transparent gif

 

Ej inloggad.

Göteborgs universitets publikationer

Can electors combat corruption? Institutional arrangements and citizen behaviour.

Författare och institution:
Stefan Dahlberg (Statsvetenskapliga institutionen & Quality of Government Institute (QoG)); Georgios Xezonakis (Statsvetenskapliga institutionen & Quality of Government Institute (QoG)); S Kosmidis (-)
Publicerad i:
European Journal of Political Research, 55 ( 1 ) s. 160-176
ISSN:
0304-4130
Publikationstyp:
Artikel, refereegranskad vetenskaplig
Publiceringsår:
2016
Språk:
engelska
Fulltextlänk:
Sammanfattning (abstract):
Studies interested in the cross-national levels of corruption have concluded that specific institutional characteristics drive the aggregate variation. In countries with high institutional clarity and plurality electoral systems, corruption tends to be lower since increased voter monitoring and clarity of responsibility incentivise politicians to deliver virtuous policies. However, the underlying accountability mechanism has never been tested at the individual level. It is still unclear whether (1) voters do place voting weights on corruption, and (2) whether these weights vary in response to aggregate institutional characteristics. In this article, survey data from 23 democracies is used to put the accountability micro-mechanism to this test. While there is some evidence that voters do vote on the basis of corruption, the moderating effect of institutional characteristics is not as strong as previously thought.
Ämne (baseras på Högskoleverkets indelning av forskningsämnen):
SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP ->
Statsvetenskap ->
Statsvetenskap (exklusive studier av offentlig förvaltning och globaliseringsstudier)
Nyckelord:
corruption, voting, clarity of responsibility, elections, congressional elections, political context, voting-behavior, government, systems, accountability, responsibility, constraints, attitudes, clarity, Government & Law
Postens nummer:
235083
Posten skapad:
2016-04-22 16:21
Posten ändrad:
2016-04-29 09:50

Visa i Endnote-format

Göteborgs universitet • Tel. 031-786 0000
© Göteborgs universitet 2007