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Göteborgs universitets publikationer

Divisibility and the Moral Status of Embryos

Författare och institution:
Christian Munthe (Filosofiska institutionen)
Publicerad i:
Bioethics, 15 ( 5/6 ) s. 382-397
Artikel, refereegranskad vetenskaplig
Fulltextlänk (lokalt arkiv):
Sammanfattning (abstract):
The phenomenon of twinning in early fetal development has become a popular source for doubt regarding the ascription of moral status to early embryos. In this paper, the possible moral basis for such a line of reasoning is critically analysed with sceptical results. Three different versions of the argument from twinning are considered, all of which are found to rest on confusions between the actual division of embryos involed in twinning and the property of early embryos to be divisible, be based on highly questionable ethical assumptions, or to imply inconsistent claims regarding the moral importance of potentiality and/or the moral status of embryos. This is taken to expose a number of related inconsistencies in the moral basis of pro-life positions. In particular, ascribing moral significance to the property of being (in)divisible is found to be incompatible with the claim that human individuals possess unique values which could underpin an absolute moral ban on murder.
Ämne (baseras på Högskoleverkets indelning av forskningsämnen):
Hälsovetenskaper ->
Hälso- och sjukvårdsorganisation, hälsopolitik och hälsoekonomi
Annan samhällsvetenskap ->
Övrig annan samhällsvetenskap ->
Teknik och social förändring
Filosofi, etik och religion ->
Filosofi ->
Praktisk filosofi
ethics, embryos, moral status of the fetus, twinning, moral status of the embryo
Postens nummer:
Posten skapad:
2007-05-22 10:03

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