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Author: Jan Rovny

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Where do Radical Right Parties Stand? Position Blurring in Multidimensional Competition

Jan Rovny

Center for European Research

University of Gothenburg

Abstract

This article questions the utility of assessing radical right party placement on economic issues, which has been extensively analyzed in academic literature. Starting from the premise that political parties have varying strategic stakes in different political issues, the article considers political competition in multiple issue dimensions. It suggests that political competition is not simply a matter of taking positions on political issues, but rather centers on the manipulation of the dimensional structure of politics. The core argument is that certain political parties, such as the radical right, seek to compete on neglected, secondary issues in the party system, while simultaneously blurring their positions on established issues in order to attract broader support. Deliberate position blurring – considered costly by the literature – may thus be an effective strategy in multidimensional competition, qualifying the study of party placements. The article combines quantitative analyses of electoral manifestos, expert placement of political parties, and voter preferences, by studying seventeen radical right parties in nine Western European party systems.

Key Words: Radical Right, Spatial Theory, Obfuscation, Dimensionality

Introduction

Today's radical right is said to be 'right-wing' due to its nationalistic, authoritative, anti-cosmopolitan and especially anti-immigrant views. The economic placement of the radical right is, however, debated. While earlier works point to neo-liberal stances of radical right parties, studies of the social bases of these parties point to significant support from traditionally left-leaning constituencies. Recent scholarship argues that radical right parties abandoned their outlying economic positions and shifted closer toward the economic center.

This article, however, questions the utility of assessing radical right party placement on economic issues. It suggests that politics is a larger struggle over the issue content of political competition. Political parties are invested in different issue dimensions, and thus prefer competing on some issues over others. Consequently, parties emphasize their stance on some issue dimensions, while strategically evading positioning on others, in order to mask the spatial distances between themselves and their voters. This article argues that parties, such as the radical right, may successfully adopt a strategy of deliberate *position blurring*. In light of such competition, taking a position may be neither an appropriate party strategy, nor an adequate academic expectation.

This argument underlines the limits of spatial theory in capturing party competition. While spatial theory conceptualizes political competition as position *taking*, this article underlines the strategic utility of position avoiding or position *blurring*. This dimensional approach to political competition considers issue positioning, issue salience, and strategic positional avoidance in multidimensional context. This approach explains the apparent variance of radical right economic placement as an outcome of these parties' conscious dimensional strategizing – of deliberate position blurring.

This article combines quantitative analyses of electoral manifestos, expert placement of political parties and voter preferences based on multiple

public opinion surveys. It considers seventeen radical right parties in nine Western European party systems. The article first reviews the literature on radical right ideological placement. The second section introduces a dimensional approach to party competition, detailing general party strategies in multidimensional context, while generating specific hypotheses about the radical right. The third section discusses the data and operationalization. The fourth section presents the analyses and results, while the final section serves as a conclusion.

Where Do Radical Right Parties Stand?

Scholarship on radical right parties agrees on a large set of their ideological characteristics. It suggests that radical right parties rely on emotive appeals to national sentiments defined in ethnic terms; reject cosmopolitan conceptions of society; react to rising non-European immigration; oppose globalization and reject European integration which they see as undermining national sovereignty and identity; and brand themselves as anti-parties, criticizing domestic political elites as corrupt and removed from the ‘common people.’¹ Rydgren (2005) argues that the rise and success of the radical right is associated with the development and diffusion of effective ideological ‘master frames.’ The frame, pioneered by the French Front National in the 1970s and 80s, combines ethno-nationalism and populist anti-establishment rhetoric, without being overtly racist or anti-democratic. It infuses the previously marginalized radical right with a potent ideological model, allowing it to “free itself from enough stigma to be able to attract [new] voters” (ibid.: 416).

This frame, however, says little about radical right economic positions. The rise of radical right parties in Western Europe is associated with a backlash against the ‘excessive role of the state’ in the economy, and the power

¹See Betz 1994; Taggart 1995; Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Mudde 1996; Hainsworth 2000; Hooghe et al. 2002; Hainsworth 2007; Kriesi et al. 2008.

of labour unions (Ignazi 2003). Earlier literature suggests that radical right parties present a “classical liberal position on the individual and the economy” (Betz 1994: 4). Kitschelt and McGann suggest that the radical right must adopt a ‘winning formula’ consisting of authoritarian and nationalistic social appeal coupled with extreme neo-liberalism, “calling for the dismantling of public bureaucracies and the welfare state,” demanding a “strong and authoritarian, but small” state (1995: 19-20, McGann & Kitschelt 2005).

Recent literature considering the social bases of radical right support, however, underscores the cross-class character of radical right voters. Evans (2005) finds that radical right parties attract both self-employed, as well as manual workers, and that continental radical right parties also increasingly attract routine non-manual workers, further diversifying the radical right class base (*ibid.*: 92). Ivarsflaten (2005) demonstrates that the self-employed and manual worker supporters of the radical right hold significantly different views on the economy, pointing to the radical right “electorates’ deep division over taxes, welfare provisions and the desirable size of the public sector” (2005: 490). Similarly, Kriesi et al. (2008) argue that radical right parties represent disparate ‘losers’ of globalization.²

How then do radical right parties respond to the diverse economic interests among their ranks? Mudde underlines the increasing orientation towards social market economy in radical right party literature, bringing these parties’ positions close to Christian democratic parties, or even the social democratic ‘third-way’ (2007: 124). Derks (2006) suggests that in order to capture disenchanted industrial workers hurt by globalization, post-industrial society and the supply of cheaper immigrant labour, radical right parties use a mix of egalitarianism and anti-welfare chauvinism. Similarly, Kitschelt’s

²This evidence revisits Lipset’s (1981) decades-old concept of working class authoritarianism. Due to declining identification with workers’ parties and organizations, manual workers are likely to consider more electoral choices, not necessarily on the basis of their economic views, but also on the basis of their authoritarian tendencies (Bjorklund and Andersen 1999).

recent work reflecting on the radical right constituency’s division over economic policies, moderates his ‘winning formula’ (Kitschelt 2004: 10). He claims that radical right parties may not be on the extreme economic right, but rather on the “market-liberal side of the political spectrum” – a stance demonstrated by the few radical right parties which attained executive office (Kitschelt 2007: 1183). Testing Kitschelt’s restated ‘winning formula’ on three cases, De Lange (2007) empirically supports the claim that radical right parties have shifted their position to the economic center.

This conceptual approach suggests that radical right parties hold discernible positions on major ideological dimensions. In fact the study of the radical right – in line with the scholarship on political parties and actors in general – uses spatial conceptions to account for party and voter placement. Kitschelt and McGann (1995, 2005), and Kitschelt (2007) analyze the ideal *stance* of radical right parties in the form of the ‘winning formula’. Van der Brug et al. (2005) explain radical right electoral success using party evaluations based on spatial proximity measures. Bjorklund and Andersen (1999) suggest that radical right voters in Scandinavia are positioned between the major left- and right-wing parties on economic issues. Ivarsflatten (2005) emphasizes the vulnerability of radical right parties, given the spatial differences among their voters on economic issues. Finally, Rydgren (2005) notes that radical right success starts with spatial electoral niches where there are “gaps between the voters’ location in the political space and the perceived position of the parties” (2005: 418).³

Spatial theory provides a classical understanding of political competition by conceptualizing it as spanning continuous issue scales, simplified into issue dimensions (Hotelling 1929, Downs 1957)⁴. Parties *take positions* within

³A significant outlier to this approach is Mudde (2007), who considers the discourse of radical right parties, underlining their “schizophrenic” positioning (2007: 135-7).

⁴Originally, spatial competition was conceptualized in a single dimension. Later models have relaxed the assumption of uni-dimensionality; their aim, however, was only to test whether and under what conditions equilibrium solutions hold in multiple dimensions (Chappell & Keech 1986, Enelow & Hinich 1989, Schofield 1993).

this dimensional structure in response to voter distributions. For spatial theory, the dimensional structure of political space is an assumed context within which competition occurs. Consequently, the spatial tradition sees competition as a contest *over party positioning* with respect to voters, who minimize the aggregate distance between themselves and the party they vote for in n-dimensional space.

The application of spatial theory to radical right party study has been importantly modified by Meguid (2005, 2008). While utilizing spatial representation of competition among mainstream parties and radical right parties, Meguid considers not only party positioning, but also issue salience and issue ownership. This leads her to formulate a strategic game in which radical right parties present new political issues into political discourse, and mainstream parties choose to engage or dismiss these issues, thus either boosting or lowering their salience (2008: 28). This broadens the spatial conception of political competition by demonstrating how issue salience allows strategic interaction between parties that are not spatial neighbours.

Meguid's work highlights how the inclusion of issue salience and ownership opens new strategic possibilities in party competition. Its implications are, however, even more profound. When political actors invest salience into new cross-cutting political issues, they are introducing new issue dimensions and redefining the political space where competition occurs. Under these conditions, parties are likely to be invested in some dimensions more than others. While they are likely to take clear positions on the dimensions of their primary interest, it may be logical for them to avoid taking clear stances on the dimensions in which they are not invested. Taking positions thus may be an inappropriate strategy in the context of multidimensional competition – and consequently, so may be its study. Thus, the question 'where radical right parties stand' may not be the right question to ask. The next section turns to an analysis of the implications of multidimensional party competition in greater detail.

Dimensional Approach

The dimensional approach to competition introduced by this article is based on two core premises. First, the structure of political competition is not merely a fixed stage, but rather is itself the subject of competition. This approach understands political competition as a contest *over the presence and bundling* of political issues into various issue dimensions. Competition is then a contest over which issues or issue dimensions dominate political discourse and voter decision-making. Political parties thus do not only take positions on issue dimensions, they actively seek to alter the structure of competition to their advantage by manipulating these issues.

The second premise of the dimensional approach is that parties do not merely respond to voter preferences by taking positions, but that they also seek to affect voters' choices through emphasizing certain issues in political campaigns. This is borrowed from issue ownership and salience theory (Budge & Farlie 1983, Budge, Robertson, & Hearl 1987, Petrocik 1996), which argues that parties strategically increase the salience of those issues on which they hold advantaged positions, while trying to mute issues somehow harmful to them. The relationship between voter preferences and party strategies is thus more complex than spatial theory suggests. Parties may on the one hand fill popular niches by championing publicly salient, but politically untapped issues. On the other hand, parties may affect the popular salience of issues by either emphasizing or ignoring them.⁵

The dimensional approach points to two theoretically separate party strategies – issue introduction and issue blurring. First, as originally formulated in William Riker's *heresthetics*, political parties tactically alter political competition by introducing novel issues into political discourse (Riker 1982, 1986).⁶ Introducing a new issue may produce a new dimension of political

⁵These premises are consistent with spatial theory, as they effectively entail emphasizing (spatial) differences on a dimension which previously either lacked salience or where no differences between parties existed.

⁶See also (Budge, Robertson, & Hearl 1987, Rabinowitz & Macdonald 1989, Rabi-

conflict and create a competitive niche for its protagonist, particularly if the issue does not naturally fold into the standing structure of competition. A party may also wish to introduce a new issue on which it is likely to be viewed favourably. Finally, a party may choose to introduce a new political issue with the aim of creating tensions within competing parties, thus weakening them.

Second, political parties may strategically avoid stances on some dimensions of multidimensional political conflict, and engage in what this article terms *position blurring*. Since political parties may have different stakes in different issue dimensions, they may not simply mute the salience of issues secondary to them. Rather, parties may attempt to project vague, contradictory or ambiguous positions on these issues. The aim of the strategy is to mask a party's spatial distance from voters in order to either attract broader support, or at least not deter voters on these issues. Position blurring is unlikely to be a successful strategy if applied on all issues. However, in the context of competing along one or few issue dimensions, blurring positions on other dimensions may be beneficial.

This is a contradictory expectation to the 'obfuscation' literature in American politics, which almost invariably concludes on both formal and empirical grounds that taking ambiguous positions is a *costly* strategy (Shepsle 1972, Enelow & Hinich 1981, Bartels 1986, Franklin 1991, Alvarez 1998). This literature, however, considers uni-dimensional competition. Blurring positions on a unique dimension of conflict is a profoundly different situation than blurring positions on some dimensions, while presenting clear stances on others. Position blurring on some dimensions may be a rational strategy in the context of multidimensional issue competition.

Position blurring may take on different forms. First, parties may avoid presenting a stance all together. More frequently, parties may present vague or contradictory positions on a given issue dimension. Mudde (2007: 127)

nowitz, Macdonald, & Listhaug 1991, Carmines & Stimson 1989)

reports, for example, that many radical right parties mix appeals for low taxation and privatization with economic protectionism, particularly in the agricultural sector. This ideological profile combines stances which are not usually connected, as most parties associate low taxation and privatization with economic liberalism. Misaligning stances on issues commonly attached to a unique dimension allows parties to blur their general dimensional positioning, while giving them the opportunity to present different voters with contradictory programs. Position blurring can thus appear as either a lack of a position, as concurrent multiplicity of positions, or as positional instability over time.

The strategies stemming from dimensional competition carry different costs. The parties facing higher costs to issue introduction and position blurring are likely to be established political parties with long-standing histories, organizational apparatuses, core constituencies and well-entrenched ideological images. They are likely to face organizational and ideological barriers to shifting political salience to new issues and blurring their positions on others. Established, mainstream parties are likely to find it harder to convince their membership and core constituents of the merits of adopting new issues and obscuring their positions on old ones. Their ideological heritage is likely connected with the historical development of social cleavages of their polity (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This means that their political stance is known, entrenched and their appeal stickier. Consequently, blurring positions on secondary issues may be futile and new issue introduction may spark crippling divisions.

On the contrary, radical right parties are less constrained in new issue introduction and position blurring. They have entered European party systems in recent decades as outsiders ostracized by political elites. Furthermore, they have centralized, hierarchical organizational structures which favour top-down decision-making patterns (Heinisch 2003). This gives them organizational facility in strategically contesting the dimensional structure of

party competition.

Moreover, radical right parties face an electoral incentive for employing these dimensional strategies. As the literature on radical right social bases suggests, there is a dimensional discrepancy to radical right support. Radical right voters share an ideological affinity on non-economic, socio-cultural issues, such as immigration or law and order, while they are divided over the economy. This argument implies that radical right voters have different preference distributions across issue dimensions. This leads to the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Radical right voters hold significantly more dispersed economic positions than major party supporters, while being less dispersed on non-economic, socio-cultural issues.

Consequently, radical right parties face different stakes in different issue dimensions. They are induced to compete on non-economic, socio-cultural issues by overemphasizing them in their discourse.

Hypothesis 2: While major parties place comparable emphasis on both non-economic and economic issues, radical right parties overemphasize non-economic issues, while muting economic issues.

This article argues that while competing on the non-economic dimension, radical right parties do not merely deemphasize economic issues. In order not to deter supporters with divergent economic outlooks, radical right parties also present blurred stances on the economic dimension. The positional ambiguity of radical right parties on the economy can be analyzed across data sources, across party types and over time:

Hypothesis 3a: The assessment of radical right party positions on economic issues significantly diverges across data sources, while the evaluation of their non-economic positions is largely consistent.

Hypothesis 3b: Voters and experts are significantly less certain about radical right party placement on economic issues than about the economic placement of other party types.

Hypothesis 3c: The assessment of radical right party positions on economic issues manifests significantly greater fluctuation over time than that of major parties.

The strategic increase in non-economic issue salience combined with position blurring on the economic dimension on the part of the radical right is likely to have positive electoral effects. By shifting emphasis towards their preferred issue dimension and distorting their economic stances, radical right parties attract their voters on the basis of non-economic, rather than economic issue considerations.

Hypothesis 4: While voters consider both economic and non-economic issues when voting for major parties, they consider primarily non-economic (and not economic) issues when supporting the radical right.

Despite its benefits, position blurring has its limits. Upon entering government, parties become responsible for implementing explicit policies, which circumscribes their ability to present vague or multiple positions, and forces them to take clear stances. Furthermore, parties who succeed in entering government with ambiguous views, may face public embarrassment. The fate of some radical right parties, particularly the Austrian FPÖ, which lost substantial public support after entering governments underlines this point (Luther 2003, Heinisch 2003, Fallend 2004). While an effective strategy in opposition, position blurring becomes a liability in government.

Hypothesis 5: Government participation limits position blurring of radical right parties.

Data and Operationalization

This article limits itself to contemporary (early to mid 2000s) Western Europe, where scholars argue the political space can be depicted in two dimensions⁷. The first dimension relates to economics, ranging from state-directed redistribution to market allocation. The second dimension relates to non-economic, socio-cultural issues, concerning such factors as lifestyle choice, national identity, immigration and religious values, and it ranges from socially liberal, alternative politics to socially conservative and traditional politics (Kitschelt 1992; Laver and Hunt 1992; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; Kitschelt 2003; Marks et. al. 2006; Benoit and Laver 2006; Vachudova and Hooghe 2009). Since the second dimension tends to be more complex and loosely structured, this article refers to it simply as the non-economic dimension (Rovny and Marks 2011).

To locate parties on these dimensions this article uses the 1999, 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES), which place parties on an economic left-right scale and on green, alternative and liberal versus traditional, authoritarian and nationalist policies (Steenbergen & Marks 2007, Hooghe et al. 2010). In order to test hypotheses 1 and 4, concerning voter preferences, the article utilizes the European Social Survey 2006 (ESS).⁸ To test hypothesis 2, concerning the salience parties attach to different issues, the article uses the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset (Budge et al. 1987). Table 5 in the appendix lists the CMP categories that were used to construct an additive measure of salience for the economic and the non-economic dimensions. To test hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c, concerning issue position blur-

⁷Although two dimensional political space is certainly a simplification, two dimensions are sufficient for capturing the key dynamics of issue emphasis and position blurring.

⁸The ESS dataset is preferred to the other public opinion survey data for three reasons. First, unlike the ISSP, the survey provides economic, as well as non-economic voter preferences. Second, it is generally considered to be of higher quality than the WVS. Finally, the ESS 2006 overlaps with the 2006 CHES data, which makes it particularly appropriate for this study. It should be noted that using the ISSP, WVS and EES data instead leads to substantively comparable results.

ring, the article combines four public opinion surveys: the World Values Surveys 1999-2000 (WVS), the 2004 European Election Study (EES), the International Social Survey Program 2006 (ISSP) and the ESS 2006.⁹ It also assesses long-term positional stability of parties using the CHES datasets. The CHES dataset also provides a basis for testing hypothesis 5 concerning the effects of government participation.

The article considers all Western European parties generally referred to as radical right, populist right, extreme right or neo-fascist by the party literature (cf. Golder 2003; Norris 2005; Kitschelt 2007). The case selection is, however, constrained by the data¹⁰. Consequently, the article is limited to the study of 17 radical right parties in nine countries. These are: FPÖ and BZÖ in Austria; FN and VB in Belgium; FP and DF in Denmark; True Finns in Finland; FN and MPF in France; REP, NPD and DVU in Germany; LAOS in Greece; AN and LN in Italy; and LPF and PVV in the Netherlands. Table 6 in the appendix contains the details.

Major parties are operationalized as the most significant political parties on either side of the left-right spectrum in each party system. These parties are either the primary governing parties or the main opposition parties. In cases where more parties can be considered as major right or major left parties, all such parties are included. See table 6 in the appendix for details.

Finally, it should be stressed that each analysis considering party place-

⁹To construct economic and non-economic scales of voter preferences, I use factor scores from separate factor analyses on the economic, and non-economic items of each dataset. The specific items used for each dimension in a given dataset are listed in table 5 in the appendix. The 2004 European Election Study (EES) only includes a question about general left-right self-placement. It does not contain any specific issue items which may be used for constructing an economic and non-economic dimension. However, its questions asking voters to place parties in their party system on the general left-right scale are very appropriate for testing hypothesis 3b.

¹⁰The CHES datasets, which are central to the dimensional analyses, do not cover Norway and Switzerland, while some radical right parties score below the dataset's 3% cutoff, and thus are not included. The CMP dataset tends to cover only electorally larger parties, hence a number of smaller radical right parties are not covered. See table 6 in the appendix for details.

ment variance measures voter or expert deviations from *party-specific* means. Consequently, the natural differences between party positions are removed from the analyses.

Analyses and Results

Radical Right Voters and Issue Dimensions

This section tests hypothesis 1, demonstrating that radical right voter preferences are highly dispersed on the economic dimension, compared to the preferences of major party supporters. Simultaneously, radical right voter positions are significantly more compact on the non-economic dimension, as compared to major party voters. Table 1 presents a summary of *party specific* standard deviations of radical right and major party supporters on the two dimensions. It considers each voter's deviation from *party specific* mean voters, thus removing the differences in individual party placements. This analysis utilizes the ESS 2006 survey because it provides data on both the economic and non-economic dimension and it is contemporaneous with the CHES 2006 data used later.

Table 1 about here

The statistics in table 1 suggest that radical right voters have a greater variance around their party's mean voter on economic issues. The variance ratio test shows that this variance is significantly greater than those of either the major right or major left parties. The radical right voter dispersion on the non-economic dimension is significantly smaller than that of major left parties, and almost identical to that of major right parties. Hypothesis 1 is thus supported with the caveat that radical right and major right parties have the same dispersion on non-economic issues.

The causal order between radical right voter and party positioning is

unclear. It is difficult to say whether some voters support radical right parties because of the parties' clear non-economic stances and vague economic stances, or whether radical right parties adjust their stances to fit these voter distributions. However, given these distributions of radical right supporters, there exists a political niche combining authoritarian positions on non-economic issues with a broad and dispersed economic placement, allowing the capture of wider economic constituencies. The next sections consider how radical right parties behave in light of this electoral niche.

Radical Right Parties and Issue Salience

Testing hypothesis 2, this section suggests that rather than contesting the entrenched issues of political competition, radical right parties highlight nationalism, ethnocentrism and general opposition to the political establishment. Their main issue domain thus lies not on the primary, economic, dimension, but on the secondary dimension.

Confirming hypothesis 2, figure 1 compares the salience that radical right parties place on economic and non-economic issues with major right and major left parties. Major parties devote about 30% of their manifestos to economic, as well as to non-economic, issues. They tend to slightly overemphasize economic issues, which is logical given the central role the economy plays in mainstream political discourse and public policy. Radical right parties, on the contrary, overemphasize non-economic issues by devoting over 40% of their manifestos to them on average. Economic issues are instead neglected, with only some 22% of manifesto space. The most striking is the relative difference: radical right parties devote almost twice as much of their manifestos to non-economic, rather than economic, issues.

Figure 1 about here

A similar picture emerges when considering the long-term trend of economic

and non-economic issue salience of these three party types (figure 2). Both major left and major right parties balance their attention between economic and non-economic issues over the post-war period. Radical right parties, on the other hand, place more or less constant emphasis on economic issues, while devoting increasingly more of their manifestos to non-economic issues over time.

Figure 2 about here

Economic Position Blurring

Radical right parties project themselves as parties contesting predominantly non-economic issues. For strategic reasons, they muddy their economic outlooks and shy away from discussing economic policies explicitly and at length, which allows them to attract a broader coalition of voters. This economic position blurring is not only picked up by voters, who tend to evaluate the radical right on the basis of their non-economic issue preferences, but also by party experts.

This section tests hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c. It first considers the assessment of radical right placements across multiple datasets. Second, it predicts the standard deviations of voter and expert party placements by party types, demonstrating the particularity of the radical right. Finally, it addresses the fluctuations of radical right party placements over time.

Figures 3 and 4 present ordinal expert placement of political parties and ordinal positioning of mean radical right voters on the economic and non-economic dimensions¹¹. Each row corresponds to a different source of infor-

¹¹Expert judgments and voter preferences are coded on different scales. When experts place political parties and voters outline their positioning on political issues, there is no certainty that they conceive of political space in comparable ways. It is thus impossible to say that distance on the voters' scale is the same as the equivalent distance on the scale used by the party experts. As a result, it is erroneous to report the placement on

mation on party placement within a given party system. Parties are arranged horizontally from left to right on the economic dimension and from social liberalism to authoritarianism on the non-economic dimension. They are lined up by major left and major right parties (lightly shaded) within each party system, while radical right parties are emphasized in bold.

The data show that *radical right economic placement seems rather erratic*. While some sources suggest that a radical right party stands on the extreme economic right, others place it *to the left* of the major left party in the given system (figure 3). This contrasts sharply with radical right positioning on the non-economic dimension of competition, where a vast majority of sources agree, and place the radical right on the authoritarian fringe (figure 4).

Figures 3 and 4 about here

The right-hand column of figures 3 and 4 provides summary measures of radical right ordinal placement, while taking the number of parties in the party system into account.¹² The standard deviation of these placements is reported at the bottom of the columns. The mean standard deviation – that is the average discrepancy between the placement measures of each radical right party – is 0.226 on the economic dimension, while it is mere 0.081 on the non-economic dimension.

This evidence, demonstrating that radical right party placement on the non-economic dimension is very consistent across data sources, but their placement on economic issues diverges extensively within each system, supports hypothesis 3a. This finding underscores the limited utility of spatial

a continuous scale. I rather opt to report the placement as ordinal level data, which compares voter positioning to other voters and expert placement relative to other expert placements.

¹²The summary measure takes the ordered position of an expert party placement or mean voter of radical right party on economic and non-economic issues, while adjusting for the number of parties in the given system. For example, if the radical right is 5th of 7 parties ordered along the economic left-right scale, it receives the score $5/7=0.714$.

conceptions when studying radical right parties. Rather than holding positions on economic issues, radical right parties try to avoid clear economic stances.

Consequently, it is important to address whether radical right placement varies significantly more than that of other parties. Table 2 presents results of OLS regression analyses predicting voter and expert standard deviations on party placement on the economic and non-economic dimensions¹³. The standard deviations are explained by party family: major right, major left, radical right and radical left¹⁴. In addition, the models control for general party characteristics: distance from the center of the left-right dimension; government participation and vote share. Government participation is interacted with the radical right dummy variable in order to assess hypothesis 5.

Table 2 about here

The results in table 2 support hypothesis 3b suggesting that radical right parties blur their economic positions. In the first three models concerning the economic dimension, the coefficient on the radical right is positive and statistically significant, meaning that voters and experts are significantly less certain (have higher standard deviations) about radical right parties. Major parties do not have a significant effect on voter and expert (un)certainty. Interestingly, both voters and experts are *more* certain about the economic placement of radical left parties, as the radical left has a negative effect on blurring (their standard deviations are significantly smaller). On the non-economic dimension (models 4 and 5), party families do not predict the certainty of voter or expert placement at all. This suggests that there is no significant difference in the (un)certainty of voters and experts about ma-

¹³These are again party-level standard deviations, measuring either voter or expert deviations from party-specific means, thus removing the differences in individual party placements.

¹⁴See table 6 in the appendix for the list of parties in each party family.

major and radical party placements on the non-economic dimension – they are comparably certain about the placement of all of these parties.

These results reject the speculation that voters and experts simply do not know as much about the parties belonging to the radical right and left, which tend to be smaller and stand on the political extremes. The results further reject the notion that the dependent variable of expert and voter standard deviations thus merely taps the voters’/experts’ (lack of) knowledge, rather than party strategies. First, the models control for vote share and distance from the center. Second, voters and experts are more certain about radical left placement, while exhibiting significant doubts about the radical right on the economic dimension. This discrepancy cannot be simply attributed to voter and expert lack of knowledge of smaller, outlying parties. It is very likely that deliberate partisan strategizing – economic blurring of the radical right – is the cause.

The interaction effect in the models of table 2 provides a basis for evaluating hypothesis 5, which expects radical right parties to decrease their economic blurring when in government. The partial slope associated with the effect of government for radical right parties shows significant effect in the expected direction only in model 1. This supports hypothesis 5 by showing that voters are significantly more certain of radical right party placement on economic issues when these have been in government. However, since the finding is not reproduced in other models, the test of hypothesis 5 is inconclusive. A more refined time-series assessment of radical right strategies when in government, which is beyond the scope of this article, is likely to provide a clearer answer.

The final test of radical right economic blurring, evaluating hypothesis 3c, assesses radical right party ideological stability on this dimension over time. Given the hypothesized vagueness of radical right economic placements, we should expect significantly greater positional shifts on the economic dimension on the part of radical right parties than on the part of major parties.

These shifts should not be interpreted as true movement of the radical right's positions, but rather as a reflection of the uncertainty of their positions.

Table 3 summarizes the mean positional change of radical right and major parties over three time periods measured by the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys – 1999, 2002 and 2006. The table provides statistical tests of differences in average position change of individual parties over this time period. Supporting hypothesis 3c, it demonstrates that radical right parties appear to change their positions on economic issues significantly more than major parties. On non-economic issues, radical right parties are viewed as not significantly different from major parties.

Table 3 about here

Thus, the evidence so far suggests that radical right parties employ deliberate dimensional strategies. They compete on non-economic issues, while blurring their stances on economic issues. These parties emphasize non-economic issues over economic ones in their manifestos. Both voters and experts are significantly uncertain about radical right economic placement, while they are more certain about the placements of other parties. Finally, radical right parties exhibit seeming instability in their economic placements over time. All of this suggests that radical right parties purposefully obscure their economic placements. The next section considers the electoral consequences of this strategy.

Why Support the Radical Right?

Since radical right parties tend to mostly consider non-economic issues, voters should support radical right parties when they agree with them on non-economic issues, as per hypothesis 4. Economic issues should play a limited role in voters' calculus over casting a vote for the radical right.

Figure 5 reports results of a Multinomial Logit Model predicting vote

choice for radical right parties using the 2006 European Social Survey. The model predicts party vote choice by positioning on the economic and social dimensions, while controlling for voters' gender, age, education and income¹⁵. Although this analysis presents combined data across party systems, looking at individual parties produces substantively identical results. Substantively identical results can be also obtained using other datasets¹⁶. The figure presents the predicted probabilities of voting for radical right parties, given a voter's positioning on the economic dimension¹⁷, while other predictors are held at their mean.

The graphs support hypothesis 4 by showing that voters of radical right parties cast their votes on the basis of non-economic issue considerations. Radical right parties attract voters who stand at or near the authoritarian extreme of the non-economic dimension. Conversely, voters do not tend to place similar emphasis on economic concerns when voting for the radical right. Although statistically significant, positioning on the economic dimension does not substantively affect the probability of voting for the radical right. The predicted probabilities stemming from the economic dimension are very low, and the economic left-right curve is almost flat. In comparison, mainstream parties attract voters on both dimensions.

¹⁵The details of the model are presented in table 4. The core assumption of Multinomial Logit – the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) – holds when tested with the Small-Hsiao test. In any case, the alternative model – Multinomial Probit – is considered problematic, although not requiring the IIA assumption. It is computationally complex and with a larger number of choice categories becomes intractable. Furthermore, recent methodological literature suggests that the estimates of Multinomial Probit are almost always less accurate than those of Multinomial Logit (Kropko 2008).

¹⁶For details, please contact the author.

¹⁷The economic axis is based on standardized scores of variable `gincdif` in ESS 2006, concerning voter propensity to redistribute income, which is the only question tapping explicitly economic preferences. The non-economic axis is based on standardized factor scores derived from principal factor analysis of the non-economic items of ESS 2006, listed in table 5 of the appendix. Given the standardized scores, the axes run from roughly -2.5 to +2.5.

Figure 5 about here

The radical right's strategies of deliberately understating economic issues and blurring its stances on them shape its electoral fortunes. Since voters do not support the radical right on the basis of economic preferences, radical right parties are able to attract a broader electoral coalition, spanning from unemployed industrial workers to some white collar workers and the self-employed. Multidimensional party competition, with its strategies of issue emphasis and position blurring, permits the amalgamation of voters united by some preferences, but divided by others, with significant electoral consequences.

Conclusion

This article explores the puzzle of radical right party positioning. Using party manifesto data, expert data on party placement, and data on voter preferences, it argues that radical right parties contest the structure of political competition. Due to their investment in various issues, they employ diverse strategies in different dimensions. Consequently, radical right parties emphasize and take clear ideological stances on the authoritarian fringe of the non-economic dimension, while deliberately avoiding precise economic placement.

This article presents a dimensional approach to political competition, which sees politics as competition *over the issue composition* of political space. Parties compete for voters by seeking to shift the basis of political competition. To sidestep major parties, non-entrenched parties like the radical right are inclined to explore previously neglected issues, such as nationalism and anti-immigration – a strategy facilitated by their hierarchical organizational structure.

This dimensional competition makes viable the partisan strategy of position blurring. While position blurring has been analyzed as *costly* in unidi-

mensional competition, it is a potentially rewarding strategy in multidimensional contests. While competing on the non-economic dimension, radical right parties keep a consciously opaque profile on economic issues. Through this position blurring they remove or misrepresent their spatial distances from voters, and attract a broader coalition of economic interests.

Radical right parties benefit directly from their strategy of economic position blurring. Voters respond to partisan signals and vote for radical right parties on the basis of their non-economic issue interests, rather than economic preferences. This benefits the radical right by securing electoral support of socially authoritarian voters, without deterring voters on the basis of economic issue preferences. Blurring ideological positions is thus a rational strategy on the part of the European radical right.

The dimensional approach to political competition presented in this article is consistent with the spatial paradigm in that it considers party and voter placement in n-dimensional space. It is, however, inconsistent with spatial theory, which sees party competition as *position-taking*, without considering the relative stakes that parties may have in different issue dimensions. It is the argument of this article that these stakes determine partisan strategic calculations, potentially leading them to avoid taking positional stances. The academic debate over radical right placement on economic issues should consequently consider the limits of spatial theory, and acknowledge the possibility that parties may compete by deliberate position blurring.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Variance Ratio Tests of Voter Positions

	Economic Dimension		Non-economic Dimension	
	N	Standard deviation	N	Standard deviation
Major Right	3612	0.967	3382	0.870
Radical Right	522	1.093	466	0.871
Variance Ratio Test	F(3611, 521)=0.783, p<0.000		F (3381, 465)=0.999, p<0.511	
Major Left	2942	0.880	2706	0.952
Radical Right	522	1.093	466	0.871
Variance Ratio Test	F(2941, 521)=0.655, p<0.000		F (2705, 465)=1.196, p<0.007	

Variance ratio test of voter placement. Measures voter deviations from party specific mean voters over radical right and major parties. European Social Survey 2006.




Figure 1: Issue Salience by Party Type
 Comparative Manifesto Data. Average salience by party type for years 2000 and up.




Figure 2: Issue Salience in the Post-War Period
Comparative Manifesto Data.

AUSTRIA		Econ Left										Econ Right		FPO	BZO
Voters	WVS 1999	KPO	SPO		Grüne	FPO			OVP	LIF				0.67	.
	ESS 2006	KPO	SPO	Grüne	LIF	FPO	BZO	OVP						0.71	0.86
Experts	CHES 1999	Grüne	SPO					OVP	FPO	LIF				0.80	.
	CHES 2006	Grüne	SPO		FPO	BZO		OVP	LIF					0.50	0.67
													0.13	0.13	
BELGIUM Flanders		Econ Left										Econ Right		VB	
Voters	WVS 1999		SP	Agalev	ID	CVP	VB	VLD						0.83	
	ESS 2006	Agalev/Groer	SP.A	VB	CD&V	N-VA		VLD						0.50	
Experts	CHES 1999	Agalev	SP		VU-ID21	CVP		VLD	VB					1.00	
	CHES 2006	Agalev/Groer	SPA		CD&V	NVA	VB	VLD						0.83	
													0.21		
BELGIUM Francophone		Econ Left										Econ Right		FN	
Voters	WVS 1999	FN	ECOLO	PS	PSC			PRL-FD						0.20	
	ESS 2006	FN		PS	ECOLO			MR						0.25	
Experts	CHES 1999		ECOLO	PS	PSC			PRL-FD	FN					1.00	
	CHES 2006			PS	ECOLO	CDH		MR						.	
													0.45		
DENMARK		Econ Left										Econ Right		FP	DF
Voters	WVS 1999	EL	SF	SD	FP	KRF	CD	RV	KP	V	DF			0.40	1.00
	ESS 2006	EL	SF	FP	SD	RV	DF	CD		V	KF			0.30	0.70
	ISSP 2006	EL	SF	SD	RV	DF	KRF	New Alliance	V	KP				.	0.56
Experts	CHES 1999	EL	SF	SD	CD	RV	KRF	DF	KF	V	FP			1.00	0.70
	CHES 2006	EL	SF	SD			DF		V	KF	RV			0.57	
													0.38	0.18	
FINLAND		Econ Left										Econ Right		True Finns	
Voters	WVS 1999	VAS		SDP	True Finns	VIHR	KD	KESK	RKP	KOK				0.38	
	ESS 2006	VAS	KD	SDP				KESK	VIHR	RKP	True Fin	KOK		0.88	
	ISSP 2006	VAS	VIHR	SDP	RKP	KD	True Fin	KESK	KOK					0.75	
Experts	CHES 1999	VAS		SDP	VIHR			KESK	True Fin	RKP	KOK			0.71	
	CHES 2006	VAS		SDP	VIHR	True Fin	KD	KESK	RKP	KOK				0.50	
													0.20		
FRANCE		Econ Left										Econ Right		FN	MPF
Voters	WVS 1999	PCF	VERTS	FN	PS		UDF		RPR	DL				0.43	.
	ESS 2006	PCF			PS	VERTS	MPF	UDF	FN	UMP				0.86	0.57
	ISSP 2006	PCF			PS	VERTS		UDF	RPR	FN				1.00	.
Experts	CHES 1999	PCF			PS	VERTS		UDF	RPR	RPF	DL	FN		1.00	.
	CHES 2006	PCF			PS	VERTS		UDF	FN	UMP	MPF			0.71	1.00
													0.24	0.30	
GREECE		Econ Left										Econ Right		LAOS	
Experts	CHES 2006	KKE		DIKKI		SYRIZA	PASOK	LAOS	ND					0.83	
GERMANY		Econ Left										Econ Right		REP	NPD
Voters	WVS 1999	PDS		REP	SPD		CDU-CSU	Gruenen	FDP					0.33	
	ESS 2006	PDS	REP	NPD-DVU	SPD	Gruenen	CDU-CSU	FDP						0.29	0.43
	ISSP 2006	PDS			SPD	Gruenen	CDU-CSU	NPD	REP	FDP				0.86	0.71
Experts	CHES 1999	PDS		Gruenen	SPD		CDU-CSU	DVU	REP	FDP				0.86	0.71
	CHES 2006	PDS			SPD	Gruenen	CDU-CSU	FDP						.	
													0.32	0.16	
ITALY		Econ Left										Econ Right		LN	AN
Voters	WVS 1999	RC	PDS	CDU	PSDI	PPI	FdV	CCD	LN	AN	FI			0.80	0.90
	CHES 1999	RC	PDS	FdV	PPI	PSDI	AN	CDU	CCD		FI	LN		0.60	1.00
Experts	CHES 2006	RC	DS	FdV	SDI	DL	IdV	UDC	AN		FI	LN		1.00	0.80
													0.20	0.10	
NETHERLANDS		Econ Left										Econ Right		LPF	PVV
Voters	ISSP 2006	SP	LPF(Fort)	PvdA	Groen	CDA	CU	PVV(Wild)	D66	VD				0.22	0.78
	Experts	CHES 2006	SP	Groen	PvdA		CU	D66	CDA		VD	PVV		.	1.00
													0.16		

Figure 3: Economic Positioning of Radical Right Parties
 Extreme right parties are in bold. Anchored by mainstream left- and right-wing parties.
 Please see appendix on details regarding the construction of dimensions.

AUSTRIA												Auth		FPO	BZO		
Voters	WVS 1999	Lib		KPO	G	LIF	SPO	FPO	OVP						0.83		
	ESS 2006					Grüne	SPO	LIF	OVP	KPO	BZO	FPO			1.00	0.86	
Experts	CHES 1999			LF	GA		SPO		OVP	FPO				1.00			
	CHES 2006			Grüne	LIF		SPO		OVP	BZO	FPO			1.00	0.83		
														0.08	0.02		
BELGIUM Flanders												Auth		VB			
Voters	WVS 1999	Lib		Agalev	SP	ID	VLD	PSC	VB	CVP					0.86		
	ESS 2006				Agalev/Gro	N-VA	VLD	SP.A	CD&V	VB				1.00			
Experts	CHES 1999			Agalev	VU-ID21	SP	VLD	CVP	VB					1.00			
	CHES 2006				Groen	SPA	VLD	CD&V	NVA	VB				1.00			
														0.07			
BELGIUM Francophone												Auth		FN			
Voters	WVS 1999	Lib		ECOLO	PS		PRL-FD	PSC		FN					1.00		
	ESS 2006			ECOLO	CDH		MR	PS		FN				1.00			
Experts	CHES 1999			ECOLO	PS		PRL-FD	PSC		FN				1.00			
	CHES 2006			ECOLO	PS		MR	CDH									
														0.00			
DENMARK												Auth		FP	DF		
Voters	WVS 1999	Lib		EL	RV	SF	KF	SD	CD	V	DF	FP	KRF		0.90	0.80	
	ESS 2006			EL	RV	SF	CD	SD		V	KF	Kristend	DF	FP	1.00	0.90	
Experts	CHES 1999			EL	SF	RV	SD	KRF	V	KF	CD	FP	DF	0.90	1.00		
	CHES 2006			EL	RV	SF	SD		V	KF		DF			1.00		
														0.06	0.10		
FINLAND												Auth		True Finns			
Voters	WVS 1999	Lib		VIHR	VAS	RKP	KOK	SDP			KESK	KD	True Finns		1.00		
	ESS 2006			VIHR	VAS	RKP	KOK	SDP	KD		KESK	True Finns			1.00		
Experts	CHES 1999			VIHR	VAS			SDP	RKP/SFP	KOK	KESK	True Finns		1.00			
	CHES 2006			VIHR	VAS	RKP/SFP		SDP	KOK		KESK	True Finns	KD		0.88		
														0.06			
FRANCE												Auth		FN	MPF		
Voters	WVS 1999	Lib		VERTS	PCF	PS	DL	UDF		RPR	FN			1.00			
	ESS 2006			VERTS		PS	PCF	UDF	MPF	UMP	FN			1.00	0.71		
Experts	CHES 1999			VERTS		PS	UDF	PCF	DL	RPR	RPF	FN		1.00			
	CHES 2006			VERTS		PS	PCF	UDF		UMP	MPF	FN		1.00	0.86		
														0.00	0.10		
GERMANY												Auth		REP	NPD-DVU		
Voters	WVS 1999	Lib			Gruenen	PDS	SPD	FDP			CDU-CSU	REP		1.00			
	ESS 2006				Gruenen		SPD	Linke	FDP	CDU-CSU	NPD/DVU	REP		1.00	0.86		
Experts	CHES 1999			Gruenen	FDP	PDS	SPD			CDU-CSU	REP	DVU		0.86	1.00		
	CHES 2006			Gruenen	Linke	FDP	SPD			CDU-CSU							
														0.08	0.10		
GREECE												Auth		LAOS			
Experts	CHES 2006	Lib		SYRIZA	PASOK	KKE		ND		DIKKI		LAOS		1.00			
ITALY												Auth		LN	AN		
Voters	WVS 1999	Lib		FdV	RC	PDS		PSDI	CDU	AN		FI	LN	PPI	CCD	0.80	0.60
	CHES 1999				FdV	PDS	RC	PSDI	UD	LN	PPI	FI	CCD	CDU	AN	0.60	1.00
Experts	CHES 1999			FdV	RC	SDI	DS		DL	IdV		FI	UDC	LN	AN	0.90	1.00
	CHES 2006																
														0.15	0.23		
NETHERLANDS												Auth		PVV			
Experts	CHES 2006	Lib		GL	D66	PvdA	VVD	SP		PVV	CDA	CU		0.75			

Figure 4: Non-Economic Positioning of Radical Right Parties
Extreme right parties are in bold. Anchored by mainstream left- and right-wing parties.
Please see appendix on details regarding the construction of dimensions.

Table 2: Predicting Voter and Expert Placement Standard Deviations

	Economic Dimension			Non-economic Dimension	
	(1) Voter Placement SD (EES)	(2) Voter SD (ESS)	(3) Expert SD (CHES)	(4) Voter SD (ESS)	(5) Expert SD (CHES)
Radical Right	0.757*** (0.196)	0.168*** (0.060)	0.669*** (0.185)	0.043 (0.071)	0.165 (0.292)
Major Left	-0.052 (0.204)	-0.007 (0.061)	-0.048 (0.193)	0.097 (0.072)	-0.288 (0.305)
Major Right	-0.030 (0.200)	0.069 (0.054)	-0.037 (0.176)	0.030 (0.064)	-0.019 (0.277)
Radical Left	-0.414*** (0.152)	-0.110** (0.050)	-0.337** (0.153)	0.048 (0.059)	0.129 (0.241)
Gov't Participation * Radical Right <i>Partial slope</i>	-0.012*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.005)
Gov't Participation * Non-Radical Right <i>Partial slope</i>	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.001)
Distance from Center	0.105** (0.050)	0.015 (0.017)	-0.050 (0.051)	-0.010 (0.021)	0.064 (0.080)
Vote %	0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.006)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.009)
Constant	1.840*** (0.119)	0.914*** (0.044)	1.302*** (0.121)	0.887*** (0.052)	1.111*** (0.191)
N	82	77	98	77	98
R ²	0.373	0.336	0.378	0.066	0.061

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

OLS Regression. The dependent variables are party level standard deviations – they measure either voter or expert deviations from party-specific means. Voter placement of parties on the general left-right scale measured in the European Election Surveys 2004. Voter positions on economic and non-economic dimension measured in the European Social Survey 2006. Expert placement on economic left-right scale and social liberalism and authoritarianism measured in the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Partial slopes calculated using Stata's `xi3` command written by Michael Mitchell and Phil Ender.

Table 3: Party Position Change Over Time

	Economic Dimension		Non-Economic Dimension	
	N	Mean Position Δ	N	Mean Position Δ
Major Right	24	0.568	24	0.604
Radical Right	12	1.200	12	0.811
Means Difference Test		T=2.750, p<0.015		T=0.935, p<0.362
Major Left	22	0.516	22	0.514
Radical Right	12	1.200	12	0.811
Means Difference Test		T=2.953, p<0.010		T=1.437, p<0.172

Mean absolute change of party positions between 1999, 2002, 2006.

Means difference tests assume unequal variances. Chapel Hill Expert Survey.




Figure 5: Vote Choice for Different Party Types
 Predicted probabilities for economic and non-economic positions while other variables held at their means.
 Based on MNL model presented in table 3. 2006 European Social Survey.
 Estimated using Stata 11.1 `prgen` command.

Appendix

Table 4: Multinomial Logit Predicting Vote Choice

	Major Right	Radical Right
Left-Right Position	1.66*** (0.08)	1.48*** (0.15)
Social Position	0.15** (0.06)	0.85*** (0.11)
Gender	0.03 (0.09)	-0.34** (0.17)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Education	0.09** (0.03)	-0.37*** (0.08)
Income	0.07*** (0.02)	0.09** (0.04)
Constant	-0.96*** (0.28)	-0.22 (0.52)
Pseudo R^2	0.25	
Log-pseudolikelihood	-3521.34	
Baseline	Major Left	
Observations	5309	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Results for MNL model predicting vote choice for Major Right, Major Left and Radical Right. Estimated using Stata 11.1. Small-Hsiao test supports the presence of IIA. Data: 2006 European Social Survey.

Table 5: Dimensional Structure of Voter Positioning

Economic Dimension	Non-Economic Dimension
WVS	
Private ownership of business increased/decreased	Religious leaders should not influence vote
People/government should take more responsibility	Employers give priority to locals v. immigrants
Competition is good/harmful	Strictness of immigration policy
State gives freedom to firms/State controls firms	Justifiability of homosexuality
	Justifiability of abortion
ESS	
Government should reduce differences in income levels	Gays and lesbians free to live as they wish
	Ban parties that wish to overthrow democracy
	European unification go further/gone too far
	Allow immigrants of same race
	Allow immigrants of different race
	Allow immigrants from poorer countries
	Immigration bad/good for country's economy
	Cultural undermined/enriched by immigrants
	Immigrants make country worse/better to live
	How often do you attend religious services
ISSP	
Cuts in gov't spending	
Finance projects to create new jobs	
Less gov't regulation of business	
Support industry to develop technologies	
Support declining industries to protect jobs	
Reduce working week to create jobs	
Gov't should spend money on environment	
Gov't should spend money on healthcare	
Gov't should spend money on education	
Gov't should spend money on retirement	
Gov't should spend money on unemployment	
Gov't responsibility to provide job for everyone	
Gov't responsibility to control prices	
Gov't responsibility to for healthcare	
Gov't responsibility for standard of living for old	
Gov't responsibility to help industry grow	
Gov't responsibility for living standard for unemployed	
Gov't responsibility to reduce income differences	
Gov't responsibility for financial help for students	
Gov't responsibility to provide decent housing	
Gov't responsibility to protect the environment	
Comparative Manifesto Data	
Free enterprise (positive)	Military (negative)
Incentives (positive)	Freedom and human rights (positive)
Economic orthodoxy (positive)	Democracy (positive)
Welfare state limitation (positive)	Environmental protection (positive)
Education limitation (positive)	Social justice (positive)
Labour groups (negative)	National way of life (negative)
Market regulation (positive)	Traditional morality (negative)
Economic planning (positive)	Multiculturalism (positive)
Corporatism (positive)	Underprivileged groups (positive)
Keynesian demand management (positive)	Military (positive)
Controlled economy (positive)	Political authority (positive)
Nationalisation (positive)	National way of life (positive)
Welfare state expansion (positive)	Traditional morality (positive)
Education expansion (positive)	Law and order (positive)
Labour groups (positive)	Multiculturalism (negative)

Table 6: Party Types

Country	Party Name	Abbreviation
Major Right		
Austria	Osterreichische Volkspartei	OVP
Belgium	Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams	CD&V
Belgium	Centre Democratie Humaniste	CDH
Belgium	Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten	VLD
Britain	Conservative Party	Cons
Denmark	Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti	V
Finland	Suomen Keskusta	KESK
Finland	Kansallinen Kokoomus	KOK
France	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	UMP
Germany	Christlich-Demokratische Union	CDU
Greece	Nea Dimokratia	ND
Ireland	Fianna Fail	FF
Ireland	Fine Gael	FG
Italy	Forza Italia	FI
Netherlands	Christen-Democratisch Appel	CDA
Portugal	Partido Popular Democratico/Partido Social Democrata	PPD/PSD
Spain	Partido Popular	PP
Sweden	Moderaterna	M
Major Left		
Austria	Sozialdemokratische Partei Osterreichs	SPO
Belgium	Parti Socialiste	PS
Belgium	Socialistische Partij Anders - Spirit	SPA
Britain	Labour Party	Lab
Denmark	Socialdemokraterne	SD
Finland	Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen	SDP
France	Parti Socialiste	PS
Germany	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	SPD
Greece	Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima	PASOK
Ireland	Labour	Lab
Italy	Democratici di Sinistra	DS
Netherlands	Partij van de Arbeid	PvdA
Portugal	Partido Socialista	PS
Spain	Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol	PSOE
Sweden	Arbetarpartiet - Socialdemokraterna	SAP
Radical Right		
Austria	Bundnis Zukunft Osterreich	BZO**
Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs	FPO
Belgium	Vlaams Belang	VB
Belgium	Front National	FN***
Denmark	Fremskridtspartiet	FP*
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti	DF
Finland	Persussuomalaiset	True Finns

Table 6: Party Types

Country	Party Name	Abbreviation
France	Front National	FN
France	Mouvement Pour la France	MPF **
Germany	Republikaner	REP***
Germany	Nationaldemokratische Partei	NPD***
Germany	Deutsche Volksunion	DVU***
Greece	Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos	LAOS**
Italy	Alleanza Nazionale	AN
Italy	Lega Nord	LN
Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn	LPF*
Netherlands	Partij voor de Vrijheid	PVV**
Radical Left		
Denmark	Enhedslisten	EL**
Denmark	Socialistisk Folkeparti	SF
Finland	Vasemmistoliito	VAS
France	Parti Communiste Francais	PCF
Germany	Die Linkspartei - Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus	Linke/ PDS
Greece	Dimokratiko Kinoniko Kinima	DIKKI**
Greece	Kommunistiko Komma Elladas	KKE
Greece	Synaspismos tis Rizospastikis Aristeras	SYRIZA
Italy	Partito dei Comunisti Italiani	PdCI
Italy	Rifondazione Comunista	RC
Netherlands	Socialistische Partij	SP
Portugal	Bloco de Esquerda	BE
Portugal	Coligacao Democratica Unitaria	CDU
Spain	Izquierda Unida	IU
Sweden	Vaensterpartiet	V

* Missing in CHES, ** Missing in CMP, *** Missing in CHES and CMP