transparent gif


Ej inloggad.

Göteborgs universitets publikationer

Metaethical Relativism: Against the Single Analysis Assumption

Författare och institution:
Ragnar Francén (Filosofiska institutionen)
Utgiven i serie vid Göteborgs universitet:
Acta philosophica Gothoburgensia/Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, ISSN 0283-2380; nr 24
Antal sidor:
Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis
Datum för examination:
Lilla Hörsalen, Humanisten
Prof. James Dreier, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, USA
Sammanfattning (abstract):
This dissertation investigates the plausibility of metaethical relativism, or more specifically, what I call “moral truth-value relativism”: the idea that the truth of a moral statement or belief depends on who utters or has it, or who assesses it. According to the most prevalent variants of this view in philosophical literature – “standard relativism” – the truth-values are relative to people’s moralities, often understood as some subset of their affective or desire- like attitudes. Standard relativism has two main contenders: absolutism – the view that the truth-values of moral statements and beliefs do not vary in that way – and non-cognitivism – the view that moral judgements do not have truth-values, since they express affective or desire-like attitudes rather than beliefs. Almost the entire dissertation concerns the plausibility of standard relativism in contrast to absolutism. Part 1 examines first the two main arguments for standard relativism: that it accounts for the connection between moral judgements and motivation (chapter 2), and for the prevalence of diversity of moral opinion (chapter 3). Then the most common objection is considered: that it is inconsistent with the existence of genuine moral disagreements (chapter 4). I argue that these arguments are inconclusive. Both relativism and absolutism can account for the features discussed. Part 2 focuses on the fact that different people have different strongly held intuitions about the relative or absolute nature of morality. I argue that given a common methodological approach in philosophy and metaethics, which takes such intuitions as evidence of correct analyses, this difference in intuitions suggests that neither a relativist nor absolutist analysis can be correct for everyone’s moral judgements. I argue that this result holds both given semantic internalism (chapter 6) and given semantic externalism (chapter 7). To get one single analysis of everyone’s moral judgements we would have to abandon the intuition- based methodology. In chapter 8, however, I argue that we can maintain this methodology if we accept analysis pluralism, the view that different analyses hold for different people’s moral judgements.
Ämne (baseras på Högskoleverkets indelning av forskningsämnen):
Filosofi, etik och religion ->
Filosofi ->
Praktisk filosofi
Filosofi, etik och religion ->
Filosofi ->
Teoretisk filosofi
moral relativism, metaethical relativism, speaker relativism, appraiser
Postens nummer:
Posten skapad:
2008-05-19 11:21

Visa i Endnote-format

Göteborgs universitet • Tel. 031-786 0000
© Göteborgs universitet 2007