As representatives of the Sweden democrats are in opposition everywhere, affiliation to this party is also controlled for in order to secure that the effect of belonging to a government party is separate from the effect of being a Sweden democrat.

As we have information on membership in local and regional executive boards, these indicators are included in the models in order to distinguish between the effect of local/regional elected office and the membership in the executive institution on local and regional tiers. For national MPs, the indicator for membership in the local and regional executive includes membership of other council committees beside the executive board.

One important lesson from earlier studies is that an individual's trust in a specific institution may in part be a result of the individual's general trust, in relation to all political institutions. In order to separate the effects of the main independent variables on each specific institution, an indicator for general trust is included in the final models: *general democratic discontent* (GDD). This indicator is built on another set of questions included in the KOLFU and RDU surveys concerning satisfaction with democracy on four tiers of government: EU, national, regional and local tiers of government. The GDD-indicator is built on the mean value of representatives' (dis)satisfaction with democracy on all four tiers; where 0 represent great satisfaction 1 represent great dissatisfaction with democracy in all four tiers. The GDD-indicator is excluded in models M1-3 and introduced in models M4 and M5.

If initial effects of indicators on trust in model 3 of tables C1-9 disappear when GDD is controlled for, the effects could be interpreted as indirect effect via a general discontent, while

remaining direct effects are specific to the analyzed institution. As GDD is a potential causal link between the main independent variables (tier association and party affiliation) and the dependent variables (trust in particular institutions), table B1 illustrates the effects of the independent variables (of model M3 in tables C1-9) on GDD to help further the discussion on causality.

One methodological problem is that there is no information on the home municipality of single-mandate regional councillors. In all models where the indicator “local majority party” is included, two thirds of the regional councillors are excluded. In tables C4-6 where trust in regional institutions are independent variables, M2 is repeated twice; in M2a only regional councillors with regional–local double-mandates are included while in M2b all regional councillors are included but the indicator of belonging to a local majority party is omitted. The local majority indicator is also excluded in M3 of tables C4-6 and in M4 of all tables C1-9. The difference between M4 and M5 is therefore the inclusion of all regional councillors but exclusion of the local majority party indicator (M4) and the exclusion of single-mandate regional councillors and the inclusion of the local majority party indicator (M5)

[In further analyses, contextual variables relating to the representatives’ home municipalities and regions may be introduced. It is for example possible that the well-being in general and the business climate in particular could affect the trust for local and regional institutions. Indicators for socio-economic factors, for the quality/quantity of service production as well as for the local business climate are potentially important (Lidström, 2008; Roos & Lidström, 2014). However, a strong focus on local contextual factors could potentially complicate the inter-level approach of the study, as it is not possible to make parallel controls for local and regional factors, and not possible at all to include such factors on the national level – as there is only one case.]

# Results

The results of the MLS-regression analyses are presented in the Table Appendix below Tables A1-3, B1 and C1-9). In this section we return to the five hypotheses and summarize their accuracy in the light of these results.

***H1.** Political representatives will trust political institutions in their own tier of government more than they trust institutions in other tiers of government*

## Mostly confirmed

- National MPs have higher trust in the national parliament and national administrative authorities than local and regional representatives, but trust in the national government is not affected by tier association
- Regional councillors have higher trust in all three regional institutions than local and national representatives
- Local representatives have higher trust in all three local institutions than regional and national representatives, but as membership in the local executive board is included in the same models as being a local council member, it is only the executive board membership and not the council membership that is significant in relation to trust in the local executive board and in local administrative authorities.<sup>11</sup>

***H1a.** Political representatives in one tier of government will trust political institutions in other tiers of government more if they are elected representatives in those tiers as well.*

## Mostly confirmed

- National MPs with local office have higher trust in the local executive board and in local administrative authorities. MPs' trust in the local council is not affected by local office and their trust in regional institutions is not affected by regional office.

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<sup>11</sup> Tests with alternative models, including tier association indicators built on dummy variables (single, double and triple mandates in 7 combinations), indicate that local council membership may indeed have a significant positive effect on trust for local council and local administrative authorities. This will be developed in later versions.

- Regional councillors with local office have higher trust in local institutions. Regional councillors trust in national institutions is not significantly affected by national office (very few regional councillors are national MPs)
- Local councillors with national office have higher trust in the national parliament and national administrative authorities (but there is no office effect on trust for the government). Local councillors with regional office have higher trust in all regional institutions.

Membership in the local and executive boards increases representatives' trust in executive boards under control for council membership. This indicates further support for the underlying assumption behind H1 and H1b that representatives' trust is higher in institutions where they are themselves members.

***H1b.** Double-mandate representatives are more trusting than single-mandate representatives towards institutions in tiers of government where they are not elected.*

#### **Not confirmed**

- There are no signs of a generalized trust deriving from a double-mandate. National MPs with local office have no higher trust in regional institutions, MPs with local office have no higher trust in regional institutions, etc. The one result in support of H1b is that among local councillors, having a regional office increase the trust for national administrative authorities slightly.

***H2.** Political representatives will trust political institutions in a particular tier of government more if their own party is in a governing position in that tier, and trust them less if their own party is in opposition.*

#### **Confirmed**

- In tables A1-3: National MPs, regional and local councillors all have higher trust in the nine political institutions if their party is in government in the tier of the institution in question. (The one exception is that there is no government-effect on trust for regional administrative authorities among MPs).
- In tables C1-9: All results are in line with the hypothesis.

*H2b. The hypothesized effect of party affiliation on political trust in H2 will be stronger in relation to executive institutions, less strong in relation to political assemblies and there will be no effect on trust for unpolitical administrative institutions.*

### **Mostly confirmed**

- In tables C1-9: In line with the hypothesis, the effect of party affiliation is stronger in relation to the executive institutions, less strong in relation to political assemblies and least strong in relation to administrative institutions. However, in contrary to the prediction of H2b, there is still a significant effect of belonging to a government party when assessing unpolitical administrative institutions.

### **Other results:**

As both tier association and party affiliation have significant effects – which of the two are the most important source of trust? The results give us no doubt on the answer: Party affiliation is by far the most important factor in most cases. One way of measuring the difference is to compare the explanatory power in models where only tier association are included as independent variables (M1 in tables C1-9) with models where only party affiliation (membership of a party in government on the three tiers) are included (M2 in tables C1-9). For all institutions, the explanatory power of belonging to government or opposition parties is at least twice as strong as tier association, and in most cases much stronger.

However there are a couple of cases when tier association is stronger: The effect of being a national MP is stronger than the effect of being a member of a national government party with regards to trust in the national parliament and in national administrative authorities. And regarding trust for regional administrative authorities, the effect of regional office is of equal size as the effect of belonging to a regional majority party.

In models M4-5 in tables C1-9, general democratic discontent is included as a control variable. This variable has the expected negative effect on trust for all institutions, enabling us to distinguish the effect of the other factors on trust for the specific institutions. A comparison of the effect of GDD on trust for the nine institutions, general discontent has a stronger effect in relation to regional and local institutions and weaker effects in relation to national institutions. Overall, the introduction of GDD in M4 and M5 has limited impact on the effects of other factors. The indicator most related to GDD is affiliation to the Sweden democrats.



Sweden democrat representatives are always in opposition. In tables A1-3 and in tables C1-9 models M3-5, Sweden democratic party affiliation is included as a separate independent variable alongside indicators of affiliation to government/majority parties on the three levels. Hence the “government-effect” in these analyses refers to other parties than the Sweden democrats. If affiliation to the Sweden democrats was not controlled for, the government-effect would be even stronger.

Being anti-establishment party, Sweden democrats are well known for being critical towards political institutions. In table B1 measuring general democratic discontent, being a Sweden democrat is the single most important factor – as Sweden democrats are clearly more discontent than others. Regarding more specific political trust, there is a separate and significant negative effect on trust for national institutions of being a Sweden democrat. With regards to regional institutions (and under control for democratic discontent, tables C4-6 models M4-5), being a Sweden democrat has a positive effect on trust. In relation to the three local institutions (tables C7-9), being a Sweden democrat has a limited negative effect (model M3) but when controlling for general democratic discontent, the effect of being a Sweden democrat is positive. This means that being a Sweden democrat has an indirect negative effect on trust through GDD and a direct positive effect on trust for local institutions.

Regarding the other control variables in model M5 of tables C1-9, women representatives have slightly higher trust in the national parliament, all regional and local institutions while men have slightly higher trust in national administrative authorities. Older representatives have lower trust and young representatives have higher trust in the national parliament, in national administrative authorities, and in the local council. Additionally, older representatives have a slightly lower trust in regional administrative authorities. High education has a negative effect on trust in the local executive and the local council. The effects of the left-right indicator show that being to the right has a negative effect on trust for local and regional institutions and positive effects on trust in national institutions. The respondents of KOLFU who comprise the vast majority in the combined KOLFU-RDU data set, answered the question in a time when the national government consisted of center-right parties. In table A1, there are no effects of left-right position on trust for eight of the nine institutions – the only exception being a negative effect of being to the right on the trust for the national government (which at the time was center-left).

## Discussion

To summarize, political representatives in the Swedish multi-level system have relatively high levels of trust in political institutions in all tiers of government. However, they have the highest trust in the institutions of tiers where they are elected and less trust in other tiers. A double-mandate boosts trust for both tiers where the representative is elected, but a double-mandate does not generate a generalized trust for institutions in other tiers. And as expected, being a member of a party in government in a specific tier increase the trust levels for the intuitions of that tier. This government-effect is stronger in relation to trust in executive institutions, less strong for trust in political assemblies and least strong for trust in administrative authorizes.

The most remarkable of these results is not that there is a government-effect (compare Holmberg's "Home Team Hypothesis" (Holmberg, 1999)), but that the effect is so dominant in relation to all other factors. When political representatives on all tiers of government assess political institutions in the Swedish multi-level system, the single most important factor determining their level of trust is whether they supports the governing regime on the tier where the institution is situated.

Henry Bäck has argued that political parties are the single most important channel of access between Swedish tiers of government (Bäck, 2010). In a system where strong forces of economic and political interest are driving the tiers apart, parties could help holding the system together. This argument is probably valid in all Nordic multi-level systems, which in international comparison stand out as particularity party politicized and where the same parties are active on most tiers of government.

However, the results of this study suggest that parties could also be a powerful undermining force for inter-level trust, as trust in relation to elected institutions is so strongly affected by which parties that are in government and which are not. The strength of this undermining force is especially evident in representatives' trust for unelected administrative authorities. The bureaucracy has no political color but is still affected by the Home Team-effect. If all political units of the multi-level system were governed by the same parties, the inter-level political trust would likely be higher.

One factor contributing to the relatively high level of inter-level trust in Sweden might be the common election day, as voters are strongly influenced by national election trends in local elections (Karlsson & Gilljam, 2014a). It is quite possible that a separation of national and local/regional elections would reduce the levels of inter-level trust.

# Table Appendix

**Table A1: National MPs' trust in nine political institutions 2014. MLS regression.**

	Trust in local institutions			Trust in regional institutions			Trust in national institutions		
	Parl.	Exec.	Admin.	Parl.	Exec.	Admin.	Parl.	Exec.	Admin.
National government party	+11**	+10**	+9**	+14***	+14***	+16***	+8*	+39***	+11***
Regional majority party	NS	NS	NS	+7*	+13***	NS	NS	NS	NS
Local majority party	+23***	+28***	+15***	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Regional office	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Local office	NS	+7*	+6*	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Gender: Woman	+5*	NS	+5*	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Education: High	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Age: 65+	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Age: -30	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	-8*
Left-right 0-10	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	-3,8***	NS
SD	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	-14**	-23***	-12**
Constant	39***	41***	49***	40***	38***	52***	67***	67***	85***
Adj R2	0,37	0,40	0,19	0,12	0,13	0,06	0,06	0,64	0,11
N	260	261	261	261	261	259	260	261	259

Comments: NS = not significant, Source: RDU 2014

**Table A2: Regional councillors' trust in nine political institutions 2012. MLS regression.**

	Trust in local institutions			Trust in regional institutions			Trust in national institutions		
	Parl.	Exec.	Admin.	Parl.	Exec.	Admin.	Parl.	Exec.	Admin.
National government party	NS	NS	NS	NS	+4*	NS	+17***	+36***	+7***
Regional majority party	NS	NS	NS	+28***	+34***	+7***	NS	NS	NS
Local majority party	+23***	+26***	+15***	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
National office	NS	NS	NS	NS	-17*	NS	NS	NS	NS
Local office	NI (+6**)	NI (+5**)	NI (+5**)	-3*	NS	+5***	NS	NS	NS
Gender: Woman	NS	-4*	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	-4**
Education: High	NS	NS	NS	NS	-3*	NS	NS	NS	+5***
Age: 65+	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	+8*
Age: -30	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Left-right 0-10	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	+1,0**	+3,5***	+1,2**
SD	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	-10**
Constant	57***	54***	65***	50***	44***	58***	50***	28***	56***
Adj R2	0,23	0,27	0,11	0,29	0,41	0,04	0,23	0,62	0,14
N	456	445	455	1135	1136	1132	1136	1141	1115

Comments: Observe that effects on regional councillors' trust in local institutions only build on responses from regional councillors who also are local councillors as there is no information of home municipality for regional councillors with single-mandates. The variable local office is not included here as all respondents have double regional-local mandates. The effects of local office on regional councillors' trust in local institutions in parentheses refer to a model without the variable local majority party. NS = not significant, NI = not included. Source: KOLFU 2012.

**Table A3: Local councilors' trust in nine political institutions 2012. MLS regression.**

	Trust in local institutions			Trust in regional institutions			Trust in national institutions		
	Parl.	Exec.	Admin.	Parl.	Exec.	Admin.	Parl.	Exec.	Admin.
National government party	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	+14***	+31***	+8***
Regional majority party	+2***	+3***	+2***	+17***	+20***	+10***	NS	-1*	NS
Local majority party	+20***	+24***	+10***	+4***	+4***	+3***	-3***	-4***	-2***
National office	-6**	-6*	NS	NS	NS	NS	+16***	NS*	+11***
Regional office	NS	NS	NS	+6***	+6***	+7***	NS	NS	+1*
Gender: Woman	+2**	+1*	NS	+3***	+3***	+2***	NS	NS	-1**
Education: High	-3***	-2***	NS	-2*	-1**	NS	+4***	+3***	+6***
Age: 65+	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	-1*	NS	NS	+4***
Age: -30	-6***	-5***	NS	-2*	-3*	NS	-3***	NS	-1**
Left-right 0-10	NS	+0,4**	-0,3*	NS	NS	-0,3*	+1,6***	+5***	+1,2***
SD	-4**	-5**	-6***	NS	NS	NS	-13***	-11***	-10***
Constant	56***	50***	61***	39***	36***	46***	48***	25***	51***
Adj R2	0,19	0,25	0,08	0,17	0,19	0,09	0,25	0,61	0,16
N	8368	8358	8324	8246	8245	8220	8354	8390	8145

Comments: NS = not significant, Source: RDU 2014

**Table B1 General democratic discontent among Swedish political representatives**

	G1	G2	G3
National government party	-6***	-6***	-3***
Regional majority party	-6***	-4***	-4***
Local majority party	NI	-6***	-6***
National MP	-4***	-4**	-4**
Regional councillor	-3***	-4***	-4***
Regional executive	NS	NS	NS
Local councillor	NS	NS	NS
Local executive	-2***	-2***	-2***
Gender: Woman	+1*	NS	NS
Education: High	NS	NS	-2
Age: 65+	NS	NS	NS
Age: -30	NS	NS	NS
Left-right 0-1	NI	NI	-7***
Party: SD	+20***	+18***	+20***
Constant	51***	53***	54***
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0,13	0,15	0,16
N	10083	9366	9270

Source: RDU 2014 and KOLFU 2012 combined. Dependent variable: index 0-100 of democratic discontent, mean value in relation to four tiers of government. NS = not significant; NI = not included.

**Table C1 Swedish political representatives' trust in the national executive/The Government**

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
National government party	NI	+50***	+35***	+34***	+35***
Regional majority party	NI	-1**	-1*	-3***	-2***
Local majority party	NI	-4***	-3***	NI	-5***
National MP	NS	NI	NS	NS	NS
Regional councillor	NS	NI	NS	NS	NS
Regional executive	NS	NI	NS	NS	NS
Local councillor	NS	NI	NS	NS	NS
Local executive	+2*	NI	NS	NS	NS
Gender: Woman	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Education: High	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Age: 65+	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Age: -30	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Left-right 0-1	NI	NI	+35***	+34***	+34***
Party: SD	NI	NI	-11***	-6***	-7***
General democratic discontent 0-1	NI	NI	NI	-19***	-21***
(Constant)	55***	37***	32***	40***	44***
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0,00	0,56	0,60	0,60	0,61
N	9944	9237	9043	9722	9032

Source: RDU 2014 and KOLFU 2012 combined.. NS = not significant; NI = not included.

**Table C2 Swedish political representatives' trust in the national parliament/The Riksdag**

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
National government party	NI	+22***	+14***	+13***	+13***
Regional majority party	NI	+1*	+1*	-2***	NS
Local majority party	NI	-3*	-4***	NI	-5***
National MP	+14***	NI	15***	+12***	+14***
Regional councillor	NS	NI	NS	NS	NS
Regional executive	NS	NI	NS	NS	NS
Local councillor	NS	NI	NS	NS	+5*
Local executive	+1*	NI	NS	NS	NS
Gender: Woman	NI	NI	+1*	+1**	+1**
Education: High	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Age: 65+	NI	NI	-3***	-3***	-3***
Age: -30	NI	NI	+3**	+3**	+3**
Left-right 0-1	NI	NI	+17***	+15***	+15***
Party: SD	NI	NI	-13***	-5***	-7***
General democratic discontent 0-1	NI	NI	NI	-29***	-32***
(Constant)	63***	55***	43***	61***	60***
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0,01	0,21	0,24	0,27	0,29
N	9895	9194	9000	9673	8989

Source: RDU 2014 and KOLFU 2012 combined.. NS = not significant; NI = not included.

**Table C3 Swedish political representatives' trust in national administrative authorities**

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
National government party	NI	+15 ***	+10 ***	+8 ***	+9 ***
Regional majority party	NI	NS	NS	-2 ***	NS
Local majority party	NI	-2 ***	-2 ***	NI	-4 ***
National MP	+17 ***	NI	+13 ***	+12 ***	+12 ***
Regional councillor	NS	NI	+2 *	NS	NS
Regional executive	NS	NI	NS	NS	NS
Local councillor	-2 *	NI	-4 *	-2 *	NS
Local executive	NS	NI	NS	NS	NS
Gender: Woman	NI	NI	-1 *	-1 *	NS
Education: High	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Age: 65+	NI	NI	-1 **	-2 **	-2 **
Age: -30	NI	NI	+4 ***	+5 ***	+4 ***
Left-right 0-1	NI	NI	+11 ***	+10 ***	+9 ***
Party: SD	NI	NI	-10 ***	-3 *	-4 **
General democratic discontent 0-1	NI	NI	NI	-26 ***	-29 ***
(Constant)	62 ***	55 ***	56 ***	67 ***	71 ***
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0,03	0,12	0,16	0,20	0,21
N	9657	8968	8783	9448	8775

Source: RDU 2014 and KOLFU 2012 combined.. NS = not significant; NI = not included.

**Table C4 Swedish political representatives' trust in the regional executive/The Regional Executive Board**

	M1	M2	M2b	M3	M4	M5
National government party	NI	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Regional majority party	NI	+19***	+22***	+21***	+18***	+17***
Local majority party	NI	+4***	NI	NI	NI	NS
National MP	NS	NI	NI	+3*	NS	NS
Regional councillor	+6***	NI	NI	+6***	+5***	+5***
Regional executive	+9***	NI	NI	+9***	+8***	+9***
Local councillor	-4**	NI	NI	-3*	-3**	-7**
Local executive	+2**	NI	NI	+2*	NS	NS
Gender: Woman	NI	NI	NI	+3***	+3***	3***
Education: High	NI	NI	NI	NS	-6*	NS
Age: 65+	NI	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Age: -30	NI	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Left-right 0-1	NI	NI	NI	NS	-3**	-4**
Party: SD	NI	NI	NI	NS	+12***	+12***
General democratic discontent 0-1	NI	NI	NI	NI	-51***	-50***
(Constant)	55***	41***	42***	44***	70***	73***
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0,02	0,18	0,18	0,21	0,32	0,30
N	9781	9078	9781	9575	9564	8879

Source: RDU 2014 and KOLFU 2012 combined.. NS = not significant; NI = not included.

**Table C5 Swedish political representatives' trust in the regional parliament/The Regional Council**

	M1	M2	M2b	M3	M4	M5
National government party	NI	-1*	NS	NS	-1*	-2*
Regional majority party	NI	+17***	+19***	+19***	+16***	+15***
Local majority party	NI	+4***	NI	NI	NI	NS
National MP	NS	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Regional councillor	+8***	NI	NI	+8***	+6***	+7***
Regional executive	+4*	NI	NI	+3*	NS	NS
Local councillor	-5**	NI	NI	-5***	-4***	-7**
Local executive	+1*	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Gender: Woman	NI	NI	NI	+3***	+3***	+3***
Education: High	NI	NI	NI	NS	-6*	NS
Age: 65+	NI	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Age: -30	NI	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Left-right 0-1	NI	NI	NI	NS	-5***	-5***
Party: SD	NI	NI	NI	NS	+11***	+11***
General democratic disoncent 0-1	NI	NI	NI	NI	-51***	-51***
(Constant)	58***	43***	45***	49***	75***	77***
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0,02	0,15	0,15	0,18	0,29	0,28
N	9788	9084	9788	9580	9568	8882

Source: RDU 2014 and KOLFU 2012 combined.. NS = not significant; NI = not included.

**Table C6 Swedish political representatives' trust in the regional administrative authorities**

	M1	M2	M2b	M3	M4	M5
National government party	NI	-2***	-2***	-2**	-4***	-4***
Regional majority party	NI	+10***	+11***	+11***	+8***	+8***
Local majority party	NI	+2***	NI	NI	NI	NS
National MP	NS	NI	NI	+4*	NS	+5**
Regional councillor	+10***	NI	NI	+10***	+8***	+7***
Regional executive	+6***	NI	NI	+5***	+5***	NS
Local councillor	NS	NI	NI	NS	NS	+9***
Local executive	+1**	NI	NI	+1*	NS	NS
Gender: Woman	NI	NI	NI	+2***	+2***	+2***
Education: High	NI	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Age: 65+	NI	NI	NI	NS	-1*	-1*
Age: -30	NI	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Left-right 0-1	NI	NI	NI	NS	-2*	-2
Party: SD	NI	NI	NI	NS	+10***	+10***
General democratic disoncent 0-1	NI	NI	NI	NI	-43***	-43***
(Constant)	53***	49***	50***	42***	65***	58***
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0,03	0,06	0,06	0,09	0,20	0,18
N	9746	9046	9746	9539	9529	8846

Source: RDU 2014 and KOLFU 2012 combined.. NS = not significant; NI = not included.



**Table C7 Swedish political representatives' trust in the local executive/The Local Executive Board**

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
National government party	NI	+3***	+2*	+3***	NS
Regional majority party	NI	+3***	+2***	+6***	NS
Local majority party	NI	+24***	+24***	NI	+21***
National MP	NS	NI	NS	NS	NS
Regional councillor	-4***	NI	-2*	-5***	-4***
Regional executive	NS	NI	NS	NS	NS
Local councillor	NS	NI	NS	+5***	NS
Local executive	+11***	NI	+11***	+10***	+10***
Gender: Woman	NI	NI	+1**	+2***	+2***
Education: High	NI	NI	-7*	-12***	-9**
Age: 65+	NI	NI	NS	-1*	NS
Age: -30	NI	NI	-2**	-2*	NS
Left-right 0-1	NI	NI	NS	-4***	NS
Party: SD	NI	NI	-3*	NS	+7***
General democratic discontent 0-1	NI	NI	NI	-61***	-51***
(Constant)	63***	50***	54***	96***	82***
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0,04	0,24	0,28	0,25	0,38
N	9905	9202	9008	9683	8998

Source: RDU 2014 and KOLFU 2012 combined.. NS = not significant; NI = not included.

**Table C8 Swedish political representatives' trust in the local parliament/The Local Council**

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
National government party	NI	NS	NS	+1*	NS
Regional majority party	NI	+2***	+2***	+4***	NS
Local majority party	NI	+20***	+20***	NI	+17***
National MP	-4**	NI	NS	NS	-4**
Regional councillor	-5***	NI	-2*	-6***	-4***
Regional executive	NS	NI	NS	NS	NS
Local councillor	+3*	NI	NS	+4**	NS
Local executive	+5***	NI	+5***	+4***	+4***
Gender: Woman	NI	NI	+1**	+2***	+2***
Education: High	NI	NI	-6*	-11***	-7**
Age: 65+	NI	NI	+2**	NS	+1*
Age: -30	NI	NI	-4***	-3**	-3**
Left-right 0-1	NI	NI	NS	-7***	-5***
Party: SD	NI	NI	-3*	NS	+6***
General democratic discontent 0-1	NI	NI	NI	-59***	-51***
(Constant)	65***	56***	61***	98***	88***
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0,02	0,19	0,20	0,22	0,32
N	9919	9217	9020	9694	9010

Source: RDU 2014 and KOLFU 2012 combined.. NS = not significant; NI = not included.

**Table C9 Swedish political representatives' trust in the local administrative authorities**

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
National government party	NI	NS	+1*	NS	NS
Regional majority party	NI	+2***	+2***	+2***	NS
Local majority party	NI	+11***	+10***	NI	+8***
National MP	NS	NI	NS	-3*	-4*
Regional councillor	NS	NI	NS	-2*	-2*
Regional executive	NS	NI	NS	NS	NS
Local councillor	+3*	NI	NS	NS	NS
Local executive	+6***	NI	+5***	+5***	+5
Gender: Woman	NI	NI	NS	NS	+1*
Education: High	NI	NI	NS	-6*	NS
Age: 65+	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Age: -30	NI	NI	NS	NS	NS
Left-right 0-1	NI	NI	-4**	-6***	-6***
Party: SD	NI	NI	-4**	NS	+4**
General democratic discontent 0-1	NI	NI	NI	-43***	-39***
(Constant)	62***	59***	61***	87***	82***
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0,02	0,07	0,09	0,14	0,18
N	9875	9177	8982	9654	8973

Source: RDU 2014 and KOLFU 2012 combined.. NS = not significant; NI = not included.

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