transparent gif


Ej inloggad.

Göteborgs universitets publikationer

The embodied mind

Författare och institution:
Helge Malmgren (Filosofiska institutionen)
Publicerad i:
International Congress of Cognitive Psychotherapy 2005 (ICCP 2005). Gothenburg, June 13-17, 2005.,
Konferensbidrag, övrigt
Sammanfattning (abstract):
The traditional mind-body problem can be framed as the question how psychological explanations of human behaviour can be valid if the human organism is wholly subject to the laws of natural science. To exemplify the problem: if all human behaviour has a complete explanation in terms of the physico-chemical workings of the brain, how can cognitive factors be explanatory of behavioural change in a psychotherapeutic process? Two main competitors for a solution are (1) to argue that psychological explanations are not causal, and (2) some version of the two-aspects theory. The present paper first shows that a properly formulated two-aspects theory offers a theoretically consistent and practically useful integration of biological and psychological explanations in psychiatry. It might be argued that this integration is achieved at the cost of regarding psychological descriptions as secondary, indirect ways of referring to physical predicates, and psychological laws as no more than illusory reflections of physical laws. I.e., two-aspects theory acknowledges that only physical reality is real; so it is actually a reductive materialism in disguise. In order to properly evaluate this argument one must understand how our physical concepts are grounded in scientific experience and praxis. The concept of an embodied mind, in Merleau-Ponty’s sense of the lived body, is essential for such an understanding. Here the embodiment of the mind does not refer to the causal interaction between a mind and a physical body, as problematized in the classical mind-body problem, but to the way in which our experience of the world is organized through the lived body as a vehicle for perception, action and thought. From this experience emerge several ways of conceptualizing the world, two of which are the physical and psychological conceptual systems. Another one is the everyday language in which we usually describe our immediate environment. These systems just express different abstractions, and they are not inherently incompatible. No one of them is more “true to reality” than the others, and no one of them can replace the other ones in their proper context.
Ämne (baseras på Högskoleverkets indelning av forskningsämnen):
Klinisk medicin ->
Filosofi, etik och religion ->
Filosofi ->
Teoretisk filosofi
Mind-body problem, embodiment, psychotherapy, cognitive therapy, psychoanalysis
Ytterligare information:
Föredrag vid International Congress of Cognitive Psychotherapy 2005 (ICCP 2005), Göteborg 13-17 juni 2005.
Postens nummer:
Posten skapad:
2010-02-23 19:45

Visa i Endnote-format

Göteborgs universitet • Tel. 031-786 0000
© Göteborgs universitet 2007