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Göteborgs universitets publikationer

Preferences over Punishment and Reward Mechanisms in Social Dilemmas

Författare och institution:
Martin G. Kocher (Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik); D. Matzat (-)
Publicerad i:
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 172 ( 1 ) s. 163-194
ISSN:
0932-4569
Publikationstyp:
Artikel, refereegranskad vetenskaplig
Publiceringsår:
2016
Språk:
engelska
Fulltextlänk:
Sammanfattning (abstract):
The existing results from literature on preferences over sanctions in social dilemmas are inconclusive. Our experimental setup allows us to study both preferences over punishment and reward mechanisms and preferences over their levels of effectiveness. We show that the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) with reward is the most favored and the most efficient institution, although the VCM with punishment leads to higher contributions. Subjects prefer extreme values of the sanctioning technologies, and contributions increase in the level of effectiveness. There is no difference in the voting pattern between a partner- and a stranger-matching treatment. (JEL: C72, C91, C92)
Ämne (baseras på Högskoleverkets indelning av forskningsämnen):
SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP ->
Ekonomi och näringsliv
Nyckelord:
public-goods experiments, voluntary contribution experiments, altruistic, punishment, good games, free-ride, cooperation, sanctions, orientations, institutions, provision
Postens nummer:
236877
Posten skapad:
2016-05-24 17:08

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