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Göteborgs universitets publikationer

Regulation via the Polluter-pays Principle

Författare och institution:
Stefan Ambec (Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik, Enheten för miljöekonomi); L. Ehlers (-)
Publicerad i:
Economic Journal, 126 ( 593 ) s. 884-906
ISSN:
0013-0133
Publikationstyp:
Artikel, refereegranskad vetenskaplig
Publiceringsår:
2016
Språk:
engelska
Fulltextlänk:
Sammanfattning (abstract):
We consider the problem of regulating an economy with environmental pollution. We examine the distributional impact of the polluter-pays (PP) principle which requires that any agent compensates all other agents for the damages caused by his or her (pollution) emissions. With constant marginal damages we show that regulation via the PP principle leads to the unique welfare distribution that induces non-negative individual welfare change and renders each agent responsible for his or her pollution impact. We extend both the PP principle and this result to increasing marginal damages due to pollution. We also compare the PP principle with the Vickrey-Clark-Groves scheme.
Ämne (baseras på Högskoleverkets indelning av forskningsämnen):
SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP ->
Ekonomi och näringsliv
Nyckelord:
allocation, externalities, mechanism, river, Business & Economics
Postens nummer:
239487
Posten skapad:
2016-07-26 11:39

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