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Göteborgs universitets publikationer

In Defence of the Four-Case Argument

Författare och institution:
Benjamin Matheson (Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori)
Publicerad i:
Philosophical Studies, 173 ( 7 ) s. 1963–1982
ISSN:
0031-8116
Publikationstyp:
Artikel, refereegranskad vetenskaplig
Publiceringsår:
2016
Språk:
engelska
Fulltextlänk:
Sammanfattning (abstract):
Pereboom’s (Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001) Four-Case Argument was once considered to be the most powerful of the manipulation arguments against compatibilism. However, because of Demetriou’s (Australas J Philos 88(4):595–617, 2010) response, Pereboom (Free will, agency, and meaning in life, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) has significantly weakened his argument. Manipulation arguments in general have also been challenged by King (Ethics 124(1): 65–83, 2013). In this paper, I argue that the Four-Case Argument resists both these challenges. One upshot is that Pereboom doesn’t need weaken his argument. Another is that compatibilists still need a response the Four-Case Argument. And another is that we get a much better understanding of the Four-Case Argument, and of manipulation arguments more generally, than is currently available in the literature.
Ämne (baseras på Högskoleverkets indelning av forskningsämnen):
HUMANIORA ->
Filosofi, etik och religion ->
Filosofi
Nyckelord:
Derk Pereboom; Four-Case Argument; Manipulation; Compatibilism; Incompatibilism
Postens nummer:
224942
Posten skapad:
2015-10-27 19:41
Posten ändrad:
2016-08-09 11:43

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