

TRUTH APPROPRIATENESS AND FOCUS

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The purpose of this paper is to propose and discuss two possible ways of providing a logical analysis for statements containing focussed components.¹ An analysis using three truth values is contrasted against an analysis using only two, and the respective merits and demerits of the two analyses for a treatment of truth. presuppositions and appropriateness are discussed. because of their closeness to earlier treatments in the history of presuppositions, the two types of analysis could perhaps be characterized as being inspired by Frege-Strawson and Russell respectively.²

1. To begin with, let us consider the relation between a statement and its truth conditions.

We can paraphrase the notion of truth conditions of a statement in roughly the following way: The truth conditions of *s* are the conditions that the world has to fulfill in order for *s* to be true.

These conditions are of two types:

(i) those corresponding to what is directly asserted and focussed in the sentence.

(ii) those corresponding to what has to be presupposed for the ,assertion to be made.

Both types of conditions have to be met for a sentence to be true, Let us consider an example to clarify the distinction between (i) and (ii).

(1) The man in the car was feeling worried

What is directly asserted is that a certain person is feeling worried. This corresponds to the truth conditions of type (i).

¹ The term focus is used roughly the same way to in Chomsky (1971).

² See Garner (1971) for a summary of the history of presuppositions.

But for (1) to be true a great many other things also have to be true - these other things correspond to the truth conditions of type (ii). So for example

(a) there has to be a definite man, whom we are talking about

(b) he must be situated in a car

We call truth conditions of type (i) assertional or focal and those of type (ii) presuppositional in the following way:

(A) A statement is true if both its truth conditions of type (i) and type (ii) are satisfied.

(B) A statement is false if its truth conditions of type (i) are not satisfied while those of type (ii) are satisfied.

(C) A statement has *no truth value* (is zero) if its truth conditions of type (ii) are not satisfied.

The characteristic trait of this type of analysis is that truth conditions of type (ii) are so to speak bracketed in the assessment of whether a statement is true or false. A statement can only properly be said to be true or false on grounds of satisfaction or nonsatisfaction of truth conditions of type (i). Truth and falsity are therefore intimately tied to what is focussed, rather than to what is presupposed by a statement.

Affirmation and negation are here very close to truth and falsity respectively. What is affirmed in a statement is what is focussed - the assertion, not the presuppositions. Consider the next sentence.

(2) The man in the car was not feeling worried

What is negated in (2) is that a certain person is feeling worried, not that he is in a car. So non-satisfaction of the truth conditions of type (i) for a statement seems to correspond very neatly with the truth of the negative complementary of the same statement. The tie between assertion, affirmation and negation is, of course, the reason why the well-known negation test for presuppositions works so well in most cases.

III. Our next step is to introduce stress into the picture. We will first study the relation between focus and stress.³

³ Compare Chomsky (1971).

- (3) The man in the car was smoking a black cigarette
- (4) The man in the car was smoking a black cigarette ⁴
- (5) The man in the car was smoking a black cigarette
- (6) The man in the car was smoking a black cigarette
- (7) The man in the car was smoking a black cigarette
- (8) The man in the car was smoking a black cigarette

(underlining indicates stress)

We see that the contrastive stress successively changes what is asserted in the statement. A test of this is provided by negating the sentences. As we have seen above negation is tied to what is directly asserted and we would therefore expect the "scope" of negation to change if what is directly asserted changes. A further check can be provided by adding qualifying clauses to the negated statements, I will do so for sentences (4-8) assuming that the preceding statement is negated.

- (4') The man in the car was not smoking a black *cigarette*, but a black cigar
- (5') The man in the car was not smoking a *black* cigarette, but a white cigarette
- (6') The man in the car was not *smoking* a black cigarette, he was swallowing it
- (7') The *man* in the car was not smoking a black cigarette, the woman was
- (8') The man in the *car* was not smoking a black cigarette, the man in the bus was

Even if (8') is somewhat unnatural, the others obviously with the change of stress also change what is being asserted, or rather in this case negated. If we first look at sentences (3-6), we can say that what seems to happen is that in (4-6) we so to speak zero in on a certain part of the complex predicate VP *smoke a black cigarette* and assert it. The parts of the predicate that are not stressed are not asserted either. These parts are instead shoved over to the presuppositional part of the sentence. thereby creating the background for the actual assertion. This same transfer from assertion to presupposition is also born out in negative assertions. In a negative assertion none of the background material is negated; only what is focussed and thereby directly asserted is negated. So stress in a predicate expression seems to have the effect of specifying the assertion while increasing the amount of material that is presupposed by the assertion. Another way of expressing this would be to say that stress besides being a device for shifting focus is also a device for moving truth conditions from type I to type II or vice versa. As we have seen, negation ordinarily only

⁴ It should perhaps be pointed out that since the sentential stress normally falls on the last word of a sentence, one therefore often does not need to stress this word extra to assert it.

operates on truth conditions of type (i) leaving those of type (ii) intact, which is exactly what we have observed.

The sentences (7-8) are more puzzling. It is perhaps not too difficult to accept that stress can highlight come part of what is asserted in a neutral position and make this into the main assertion. It is much more difficult to accept that stress also seems to be able to move the assertion from what is asserted in a neutral statement to that of which the assertion is made in the neutral statement.

Even if (7'-8') seem to function a little less smoothly than (4'-6'), they at least function well enough to be acceptable. And the strange thing that exactly what happened in (4-6') seems to happen with (7' - 8'). The assertion is narrowed down, and what is presupposed is increased both in the affirmative and negative versions of the assertion. I have no really good way of explaining why assertative specification seems to be independent of what is asserted in the neutral sentence, so for the moment I am content to merely accept that this is the case.

It should be mentioned that there are various ways in which, transformationally or with the aid of pure paraphrase, one can achieve the same focussing effect as with contrastive stress. Compare the following sentences

- (9) The black thing the man in the car was smoking was a cigarette
- (10) The cigarette that the man in the car was smoking was black
- (11) What the man in the car did to a black cigarette was to smoke it

(9), (10) and (11) make the same assertions as (4), (5) and (6) respectively. In all three of (9), (10) and (11) we are pushing elements of the neutral sentence (3) into focus by making them the only things that are asserted by the predicate.

If we negate the main verb of (9), (10) and (11) we see that we get precisely the effect we got by negating (4), (5) and (6). This implies that the lexical and syntactical differences between (9), (10) and (11) are indicative of the same type of shift between what is asserted and what is presupposed as that which we observed in (4), (5) and (6). To the extent that this is true, what is said below about the logical effects of stress can also be taken as a description of the logical consequences of the differences between (9), (10) and (11).

IV. Let us now return to our Frege-Strawson-inspired analysis of presuppositions in order to apply it to what we have found about affirmation - negation and focus. Consider the following sentence*

- (12) Bill is reading a book
- (13) bill is reading *a book* (stressed)

(12) and (13) are both true if all of their truth conditions of type (i) and (ii) are satisfied. They are false if their truth conditions of type (ii) are satisfied but their truth conditions of type (i) are not satisfied.

However, what is asserted and what is presupposed in (12) and (13) is not the same which can be seen by considering their negation.

(12') Bill is not reading a book, he is riding a horse

(13) Bill is not reading a *book*, he is reading a magazine

Due to the stress the assertion in (13) is much more specific than that in (12). Therefore more is also presupposed by (13) than by (12). (13) can be adequately asserted of a much more restricted set of situations than (12), which of course follows from the fact that it presupposes more. I think it is correct to say that (12) can be adequately asserted wherever (13) can, but that (13) can not be adequately asserted wherever (12) can. More succinctly we might say that the range of situations where (13) is applicable is properly included in the range of situations where (12) is applicable.

Let us consider these facts in relation to the truth and falsity of (12) and (13). First we observe that whenever (13) is true (12) is also, and whenever (12) is false (13) is also. But are there situations in which (13) is false but (12) true? for example is this the case in those situations where (12) is true but (13) is not applicable?

According to a Frege-Strawson-inspired analysis this would not be the case. Instead one would say that the cases where the presuppositions of (12), but not of (13), were satisfied would make (12) true or false but (13) would lack truth value (or be zero) in these situations. A statement always lacks truth value if its presuppositions or truth conditions of type (ii) are not satisfied. So (13), which presupposes that Bill is reading something, would lack truth value while (12) which has no such presupposition would be false if Bill was out riding.

We can briefly state our Frege-Strawson-inspired analysis in the following way:

1. If two statements p and q' are differentiated only by the fact that q has a more restricted focus than p, then q makes more specific assertion and presupposes more than p. q can therefore be used adequately of fewer situations than p.
2. Whenever p and q are asserted of the same situations we say that both are true if all of their respective truth conditions are satisfied. They have no truth value or are zero when their truth conditions of type (ii) are not satisfied, and they are false when their truth conditions of type (i),

but not type (i) are satisfied. Therefore, although p and q are false in the same situations, there are situations in which p is true but q lacks truth value.

V. Let us now turn our attention to a more Russell-inspired analysis of the phenomena just considered. We can call this alternative analysis the excluded middle analysis after the classical law of logic. In this analysis no difference is made between truth conditions of type (i) and (ii). Lack of satisfaction of conditions of either type leads to falsity. The excluded middle analysis could therefore be the following way.

(A) A statement is true if both its truth conditions of type (i) and type (ii) are satisfied.

(B) A statement is false if any of its truth conditions of either type (i) or (ii) is not satisfied.

This analysis has the effect of making every statement true or false. No statement will lack truth value. Further it will make every declarative sentence true or false independently of what is focussed in the sentence. As we have seen the Frege-Strawsonian analysis relies heavily on what is focussed for assignment of truth value. This analysis does not. It furthermore avoids the problem of whether the predication in a statement must have actual assertoric force or not. Strawson seems inclined to hold that this should be so. However, we know that there are many sentences which are not actually asserted, but still must be said to possess a truth value. Consider sentence (14)

(14)(Jones always took me by surprise) Either I did not *see* him or I did not *hear* him

The non-bracketed sentence is, as we can see, a disjunction where both disjuncts contain contrastive stress. But neither of them can be said to have actual assertoric force⁵ It is the whole disjunction that is asserted, its individual sentential constituents. But in spite of their lack of actual assertoric force both of the disjuncts must be said to possess a truth value. In fact this is a precondition of the truth value of the disjunction itself.

The excluded middle does not have to deal with this problem as it assigns truth value on the basis of all truth conditions, presuppositional as well as assertorical.

⁵ Both disjuncts contain a stressed element. This is usually a sign of focus. Therefore, although what is focussed in a declarative sentence normally is taken to be what is actually asserted (14) shows that this is not necessarily the case. As for the exact relation between the focus and the force of a sentence the only thing I have to offer is a few examples for consideration.

(1) I promise to drive tomorrow

(2) I promise to drive tomorrow

(3) Did John run home yesterday?

(4) Did John run home yesterday?

The effect of focus on questions is noticeable in the range of negative answers possible to a focussed question.

Consider the, following as answers to (3)

(5) No, Bill did

(6)? No, he walked.

VI. The problem of whether truth values are dependent on actual assertoric force brings us to what is perhaps the most significant theoretical difference between the two types of analysis.

In the Frege-Strawson inspired analysis there is no serious difference between truth values, appropriateness and applicability. They are all part of the same dimension. Truth is but a special case of appropriateness, and falsity is really a special case of inappropriateness. Statements can be inappropriate in many ways, two of these being, the non-satisfaction of assertorical and presuppositional truth conditions. ⁶

The excluded middle analysis makes a stronger claim for it claims that truth and appropriateness are separable dimensions. Truth and appropriateness can therefore be independently assigned to a statement. Appropriateness is not necessarily a precondition for truth if we return to (12) and (13).

(12) Bill is reading a book

(13) Bill is reading a *book*

this would mean that both (12) and (13) would be false in the situation where Bill was riding a horse, but while (12) would be appropriate (13) would not be.

(15) It is not a book that bill is reading

(15) in the same situation would be true but again highly inappropriate. Truth is therefore in this analysis taken in a purely factual sense. It depends only on whether what is stated is or *is not* the case. No other information than this purely factual information is given by the truth value. So while in the Frege Strawsonian type of analysis facticity and appropriateness are indicated together on one scale by a varying number of truth values, in the excluded middle analysis statements are classed on different dimensions for truth and appropriateness, the truth scale being binary with *true* - it is the case, and *false* - it is not the case, and the appropriateness scale being multivalued.

The difference between presuppositional and assertorical truth conditions is completely tied to appropriateness in this analysis. breach of a presupposition has as its consequence inappropriateness rather than any special truth value.

The excluded middle analysis can therefore be briefly characterized in the following way..

⁶ For an account of some other ways in which a statement can be inappropriate see Austin (1962), the sections on misfires and infelicities.

Whenever two statements p and q are differentiated only by the fact that q has focus on some element where p has not, then q is true or false in the same situation as p , but differs from p that it presupposes more and therefore is inappropriate in some situations where p is appropriate.

One objection that might be raised against the excluded middle analysis of presuppositions is that it misses the intimate connection between negation and assertion that was upheld in the Frege-Strawsonian type of analysis. Whenever what was asserted was false, the negation of that assertion was true and conversely, presupposing that the presuppositions were satisfied. The connection between negation and assertion is convincingly demonstrated by the stress cases. Wherever there is a change in assertion there is a corresponding change in negation. But the Strawsonian analysis does not only manage to keep the tie between negation and an assertion it also keeps the tie between the falsehood and the negation of a true sentence. This latter effect is achieved by claiming that the negated and the affirmed variants of a statement always have the same presuppositions, and that these presuppositions have to be fulfilled for the statement to be assigned a truth value at all. Does the excluded middle analysis not lose this elegance? Must it not make negation something different from falsehood in cases where we have negated statements which were earlier assigned zero value because their presuppositions were not satisfied?

The options open to excluded middle analysis here seem to be only two:

- (1) To affirm the connection between negation and assertion while at the same time denying the connection between falsity and negation. This would make a statement of the above mentioned type false e.g. (15)).
- (2) To affirm the connection between falsity and negation while denying that between assertion and negation. This would make the statement in question true.

Nevertheless, there also seems to be a third option open in the form of an approach which is based mainly on (2) while capturing much of (1) as well.

In this approach just as in (2) we take negation to be basically factual or contradictory indicating only that a certain state of affairs does not obtain, without in any way indicating how or why it does not obtain. The tie between negation and assertion is sensitive to certain general norms of communication which in most cases have the effect of making negation automatically operate only on what is directly asserted. This makes the tie between negation and assertion not direct, but mediated by these general norms of communication.⁷ However, the tie between assertion and

⁷ For a more detailed argument for this thesis see Allwood (1972).

negation which normally is very strong can be weakened in certain respects by presuppositional failure. In such casts, especially if the presuppositional failure is recognized by all participants in the speech act, an assertion becomes pointless because its presuppositional foundations have been pulled away from underneath. The negation of such an assertion therefore becomes pointless as well Why negate something which already is out because of presuppositional failure? The negation becomes pointless and trivial but does not therefore lose its truth value. In the same way the assertion itself does not lose its truth value even if it is pointless. So the only difference between an affirmation and a negation of an assertion that suffers from presuppositional failure will be that while the affirmation affirms something which is made impossible by presuppositional failure and therefore must be false, the negation trivially confirms the impossibility of the assertion and therefore must be true even if inappropriate in the sense of being pointless.

So by strictly adhering to the distinction between semantic truth this third approach manages to preserve the tie between falsity, negation and assertion. For it in fact claims that the tie between falsity and negation lie* on the level of semantic truth while the connection between negation and assertion lies on the appropriateness level. As these two levels, of course always operate together in actual linguistic utterances, one can say that what the excluded middle analysis here attempts is a theoretical reduction of what in actual linguistic utterances functions like a single one-level trinity to *two* more abstract underlying interacting levels, ⁸ appropriateness and "truth". It is interesting to note that the different lexical expressions of negation seem to have somewhat different functions with respect to our two underlying levels: *it is not the case that*, *it is false that* and *it is not true that* are all bound to the level of semantic truth, while *not* seems to be much more closely bound to assertion. This can be verified by trying the different negation* on statements that suffer from presuppositional failure and noticing the difference in acceptability for the first group of negation* and *not*.

In the choice between a Frege-Strawsonian type of analysis and an analysis of the excluded middle type, I personally feel inclined to opt for an analysis of the latter type. The reason for this is primarily that it seems to offer a more interesting framework for the solution of other semantical problem . In particular I am thinking of the problem of how to elucidate the difference between what in German is designated as *meinen* and *bedeuten* (Swedish *mena* and *betyda*). In other words how To-get at the difference between what a speaker mean by his utterance and what the utterance itself literally means.⁹ I think that there is a close connection between what the utterance literally

⁸ Dimension might be a better word than level.

⁹ See Grice (1968).

means and its semantic truth conditions;¹⁰ just as I think there is a connection between what a speaker can mean by an utterance and the appropriateness conditions connected with the utterance. If we are interested in studying the interaction between literal meaning, speaker's meaning and actual meaning, I think it becomes essential to make one's hypothesis about the interacting factors as clear and strong as possible. For these reasons I think the excluded middle analysis which clearly separates semantic truth and appropriateness is preferable to an analysis which does not.

When it comes to speaker intuitions about one or the other of the two types of analysis, we are stepping on very unsteady ground as always when it comes to empirical verification in semantics. The distinction between semantic truth and appropriateness is somewhat subtle and one should not expect that true in every discourse is used consistently enough to enable people to at once draw a distinction of the type we want. However, in my experience quite a few people actually do make the distinction the way the excluded middle analysis predicts.

NOTES

I wish to thank Östen Dahl for critical discussion of several of the points treated in the paper, However* this does not mean that his and my views necessarily correspond.

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¹⁰ However, it is obvious that the truth conditions and the literal meaning of a sentence cannot be directly identified. This is clear if we consider expressions which are logically equivalent (equivalent in truth conditions) but in no way synonymous.

(1) it's raining or it's snowing

(2) it's not the case that it's not raining and not snowing

(3) equilateral triangle

(4) equiangular triangle

The pairs (1), (2) and (3), (4) are both logically equivalent. but certainly not synonymous.

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