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Göteborgs universitets publikationer

Unions in a frictional labor market

Författare och institution:
Per Krusell (Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik); Leena Rudanko (-)
Publicerad i:
Journal of Monetary Economics, 80 s. 35-50
ISSN:
0304-3932
Publikationstyp:
Artikel, refereegranskad vetenskaplig
Publiceringsår:
2016
Språk:
engelska
Fulltextlänk:
Sammanfattning (abstract):
A labor market with search and matching frictions, where wage setting is controlled by a monopoly union that follows a norm of wage solidarity, is found vulnerable to substantial distortions associated with holdup. With full commitment to future wages, the union achieves efficient hiring in the long run, but hikes up wages in the short run to appropriate rents from firms. Without commitment, in a Markov-perfect equilibrium, hiring is too low both in the short and the long run. The quantitative impact is demonstrated in an extended model with partial union coverage and multiperiod union contracting.
Ämne (baseras på Högskoleverkets indelning av forskningsämnen):
SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP ->
Ekonomi och näringsliv ->
Nationalekonomi
Nyckelord:
Labor unions; Frictional labor markets; Time inconsistency; Limited commitment; Long-term wage contracts
Postens nummer:
238458
Posten skapad:
2016-06-28 10:49
Posten ändrad:
2016-07-04 08:59

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