transparent gif


Ej inloggad.

Göteborgs universitets publikationer

Internalists Beware – We Might All Be Amoralists!

Författare och institution:
Gunnar Björnsson (Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori)
Publicerad i:
workshop University of California, Riverside, Dpt of Philosophy 26/4 2011,
Sammanfattning (abstract):
Standard motivational internalism is the claim that by a priori, a psychological state is a moral opinion only if it is suitably related to genuinely moral motivation. Many philosophers, the authors of this paper included, have assumed that this claim is supported by intuitions about people not properly related to such motivation, intuitions suggesting that they lack moral opinions proper. In this paper we argue that this assumption was mistaken. Intuitions appealed to by defenders of internalism are consistent with the conceptual possibility that our own actual moral practice as a whole is one where moral opinions fail to motivate in the relevant way. We present a scenario of this kind, a thoroughly cynical hypothesis about human moral motivation, and argue that it is conceptually possible that it correctly describes our actual moral opinions. If correct, this refutes standard motivational internalism.
Ämne (baseras på Högskoleverkets indelning av forskningsämnen):
Filosofi, etik och religion ->
Filosofi ->
Praktisk filosofi
internalism, amoralism, moral psychology, a priori intuitions
Postens nummer:
Posten skapad:
2011-06-17 16:29

Visa i Endnote-format

Göteborgs universitet • Tel. 031-786 0000
© Göteborgs universitet 2007